The State v. Brown.
| Citation | 308 Ga.App. 480,708 S.E.2d 63 |
| Decision Date | 16 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. A10A2202.,A10A2202. |
| Parties | The STATEv.BROWN. |
| Court | United States Court of Appeals (Georgia) |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Richard Ashley Mallard, Brian Ashley Deal, Appellant.George Terry Jackson, Jackson & Schiavone, for Appellee.DILLARD, Judge.
Harrison R. Brown, appellee, was indicted on one count each of aggravated sodomy,1 aggravated child molestation,2 child molestation,3 and felony sexual battery.4 Prior to his indictment, Brown confessed to investigators that he sexually molested the four–year–old child, but he later moved to suppress his statements on the ground that they were made involuntarily from a “hope of benefit”—namely, that he would not be charged with any of the crimes to which he confessed. Brown moved to suppress his confession, and the trial court granted his motion. For the reasons noted infra, we reverse.
The alleged victim in this case was the son of a woman who was dating Brown's brother. Allegations of molestation arose when the child told his grandmother that Brown “had sucked on his wee-wee and made it bigger.” The sheriff's office asked Brown to come in for questioning, and he voluntarily complied with this request. Upon his arrival, Brown was advised of the allegations made against him, and he then had a brief meeting with a female investigator and a DFACS representative. The female investigator testified at the suppression hearing that she did not threaten Brown with arrest.
Brown was then questioned by two male investigators from the sheriff's office. Brown's gradual confession to touching the child's penis and placing it in his mouth occurred during this second interview, which was videotaped and spanned over the course of approximately two hours. This confession was initially made in a non-custodial setting. Indeed, the investigators advised Brown at the very beginning of the interview that he could leave any time he wanted, and Brown expressed his general familiarity with criminal procedure, informing the officers that he had taken criminal-justice classes in school.
The tone of the second interview was conversational, Brown was not in handcuffs, and the door to the office was unlocked. Once Brown confessed to placing his mouth on the child's penis, the investigator immediately stopped the interview, told Brown that in light of what he had just confessed he would no longer be able to leave, and then gave Brown his Miranda 5 rights. Although Brown volunteered that he was already aware of his Miranda rights, the investigator proceeded with reading those rights to him just the same. And prior to resuming any questioning, the investigator spent a considerable amount of time ensuring that Brown fully understood his Miranda rights and that he was willing to waive them by continuing with the interview. During this exchange, Brown tried repeatedly to discuss the incident and express remorse for his actions, but each time he did so, the investigator emphasized that he could not continue speaking to Brown unless he was first willing to waive his Miranda rights and sign the waiver form. Brown eventually initialed the Miranda waiver, thus acknowledging that he had been advised of his constitutional rights and that he, nevertheless, was willing to continue freely speaking with the investigator. After doing so, Brown repeated his earlier admissions—i.e., that he had touched the child's penis and put it in his mouth. Brown then made similar inculpatory statements while speaking with a different investigator the following day. Thereafter, Brown was indicted for aggravated sodomy, aggravated child molestation, child molestation, and felony sexual battery. Brown moved to suppress his statements, and the trial court granted his motion. This appeal follows.
The crux of this appeal is whether Brown's confession was voluntary or whether it was instead induced by a “hope of benefit” promised by the State. At the outset, we note that incriminating statements are only admissible if “made voluntarily, without being induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.” 6 Thus, to overcome suppression, the State must show that (1) the suspect was not presented with the “slightest hope of benefit,” and (2) even if a “hope of benefit” was presented to the criminal defendant by the State, the suspect's incriminating statements were not actually induced by this “hope of benefit,” such that his or her confession was rendered involuntary as a matter of law.
In a motion to suppress hearing, the State must demonstrate voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence,7 and the trial court's determination must be based on the totality of the circumstances. 8 Then, in reviewing the trial court's suppression of evidence, we “must construe the evidence most favorably to ... upholding ... the trial court's findings and judgment.” 9 Moreover, because “we accept the trial court's findings on disputed facts and witness credibility,” 10 a determination of voluntariness must be upheld unless it is clearly erroneous. 11 Nevertheless, when “controlling facts are not in dispute, ... such as those facts discernible from a videotape, our review is de novo.” 12 Finally, we apply the legal principles to the facts independently.13 With the foregoing in mind, we now consider the State's enumerations of error.
1. On appeal, the State argues that there is no evidence that the investigators suggested to Brown that the possibility of arrest was contingent upon what was said in the interview. Brown contends, and the trial court agreed, that the investigators gave him the impression at the beginning of the interview that he would not face criminal charges when the investigators told Brown he would go home after the interview regardless of what he told them. Specifically, Brown claims that his statements to investigators, both before and after the reading of his Miranda rights, were involuntary and inadmissible. We agree with the State that, when considered in the totality of the circumstances, the statements by investigators did not suggest that Brown would never be arrested or charged regardless of what he said during the interview.
The reward of a lighter sentence is generally what is meant by the phrase “hope of benefit,” as used in OCGA § 24–3–50.14 When an accused is made a promise concerning a collateral benefit, however, his subsequent confession is not excludable.15 Indeed, we have previously held that statements referring to an accused going home after an interview are collateral promises that in no way relate to the sentence or charges facing the suspect.16 Additionally, we have held that a hope of benefit may be dispelled by a statement that an officer has no influence over an accused's possible punishment.17
And here, the videotaped confession shows that Brown inquired as to what would happen to him, hypothetically, if he had done what the child alleged. One of the investigators responded, The second investigator then said, The second investigator continued to tell Brown that “if you tell me it happened, I'm not going to snatch you up, place you in handcuffs and drag you back there in the back ... I'm not going to ruin that relationship by snatching you up.” The first investigator then said,
The statement that Brown would not be arrested on the spot was collateral and clearly not the type of “hope of benefit” contemplated by OCGA § 24–3–50. But even assuming that this statement was not collateral, any hope of benefit was clearly dispelled by the officers' assertions that they had no control over what would ultimately happen to Brown. Furthermore, throughout the interview—before, during, and after his confession—Brown expressed an understanding that there would be consequences for his actions. Indeed, shortly after the investigating officers made the allegedly confession-inducing statements, Brown continued to deny that he had done anything to the child. The investigators then asked Brown what he thought should happen to somebody who did what was alleged, and Brown speculated that such a perpetrator would face jail time, probation, and rehabilitation. Additionally, when investigators said “[i]t's not going away,” Brown said that he understood that was the case and that there would be consequences for his actions. One investigator even said that he would not tell Brown that there would not be consequences for his actions.
And when Brown eventually confessed to placing the child's penis in his mouth, the investigator immediately responded, “You know I can't let you get up and walk out of here with what you just told me,” and then proceeded to recite to Brown his Miranda rights. Brown acknowledged his understanding of the investigator's statements and at no point attempted to retract his confession, instead repeatedly saying, “I'm screwed.” Brown also repeatedly attempted to continue speaking with the officer who maintained that he could not speak to Brown any further unless and until Brown first signed the Miranda waiver form. Moreover, throughout the significant amount of time between his first confession and his signing of the Miranda waiver, Brown indicated several times that he knew he was going to jail. Brown also asked the investigator what would happen after the interview, and the investigator responded that Brown would be charged, booked, and go to court; but the investigator also advised that he could not tell Brown whether he would ultimately go to prison. Brown also inquired as to the possibility of...
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Boyd v. State, A11A2381.
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