The State Of Ga. v. Jones

Decision Date30 September 1849
Docket NumberN0. 69.
Citation7 Ga. 422
PartiesThe State of Georgia, plaintiff in error. vs. William jones, defendant in error.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

This writ of error was sued out to review a decision of Judge Wright, ordering an indictment quashed against the defendant, who was charged, in Lumpkin Superior Court, with the offence of false imprisonment. A motion was made to dismiss the writ in this Court, on the ground, that under the Act organizing this Court, a writ of error does not lie at the instance of the State to review a decision in favor of the defendant.

J. W. H. Underwood, for the motion.

C. Peeples, representing Word, Solicitor General, contra.

By the Court.— Nisbet, J., delivering the opinion.

A motion was made in the Court below to quash the indictment, which was sustained, and upon that judgment, the State-brought this writ of error. A motion is now made before us to dismiss the writ, upon the ground that the State cannot, in a crim-inal case, bring a writ of error to this Court. We sustain the motion, and the writ is dismissed. The effect of a judgment to quash, is to annul the indictment, and is founded upon such defect therein, as would make it impossible to execute judgment in the case. An order to quash is therefore a final disposition of the cause. The question here.seems to be resolvable into three inquiries.

1. Whether, upon general principles, the State is entitled to a review in any form of alleged errors in criminal eases?

2. Whether the Constitution of the United States has any bearing upon the question? and,

3. Whether the Act of our own Legislature, organizing this Court, has granted to the State the right of being heard upon a writ of error in criminal eases?

The Common Law writ of error removes nothing for examination but the question of law, upon which error is assigned. It removes no facts. That is, no new inquiry can be instituted upon it as to the facts. Vet. the corrective Court takes, is obliged to take cognizance of the facts as they appear upon the record, and pronounces the law arising upon the facts. By our own Act, the jurisdiction of this Court is limited to questions of law. Story's Com. on the Const. 3 vol. §§1756, 1759. 3 Dall. 321. 6 Wheat. 409 to 412. Act of 1845.

At Common Law, this writ is grantable ex debito justitiœ, to the subject, in all cases, except treason and felonv. 2 Salk. 504. 3 Durnf. & East, 78. 9 Price, 606. 2 Tidd, 1134. The right of new trial and to the writ of error, depend upon the same principles, as in ease of reversal upon writ.of error, a rehearing is generally awarded. The subject in England is not entitled to a new trial in cases of treason and felony, when convicted, no matter what may have been the errors of the Court or of the Jury. He is in all such cases turned over to the mercy of the Crown. 6 Burnt. & East, 638. 2 Tidd, 911. 13 East, 416, n. (b). 4 Black. Com. 362, note 33. 2 Russell on Crimes, 726. 8 Wend. 549. 2 Sumner, 19.

In this country a new trial will be granted to the prisoner, I apprehend, in all cases, when according to law, in any ease, he may be entitled to it. He is entitled to his bill of exceptions and writ of error by Statute in Georgia, as well in criminal as civil cases. 3 Dallas, 515, United States vs. Fries. 1 Bay, 372, State vs. Hopkins. 17 Mass. 513, Commonwealth vs. Rogers. Act of 1845. see. 4. 1 Leigh\'s R. 598. 1 Blackf. R, 399. But see 2 Sum. 19. The rule seems to he well settled in England, that in criminal cases a new trial is not grantable to the Crown after verdict of acquittal, even though the acquittal be founded on the misdirection of the Judge. This is the general rule, and obtains in the States of our Union. It excludes a rehearing after acquittal upon errors of law, and therefore, it would seem, denies also a rehearing upon judgments of the Court upon questions of law, even when the Jury have not passed upon the guilt or innocence of the prisoner. If the effect of the judgment is a discharge, there can be no rehearing, either by new trial or writ of error. Indeed it may be stated as a general rule, that in criminal cases, upon general principles, errors are not subject to revision at the instance of the State. 2 Hawk. Pleas of the Crown, 442. 4 Black. Com. 361, note 33, by Chitty. 2 Tidd\'s Prac. 911. 6 East, 315. 4 M. & S. 337. 1 B. & Ald. 63. 2 Chitty\'s R. 282, S. C. 1 Chitty\'s R. 352. 1 Chitty\'s Crim. Law, 658. 1 Starkie N. P. R. 516. 5 B. & Ad. 52. 2 Russ. on Crimes, 726. 6 T. R. 625. Graham on New Trials, 505, 506. 8 Wend. 549. 1 Scam. 257. 1 Murphy, 257. 5 Litt. 289. 2 Yerg. 360. 2 Virg. Cas. 202. 5 Har. & Johns. 317. 4 Hayw. 110. 2 Sumn. 19. An exception to this rule is stated to exist, when the acquital of the defendant is effected through his fraud or misconduct. 1 Chitty\'s Crim. Law, 657.

These principles are founded upon that great fundamental rule of the Common Law. Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa; which rule, for greater caution and in stricter vigilance over the rights of the citizen against the State, has been in substance embodied in the Constitution of the United States, thus: "Nor shall any person be subject for the same offence, to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." Const. U. S. art. 5, Amendments of March 4, 1789.

I do not mean to say, that if otherwise entitled to the writ of error, the State would in this case be precluded by the operation of this provision of the Constitution: for according to the most liberal construction of it, a defendant is protected from a second trial, only where, upon a good indictment, the Jury have been charged with the prisoner, and have been discharged without legal necessity—other constructions requiring that they shall be charged with the prisoner upon a sufficient indictment, and have deliveredthemselves of the charge by a verdict. I express no opinion on these points; it is not necessary that I should in this case. Under no construction of the Constitution has it any direct bearing upon this case, and to show that alone, have I referred to the constrictions as above. In this case, the Jury were not charged with the trial, and the offence is only a misdemeanor. See to these points, United States vs. Gilbret, 2 Sumn. 19. The People vs. Goodwin, 18 Johns. E. 188; and 3 Kelly, 53, where the authorities are reviewed,

It may be said, too, that the rule of the Common Law, denying to the State a new trial, contemplates cases only where there has been a verdict of acquittal, and cannot apply to errors in law committed by the Court; whereas, here, there was no verdict. We have seen that a new trial will not be given in cases where the verdict is the result of the misdirection of the Court. Errors in Law, therefore, cannot be reached by a new trial at the instance of the State. But, farther, the Common Law maxim and the Constitution are founded in the humanity of the law, and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State. It is, doubtless, in the spirit of this benign rule of the Common Law, embodied in the Federal Constitution—a spirit of liberty and justice, tempered with mercy, that, in several of the States of this Union, in criminal causes a writ of error has been denied to the State.

The trial of a citizen for a violation of the Criminal Law, is a very different thing from the trial of civil rights between two citizens. The forms of procedure, and the principles upon which they proceed, are different. When the prosecution is upon information, the prosecutor is not to be viewed in the light of a party. He has no rights to lie violated by denying the writ of error—he has no more interest in the administration of criminal justice than has every other citizen. The offence to be punished is against the people. The violation is of a public law—the object of the trial is not compensation or restitution, or the settlement of conflicting claims to property, but punishment if there is guilt. The punishment inures to the safety and peace of the whole body politic. If there is, by reason of the offence charged, an injury done, especially to any one person, he has a remedy for the wrong. In criminal trials, the State—the supreme authority—that authority which makes the law, and prescribes itspenalty, and executes its judgments—moves against the citizen The Court, the Jury and the Solicitor General are its agents. The State is not a partythe State is rather an accuser—she charges crime, arrests, tries, convicts and executes. In criminal causes, the State, through her agents, is the judge who tries the accused. In civil cases, she stands aside and leaves the parties to litigate upon equal terms before a tribunal independent of both. Thus unequally do the State and the defendant enter upon an issue, the result of which may involve the liberty or life of the one. and no sensible consequence to the other. Viewed in this...

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