The State v. Hockett

• Decision Date: 02 March 1908
• Citation: 108 S.W. 599,129 Mo.App. 639
• Parties: THE STATE OF MISSOURI, Defendant in Error, v. CHARLES HOCKETT et al., Plaintiffs in Error
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

108 S.W. 599

129 Mo.App. 639

THE STATE OF MISSOURI, Defendant in Error, v. CHARLES HOCKETT et al., Plaintiffs in Error

Court of Appeals of Missouri, Kansas City

March 2, 1908

Error to Jasper Circuit Court.--Hon. Howard Gray, Judge.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Judgment reversed and discharged.

Clay & Sheppard for plaintiffs in error.

(1) The court had no authority or jurisdiction to pass sentence upon the defendants at the June term, 1907, upon a plea of guilty entered at the November term, 1906. People ex rel. Smith v. Allen (Ill.), 39 N.E. 568; United States v Wilson, 46 F. 748; Colby, Cr. Law, 392; People v Morrisette, 20 How. Pr. 118; People v. Court of Sessions Sup., 19 N.W. 508; Weaver v. People, 33 Mich. 295; People ex rel. v. Barrett, 67 N.E. 23; People v. Blackburn (Utah), 23 P. 759; People v Brown, 54 Mich. 15, 19 N.W. 571.

H. C. Compton, for defendant in error, filed no brief.

OPINION

ELLISON, J.

--The defendants were proceeded against on an information by the prosecuting attorney of Jasper county for selling intoxicating liquors on Sunday and for keeping open his licensed dramshop on that day. At the November term, 1906, they pleaded guilty. On the plea being entered the record recites that "thereupon by agreement, the assessing of punishment and sentence is deferred to some future time." The defendants were permitted to go at large without bail. No further entry appears of record for that term after that just quoted. The regular February term passed with no mention of the case. At the June term, 1907, the record not showing the presence of defendants, the following appears: "The defendants in this cause having heretofore appeared on the 6th day of December, 1906, it being the 15th judicial day of the November term, 1906, of this court, and plead guilty to the crime of selling liquor on Sunday and keeping their dramshop open on said day, and by agreement assessing of punishment having been deferred to some future time, now at this day the court doth assess their punishment therefor at a fine of $ 100 each; and the court further orders that the license of the defendants as dramshop keepers be and the same is hereby revoked, and that said defendants be and they are hereby prohibited from obtaining a license as a drampshop keeper in Jasper county, Missouri, for a period of two years from the 6th day of December, 1906." And judgment was entered accordingly.

The defendants contend that the court was without jurisdiction to assess the punishment and to give judgment thereon. The ground of the position is that the court having passed the case over indefinitely after the plea of guilty, without any legal cause therefor, lost its jurisdiction. The position seems to be well taken. It is supported by authority. In People v. Allen, 155 Ill. 61, 39 N.E. 568, the Supreme Court of that State discharged a prisoner from the penitentiary. He had entered a plea of guilty to a charge of felony, but sentence was stayed and he was allowed to depart the court without recognizance. At a subsequent term the case was docketed and he was sentenced to three years at hard labor in the penitentiary at Joliet. The court held that the trial court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence at such subsequent term, saying that "the attempt upon the part of that court was to indefinitely suspend sentence upon the plea of guilty, and the question now is, having then withheld judgment upon the plea, and permitted the prisoner to go at liberty, without in any way requiring him to further appear in answer to the charge, had the court jurisdiction, more than three years thereafter, to cause his arrest, and pass sentence upon him? It must be admitted that, if such power remained in the court three years, it would continue indefinitely, and might be exercised at any future time; and that too, without any reason for doing so, except such as might exist in the mind of the judge causing the rearrest, and pronouncing judgment. Thus a youth charged with crime, to which he pleads guilty, may be, in effect, assured by the court before whom he enters the plea that he ought not to suffer punishment, and given his liberty, and yet, in after years, no matter what may then be his family relations or position in society, that judge, or another of the same court, may consign him to the penitentiary for any term of years within the limit fixed by law. On the other hand, the State has a right to demand, and the welfare of society requires, that those who are convicted or plead guilty to violations of the law shall be promptly and certainly punished. . . .

"Until the Legislature shall vest courts in this State with powers not now given them, it is their duty, in the trial of criminal cases, upon a conviction or plea of guilty to pronounce judgment at that time, unless, upon motion for a new trial, in arrest of judgment, or for other cause the case is continued for further adjudication and the defendant, by recognizance or being held in custody, required to continue to answer the charge. And if they fail to perform that duty, but discharge the prisoner, or permit him to go indefinitely, their power and jurisdiction over him ceases, and a subsequent sentence is without judicial authority."

In United State v. Wilson, 46 F. 748, it is said that "Courts have no power to suspend sentence except for short periods pending the determination of other motions or considerations arising in the...