The Trs. of Purdue Univ. v. Wolfspeed, Inc.
| Decision Date | 10 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:21CV840 |
| Parties | THE TRUSTEES OF PURDUE UNIVERSITY, Plaintiff, v. WOLFSPEED, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina |
Before this court is a Partial Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) filed by Defendant Wolfspeed, Inc. (Doc. 21.) Defendant seeks to dismiss Plaintiff The Trustees of Purdue University's allegations of willful infringement, enhanced damages, and induced infringement. (Id.) Additionally, Defendant has filed a motion to seal regarding an exhibit attached to its motion to dismiss. (Doc. 23.) For the reasons that follow, this court will grant Defendant's motion to seal, (id.), and deny Defendant's motion to dismiss, (Doc. 21).
For purposes of a motion to dismiss, a court must “accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Ray v. Roane, 948 F.3d 222, 226 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 212 (4th Cir. 2016)), however, this court is not bound to accept legal conclusions as a factual allegation, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) . The facts, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, are as follows.
Plaintiff “is a statutory body corporate . . . charged by Indiana law with the responsibility for operating Purdue University.” (First. Am. Compl. for Patent Infringement (“FAC”) (Doc. 20) ¶ 1.)[1] Defendant is a company that “makes and sells various silicon carbide metal oxide semiconductor field effect transistors (SiC MOSFETs) .” (Id. ¶¶ 6-7.)
Plaintiff owns two patents: U.S. Patent No. 7,498,633 (“'633 Patent”) and U.S. Patent No. 8,035,112 (“'112 Patent”) (together, “Asserted Patents”). (Id. ¶ 1.) “The '633 Patent relates generally to semiconductor devices . . . for high-voltage power applications.” (Id. ¶ 15.) “The '112 Patent relates generally to semiconductor field effect transistors . . . having self-aligned source contacts.” (Id. ¶ 23.)
Plaintiff alleges certain SiC MOFSETs of Defendant (“Accused Products”) infringe one or more claims, including claim 9, of the '633 Patent. (Id. ¶¶ 31-45.) Defendant “has been aware of the '633 Patent and its coverage of SiC MOFSETs since as early as December 18, 2014.” (Id. ¶ 38.) On that date, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) notified Defendant of the '633 Patent in connection with the prosecution of one of Defendant's patent applications. (Id.) The '633 Patent was also cited during the patent prosecution of several of Defendant's patents. (Id.)
In addition to learning about the '633 Patent during patent prosecution, in April 2021 Plaintiff sent Defendant a notice letter. (Id. ¶ 39.) On June 25, 2021, Plaintiff gave Defendant “claim charts that detailed Wolfspeed's infringement of the '633 Patent.” (Id. ¶ 40; Ex. C (“'633 Claim Chart”) (Doc. 20-3).) Purdue provided Wolfspeed with updated claim charts on August 4, 2021. (FAC (Doc. 20) ¶ 41.) At a meeting on August 12, 2021, Plaintiff presented the updated claim charts to Defendant. (Id. ¶ 42.)
Despite knowing about the '633 Patent and its coverage of the Accused Products, Defendant continues to create and disseminate the Accused Products as well as manuals, promotional, technical, and marketing materials to end users “by encouraging others to infringe the '633 Patent with the specific intent to induce such infringement.” (Id. ¶ 43.) Defendant also “directs customers to purchase the Accused Products from various distributors on its website.” (Id.)
Plaintiff also alleges the Accused Products infringe one or more of the claims of the '112 Patent, including claim 6. (Id. ¶¶ 46-47.) Defendant “has been aware of the '112 Patent and its coverage of SiC MOSFETs since as early as July 19, 2012, when the USPTO expressly notified [Defendant] of the '112 Patent in connection with the prosecution of” one of Defendant's patent applications. (Id. ¶ 52.) The '112 Patent was also cited during the patent prosecution of five of Defendant's patents. (Id.)
Like with the '633 Patent, Plaintiff provided Defendant claim charts detailing Defendant's infringement of the '112 Patent. (Id. ¶¶ 53-55; Ex. D (“'112 Claim Chart”) (Doc. 20-4).) Despite knowing about the '112 Patent and its coverage of SiC MOFSETs, including the Accused Products, Defendant continues to create and disseminate the Accused Products as well as manuals and promotional, technical, and marketing materials to end users by “encouraging others to infringe the '112 Patent with the specific intent to induce such infringement.” (FAC (Doc. 20) ¶ 56.)
Plaintiff filed its Complaint on October 28, 2021. (Original Compl. for Patent Infringement (Doc. 1).) Plaintiff amended its Complaint on January 18, 2022. (FAC (Doc. 20).) Defendant moved to dismiss the allegations of willful infringement, enhanced damages, and induced infringement, (Doc. 21), and filed a brief in support, (Mem. in Supp. of Wolfspeed's Partial Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.'s Br.”) (Doc. 22)). Plaintiff responded, , and Defendant replied, (Wolfspeed's Reply to Purdue's Opp'n to Wolfspeed's Partial Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.'s Reply”) (Doc. 30)).
Before addressing the merits of Defendant's motion to dismiss, this court will first address Defendant's motion to seal, (Doc. 23). The underlying document that Defendant seeks to seal is a Mutual Confidentiality Agreement and Limited Mutual Covenant Not to Sue (“NDA”) entered into by the parties. (See id.; see also Def.'s Br. (Doc. 22) at 8.) Defendant asserts sealing the exhibit and redacting the portions of its brief referencing that exhibit are necessary to protect Defendant's confidential business information. (See Doc. 23.)
“It is clear that the courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) . "[Documents filed with the court are ‘judicial records' if they play a role in the adjudicative process, or adjudicate substantive rights.” In re Application of U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2703(d), 707 F.3d 283, 290 (4th Cir. 2013).
For those records and documents that are judicial in nature, "[t]he right of public access to documents or materials filed in a district court derives from two independent sources: the common law and the First Amendment.” Va. Dep't of State Police v. Wash. Post, 386 F.3d 567, 575 (4th Cir. 2004). The distinction between the rights afforded by these two sources is significant because "the common law does not provide as much access to the press and public as does the First Amendment.” In re State-Record Co., 917 F.2d 124, 127 (4th Cir. 1990). "While the common law presumption in favor of access attaches to all judicial records and documents, the First Amendment guarantee of access has been extended only to particular judicial records and documents.” Stone v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 178, 180 (4th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“The common law presumes a right to inspect and copy judicial records and documents.” Id. “This presumption of access, however, can be rebutted if countervailing interests heavily outweigh the public interests in access.” Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988) .However, as described in In re Application of United States, the regularly cited cases in this area all rely on Nixon and each In re Application, 707 F.3d at 293 n.12 (quoting Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253).
The following are among the factors to be weighed in the common-law balancing test: “whether the records are sought for improper purposes, such as promoting public scandals or unfairly gaining a business advantage; whether release would enhance the public's understanding of an important historical event; and whether the public has already had access to the information contained in the records.” In re Knight Publ'g Co., 743 F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 1984).
Unlike the common-law right of access, “the First Amendment guarantee of access has been extended only to particular judicial records and documents.” Stone, 855 F.2d at 180. “When the First Amendment provides a right of access, a district court may restrict access only on the basis of a compelling governmental interest, and only if the denial is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” Va. Dep't of State Police, 386 F.3d at 575 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Stone 855 F.2d at 180). The Fourth Circuit has held that the First Amendment grants access to “documents filed in connection with plea hearings and sentencing hearings in criminal cases” as well as “documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case.” Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253. “In deciding whether the First Amendment right of access extends to a particular kind of hearing, both the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals have looked to two factors: historical tradition and the function of public access in serving important public purposes.” In re Wash. Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 389 (4th Cir. 1986). “The burden to overcome a First Amendment right of access rests on the party seeking to restrict access, and that party must present specific...
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