The State v. Goodwin
| Decision Date | 05 November 1907 |
| Docket Number | 21,029 |
| Citation | 82 N.E. 459,169 Ind. 265 |
| Parties | The State v. Goodwin |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From Dekalb Circuit Court; Frank M. Powers, Special Judge.
Prosecution by the State of Indiana against Samuel Goodwin. From a judgment for defendant, the State appeals.
Reversed.
James Bingham, Attorney-General, A. G. Cavins, H. M. Dowling, E. M White and Charles S. Smith, Prosecuting Attorney, for the State.
Willis Rhoads, George W. Crooks and J. E. Pomeroy, for appellee.
A prosecution was lodged against appellee for an alleged refusal to stop his automobile on the public highway when signaled to do so by the prosecuting witness. The prosecution was based upon the act of March 6, 1905 (Acts 1905, p. 202, § 5, § 8703e Burns 1905). So much of said section as is material in the case is as follows: "Any person or persons operating a motor vehicle shall, upon meeting any person or persons riding, leading or driving a horse, horses or other draft animals or other farm animals on any public highway, upon request or signal by putting up the hand from any such person or persons so riding, leading or driving any horse, horses or other draft animals or other farm animals (if in sufficient light for such signal to be perceptible) immediately bring his motor vehicle to a stop and remain stationary so long as may be reasonable to allow such horse, horses or other draft animals or other farm animals to pass."
The affidavit charges, in substance, that Rosa and Josie Case, while driving in a buggy on a certain public highway, met the defendant traveling in the opposite direction in an automobile; that Rosa was directing the horse and Josie was sitting by her side in the buggy; that the horse becoming frightened at the automobile Rosa became so engrossed in holding and directing said horse that she was unable to raise her hand to signal the defendant to stop, without relaxing her hold on the lines, and thereby losing her control of said horse, whereupon Josie, for and on behalf of Rosa, and with the latter's knowledge and consent, raised her hand and signaled the defendant to stop, which he failed and refused to do, though there was sufficient light for him to see such signal.
The question for decision is: To constitute an offense, does the statute require the danger-signal to be given by the driver or manager of the horse in person, or may it be given by another occupant of the vehicle, authorized to act for the driver, or is it sufficient for any occupant of the vehicle, upon his own initiative, to give the signal?
While the rule of strict construction applies generally to the interpretation of criminal statutes, the excessively strict construction that formerly prevailed has in recent years been so modified as to look within the bounds of reason and common sense to the legislative intent when plainly manifested or expressed in the enactment. Courts, on the one hand, refusing to hold those not clearly brought, within the scope of the statute, and, on the other hand, equally refusing, by radical refinement, or unreasonable or incongruous construction, to discharge those plainly within its scope. Gillett, Crim. Law (2d ed.), §§ 19, 20; Daniels v. State (1898), 150 Ind. 348, 50 N.E. 74, and authorities cited; State, ex rel., v. Roby (1895), 142 Ind. 168, 33 L. R. A. 213, 51 Am. St. 174, 41 N.E. 145; Fahnestock v. State (1885), 102 Ind. 156, 162, 1 N.E. 372.
It is obvious that the legislative purpose in enacting the law under consideration...
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