The United States, Appellants v. Archibald Ritchie

• Citation: 58 U.S. 525,15 L.Ed. 236,17 How. 525
• Parties: THE UNITED STATES, APPELLANTS, v. ARCHIBALD A. RITCHIE. *
• Decision Date: 01 December 1854
• Court: United States Supreme Court

58 U.S. 525

17 How. 525

15 L.Ed. 236

THE UNITED STATES, APPELLANTS, v. ARCHIBALD A. RITCHIE.^*

December Term, 1854

THIS was an appeal from the district court of the United States for the northern district of California.

The act of congress respecting the claimants to land in California, and the title of Solano, under whom Ritchie claimed, are so particularly set forth in the opinion of the court, that the reporter has nothing to add upon those topics.

It was argued in this court by Mr. Cushing, (attorney-general,) for the United States, and by Mr. Bibb, for the appellee.

The brief of Mr. Cushing became expanded into a printed argument of eighty-eight pages, of which the following is a mere outline:——

The act of congress passed on the 3d of March, 1851, (9 Stats. at Large, 631,) contains a clause which is declaratory of the general principles of law, by which the decisions of land claims in California are to be governed. It is in these words:——

'The commissioners herein provided for, and the district and supreme courts, in deciding on the validity of any claim brought before them under the provisions of this act, shall be governed by the treaty of Guadaloupe Hidalgo, the law of nations, the laws, usages, and customs of the government from which the claim is derived, the principles of equity, and the decisions of the supreme court of the United States, so far as they are applicable.'

Mr. Cushing analyzed these five sources of authority separately, with a view to settle and ascertain the principles of law which bore upon the case; and, in the course of his argument, discussed, at great length, the question how the laws, usages, and customs of a foreign government were to be proved. Proceeding to this particular case, he contended that Mariano Guadaloupe Vallejo, under whom Ritchie claims, had no title to convey, the pretended title in him being, for various reasons, null and void in law and equity.

I. Of the conveyance from Solano to Guadaloupe Vallejo.

§ 1. The claimant assumes that, by reason of the 12th and 13th articles of the plan of Iguala, Indians in Mexico may take, hold, and sell lands.

To which the reply is:——

1. They might do this, not only since, but before the plan of Iguala, beyond all doubt, as will be shown hereafter.

2. The plan of Iguala neither increased nor diminished the power of Indians, in this respect.

3. The true question is not, whether an Indian could, in California, hold and sell land, but under what circumstances and conditions.

4. Thus, any free citizen of the United States can take, hold, and sell lands; but the law imposes forms of conveyance, without which there can be no valid sale; and it also prescribes certain safeguards of conveyances by whole classes of citizens, such as married women, minors, and others, to prevent their being defrauded.

In the discussion of these points, he discarded entirely the

testimony of the witnesses in California, and contended that they must be decided by the Recopilacion de Indias, which was the law of the Mexican Republic, except where any of its provisions may have been repealed, either expressly, or by necessary implication, since the separation from Spain. This code, Lib. 6, Tit. 1, l. 37, Law 27, 1572, forbade Indians from selling their land, unless with permission of the court, and in pursuance of a prescribed form.

The provisions of this law, he contended, had never been repealed. The plan of Iguala and the treaties of Cordova did not repeal them. This plan and these treaties, together with the other Mexican authorities, were then particularly examined. The special legislation of the several Mexican States, on the subject of Indians, afforded conclusive evidence that the plan of Iguala did not repeal this law, (27,) or any other law of the Recopilacion de Indias, for the protection of the Indians. Our own laws for their protection, by forbidding conveyances, are analogous to this Spanish law.

As to the confirmation of Solano's title by the departmental assembly in 1845, Mr. Cushing contended that such confirmation did not enure to the benefit of Vallejo, the grantee, for these reasons:——

1. The purchase of Solano was not authorized by law.

2. Solano had no authority to make a valid covenant in relation to the land, or title thereto.

3. There was not, in fact, any covenant for further assurance in this instrument which could enure to the benefit of Vallejo.

Passing to anothr branch of this case, Mr. Cushing contended that the alleged grant to Solano, and conveyance by him to Vallejo, were fraudulent and void as against the Mexican government; that Vallejo was commandant of Sonoma, and Solano was his bailiff of overseer, and that Solano's name was used merely to cover the fraud. He further contended, that the missions were not the subject of the colonization law. The following is a summary of his points:——

1. The alleged sale from the Indian, Solano, was not made in the presence of a justice, and by public vendue; and was, therefore, null and void, even supposing Solano to have had a good title from the Mexican government.

2. This defect is not cured by the action of the departmental assembly, which does not relate back, nor enure for the benefit of Vallejo.

3. The case rests mainly on the testimony of Vallejo, who, having conveyed to Ritchie, with covenants of seisin and warranty, was incompetent, as a witness, to prove the title.

4. No title passed from the government to Solano, the whole

transaction being a fraud, of which Solano was the instrument, for the benefit of Vallejo.

5. The land, being mission land, was not colonizable; and, therefore, the pretended grant to Solano was null and void.

6. Being mission land, if (which is denied) Solano acquired any interest therein, he could not lawfully convey it to Vallejo by any form of conveyance whatever; and on his possession ceasing, the land reverted to the public domain.

7. The pretended title of Vallejo, through Solano, was only a fraudulent device to cover the plunder, by him, of a part of the mission lands of San Francisco Solano.

8. The land is not shown to be at the necessary distance from the frontier to make it subject to colonization.

9. Of course, Vallejo, having no title, could convey none to Ritchie, and the land appertains to the public domain of the United States.

Mr. Bibb's first two points related to the nature of the conditions upon which the estate was granted—a matter that will be more especially noticed in the next case, of the United States v. Fremont. His third point was: The United States have not prosecuted a review of the decision of the commissioners in the manner and form required by the 9th section of the act of March 3, 1851, to ascertain and settle the private land claims in the State of California, (9 Stats. at Large, 632, ch. 41,) and therefore have no grounds, no standing, no foundation whereon to pray this court to review and reverse the decision of the commissioners.

The 9th and 10th sections of this act, he contended, were not repealed by the 12th sect. of the act of 1852, (Stats. at Large, 99, ch. 108.)

IV. The time when the attorney-general received a transcript of the proceedings and decision of the commissioners does not appear in the record, and it does not appear to the court that the notice was filed with the clerk of the district court within the period of time prescribed by the 12th section of said act of 1852, that the appeal would be prosecuted by the United States; therefore, the appeal ought to be regarded as dismissed.

The final decree of the board of commissioners was pronounced and recorded January 3, 1853; the notice by the attorney-general, that appeal would be prosecuted, was filed with the clerk September 20, 1853; seven months and sixteen days had intervened; so the filing of the notice with the clerk might have been after the lapse of six months from the time the attorney-general had received a transcript of the proceedings and decision of the commissioners.

As the period of limitation began to run and to be accounted

from the time of a fact known only to the attorney-general, who gave the notice, the time that he received the transcript ought to have been made to appear on the record of the district court; which fact, if it had been alleged by the plaintiff, would have been traversable by the respondent. But the total disregard by the plaintiff of the provisions of the 9th section of the act of 1851, deprived the defendant, Ritchie, of the opportunity to rely upon the statute of limitations in the district court.

V. The title under which the appellee holds, was complete and perfect—a legal title, under a grant by the executive branch of the Mexican government, approved by the legislative branch, and consummated by the judicial branch, by juridical possession delivered to the grantee, under which the land was inhabited, improved, cultivated, and enjoyed by the owner in fee, long before and at the treaty of Guadaloupe Hidalgo.

By that treaty, the United States acquired no right of the soil included in this grant; nothing but the political powers, jurisdiction, and sovereignty, under a special stipulation that the owners of property should be protected in the enjoyment thereof.

Before that treaty, this land had been so completely severed from the public domain of Mexico, so perfectly vested in the grantee by a legal title in fee, that no right of property in the land passed to the United States.

VI. By the laws, usages, and customs in California, all persons, without any distinction between races, had capacity to take and alienate lands. Upon this point of the case, Mr. Bibb's citations were very numerous.

1. The governor and departmental assembly considered that Solano's being an Indian did not prevent him from holding land.

2. The laws, customs, and usages of the Mexican government permitted it. Proof of this was in the record by witnesses.

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