The State v. Steve D. Corley
Decision Date | 16 June 1981 |
Docket Number | 80-CA-4,81-LW-2246 |
Parties | THE STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STEVE D. CORLEY, Defendant-Appellant. CASE |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Before Hon. Robert E. Henderson, P.J., Hon. Leland Rutherford, J Hon. John R. Milligan, J.
This is an appeal from a Judgment of the Common Pleas Court of Delaware County, Ohio entered upon a Jury Verdict of guilty to one count of Grand Theft. (R.C. 2913.02)
Defendant-Appellant raises the following Assignments of Error:
The facts in this case indicate that on July 20, 1979 a party was held for some of the employees of the J.G. Casting Company at the Lounge in Delaware, Ohio. One of the employees was Orbin R. Maggard. During the course of that evening, Mr. Maggard met Defendant-Appellant, who offered the sexual services of a lady friend that he was with by the name of Edwina Bowman. After the transaction was agreed upon, the parties proceeded in two separate cars to the El-Siesta Motel on the south side of Delaware, Ohio.
The record indicates that after going into the motel room during the early hours of July 21, 1979, several things occurred during the course of the next 30 to 45 minutes, including the theft of Mr. Maggard's wallet, containing in excess of $150.00 in cash. Immediately thereafter Defendant-Appellant with Edwina Bowman fled from the motel in Mr. Maggard's automobile, after emptying the wallet of its money contents.
On December 11, 1979, Defendant-Appellant was indicted by the Delaware County Grand Jury for one count of Grand Theft in violation of Sec. 2913.02 of the Ohio Revised Code with the inclusion in the charge that the Defendant had been previously convicted of a theft offense.
The record further indicates that the matter was heard before a jury and that the jury returned a guilty verdict to the Grand Theft count. The record further indicates that on January 9, 1980 at a hearing in the Common Pleas Court of Delaware County, Ohio, Defendant-Appellant was sentenced to Lucasville for a period of not less than two years nor more than five years, said sentence to run concurrently with another sentence which was imposed in a companion case. (Case No. 80-CA-5)
Defendant-Appellant raises as his First Assignment of Error the fact that there were no Negroes on the Jury and that this did not provide him with a fair trial.
R.C. 2313.01 et. seq. outlines the procedures for compiling the lists of potential jurors and the drawing of the final lists as required. There is no indication in this record that the procedures were not followed in selecting the jurors either for the venire or at the time of the selection of those who constituted the jury who tried Defendant-Appellant. It has been held in State v. Strodes, 48 Ohio St. 2d 113, 357 NE 2d 375, that "an array of veniremen need not reflect an exact cross section of the community". Defendant-Appellant does not cite and we know of no constitutional right to be tried by a member of a specific race. It cannot be inferred merely from the fact that there were no negroes on this jury that Defendant-Appellant was not afforded a fair trial, particularly in the absence of any evidence showing that the jury was in some way prejudiced against Defendant-Appellant because of his race or that the procedures for the selection of juries in Delaware County did not conform to Chapter 2313 of the Ohio Revised Code. As long as the jury selection standards apply equally to all persons, it is not necessary that a proportionate number of an accused's race be seated on a jury. There is likewise no constitutional requirement for the same: See State v. Wilson, 30 Ohio St. 2d 199, 283 NE 2d 632, also see State v. Willis, 33 Ohio Misc. 159, 293 NE 2d 895.
For the reasons set forth hereinabove, we overrule Defendant-Appellant's proposition that the absence of blacks from the jury is prima facie evidence of the unconstitutional system of jury selection in Delaware County, and find the same to be without any foundation whatsoever.
We note that counsel for Defendant-Appellant did not raise any issue at the time that Mrs. Goodrich was excused from this Jury, but rather concurred in permitting Mrs. Goodrich to be excused. Residence is one of the qualifications of being an elector and henceforth eligible for jury service. R.C. 3503.01 indicates as follows:
"Every citizen of the United States who is of the age of eighteen years or over and who has been a resident of the state thirty days next preceding the election at which he offers to vote, is a resident of the county and precinct in which he offers to vote, and has been registered to vote for thirty days, has the qualifications of an elector and may vote at all elections in the precinct in which he resides."
It has been held that if a person acquires the status of an elector in a precinct, that status is lost if that person moves to another county in the state and establishes residence in the new precinct 30 days preceding the next election. See Kyser V. Board of Elections, 33 Ohio App. 2d 52, 291 NE 2d 775. The Trial Court determined that Mrs. Goodrich failed to comply with the residence qualifications of an elector, and, therefore, was not eligible to sit as a member of this Jury.
R.C. 3503.02(A) defines residence as follows:
"That place shall be considered the residence of a person in which his habitation is fixed and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning."
Residency is a question of fact and the Trial Court cannot be faulted at this point, for having reached the conclusion based upon the election laws and residency statutes of Ohio that Elizabeth Goodrich was not qualified to sit on the jury because of her move into Franklin County.
For the reasons set forth hereinabove, we hereby overrule Defendant-Appellant's Second Assignment of Error.
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