The State v. Mussman.
| Decision Date | 21 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. S10G1743.,S10G1743. |
| Citation | 289 Ga. 586,713 S.E.2d 822 |
| Parties | The STATEv.MUSSMAN. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Daniel J. Porter, Dist. Atty., William C. Akins, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellant.Douglas N. Peters, Decatur, for appellee.Perry & Walters, George P. Donaldson III, Albany, Joseph Scott Key, McDonough, for amici curiae.MELTON, Justice.
In Mussman v. State, 304 Ga.App. 808, 697 S.E.2d 902 (2010), the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of Aron Mussman's motion to suppress evidence or dismiss the indictment against him for vehicular homicide. In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals found that the State had acted in bad faith and committed a due process violation by failing to preserve constitutionally material evidence, and found that the State had violated OCGA § 17–5–56(a), which reads:
Except as otherwise provided in Code Section 17–5–55, on or after May 27, 2003, governmental entities in possession of any physical evidence in a criminal case, including, but not limited to, a law enforcement agency or a prosecuting attorney, shall maintain any physical evidence collected at the time of the crime that contains biological material, including, but not limited to, stains, fluids, or hair samples that relate to the identity of the perpetrator of the crime as provided in this Code section. Biological samples collected directly from any person for use as reference materials for testing or collected for the purpose of drug or alcohol testing shall not be preserved.
We granted review to determine (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in its application of OCGA § 17–5–56(a), and (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the State committed a due process violation by failing to preserve evidence. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
The relevant facts of record, as found by the Court of Appeals, show that
[o]n October 9, 2007, Mussman was involved in a single-car accident in which the other occupant of the car, Daniel Stephens, died of blunt force trauma to his head and chest.... In his preliminary report, the [police] officer [who arrived at the scene] said Mussman, who was not injured, had been the passenger and Stephens had been driving. Mussman was questioned and released from the scene with no indication he was suspected of criminal activity.
The police impounded the car, photographed it, and removed samples of biological evidence from the interior. On October 29, 2007, without notice of the contemplated criminal charges against Mussman, the State released the car to a towing [company]....
...In July 2008, Mussman was indicted for homicide by vehicle, accused of causing Stephens' death by recklessly speeding and failing to maintain his lane. His attorney immediately hired an investigator to find the car, which had been purchased by a salvage wholesaler. The investigator determined that the salvager sold the car in January 2008 to a mechanic in Quebec, who cleaned, repaired, repainted, and resold the vehicle, thus rendering it useless for purposes of an independent examination. ...At a hearing on [Mussman's motion to suppress the evidence police obtained from the car], the officer admitted that law enforcement in Gwinnett County only keep cars in vehicular homicide cases they consider “ unsolved.” Once they “solve” a case, they release the car.... [Stephens'] clothing was not photographed or saved.
Both the State and Mussman agree that the car's passenger had been wearing a seat belt and the driver had not been. The medical examiner and the investigating officer concluded that the pattern of an injury on the back of Stephens' head appeared to be “consistent with” a hinge located on the convertible top behind the passenger seat. This match led them to believe that Stephens had been the seat-belted passenger and Mussman had been the unbelted driver. The medical examiner ... and a hospital nurse [reported] no obvious signs [Stephens] had been wearing a seat belt. The record contains no photographs of Stephens' body. A crime scene investigator recovered blood and hair from the hinge on the convertible top and sent it to the crime lab for DNA testing. The testing ultimately confirmed that the biological material came from Stephens.
Mussman, supra, 304 Ga.App. at 808–810, 697 S.E.2d 902.
1. In interpreting OCGA § 17–5–56(a), the Court of Appeals held that the statute required that law enforcement maintain not only biological samples, but also the “container” or “source” of the sample. Mussman, supra, 304 Ga.App. at 811(1), 697 S.E.2d 902 ( ). Based on this interpretation, the Court of Appeals determined that the State violated OCGA § 17–5–56(a) by failing to maintain the car, or at least the hinge inside the car, from which the biological samples were recovered. See id. at 812(1), 697 S.E.2d 902. In order to determine whether the Court of Appeals' interpretation of OCGA § 17–5–56(a) is correct, we must turn to the basic rules of statutory construction. Specifically,
we apply the fundamental rules of statutory construction that require us to construe [the] statute according to its terms, to give words their plain and ordinary meaning, and to avoid a construction that makes some language mere surplusage. At the same time, we must seek to effectuate the intent of the legislature.
(Citations omitted.) Slakman v. Continental Cas. Co., 277 Ga. 189, 191, 587 S.E.2d 24 (2003). Furthermore, “[t]his Court may construe statutes to avoid absurd results.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Allen v. Wright, 282 Ga. 9, 12(1), 644 S.E.2d 814 (2007).
With these principles in mind, the plain language of OCGA § 17–5–56(a) reveals that governmental entities are required to maintain “any physical evidence collected at the time of the crime that contains biological material, including, but not limited to, stains, fluids, or hair samples that relate to the identity of the perpetrator of the crime.” (Emphasis supplied.) In listing “stains, fluids, or hair samples,” the legislature gave examples of the types of evidence that the statute requires governmental entities to maintain in a criminal case. The statute does not require governmental entities to maintain any and all “containers” or “sources” (or in this case, the vehicle) that happen to house the biological material in question, just the contents of the collected biological material itself that “relate to the identity of the perpetrator of the crime.” Id. Indeed, in this case, the State maintained the hair and blood samples taken from the vehicle, which was consistent with the plain language of OCGA § 17–5–56(a). In fact, this is exactly the type of evidence that the Legislature explicitly contemplated that governmental entities are required to maintain pursuant to the statute. Id.
By holding that OCGA § 17–5–56(a) would require governmental entities to maintain not only biological materials but also the “sources” of such biological materials, the Court of Appeals has gone beyond the plain language of the statute and offered an interpretation that leads to an absurd result. Specifically, the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the statute would “impos[e] on the police an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and to preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution.” (Emphasis supplied.) Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). The United States Supreme Court has already determined that there is no constitutional due process requirement that police maintain “all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance.” Id. However, the Court of Appeals' interpretation of OCGA § 17–5–56(a) would force governmental entities to, for example, preserve an entire mattress if DNA evidence were recovered from a portion of the mattress; maintain an entire recliner chair if bodily fluids were recovered from a button on the chair; maintain indefinitely the corpse of every murder victim that contains biological material from the perpetrator and every car involved in a fatal wreck; or maintain any number of large items when the relevant biological material collected from...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Ash v. State
...means.(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Goins v. State, 310 Ga. 199, 202 (3), 850 S.E.2d 68 (2020) ; see also State v. Mussman , 289 Ga. 586, 590 (2), 713 S.E.2d 822 (2011) (applying this test where the State failed to preserve evidence that "could have been exculpatory, but where it is ......
-
Clay v. State
...does not constitute a bad faith effort on the State's part to deny Clay access to potentially useful evidence. See State v. Mussman, 289 Ga. 586, 591(2), 713 S.E.2d 822 (2011) (holding that following a standard policy, by itself, is not evidence of bad faith where the defendant fails to sho......
-
Abercrombie v. State, A17A1847
...244 (2016) (punctuation omitted); accord Valentine v. State, 323 Ga. App. 761, 763, 748 S.E.2d 122 (2013).6 State v. Mussman, 289 Ga. 586, 588 (1), 713 S.E.2d 822 (2011) (punctuation omitted); see also Martinez v. State, 325 Ga. App. 267, 273 (2), 750 S.E.2d 504 (2013) ("[A]s with any quest......
-
Algren v. State
...Ga.App. 411, 415(4)(b), 750 S.E.2d 721 (2013) ; Orr v. State, 283 Ga.App. 372, 373(1), 641 S.E.2d 613 (2007).21 State v. Mussman, 289 Ga. 586, 588(1), 713 S.E.2d 822 (2011) (punctuation omitted); see also Martinez v. State, 325 Ga.App. 267, 273, 750 S.E.2d 504 (2013) (“[A]s with any questio......