The United States, Plaintiffs v. Lawrence Coombs

• Decision Date: 01 January 1838
• Parties: THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFFS v. LAWRENCE COOMBS
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

37 U.S. 72

12 Pet. 72

9 L.Ed. 1004

THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFFS v. LAWRENCE COOMBS.

January Term, 1838

THIS case came before the Court on a certificate of a division of opinion between the judges of the circuit court for the southern district of New York.

Lawrence Coombs was indicted under the 9th section of the act entitled, 'an act more effectually to provide for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States, and for other purposes, approved the 3d of March, 1825,' for having, on the 21st of November, 1836, feloniously stolen at Rockaway Beach, in the southern district of New York, one trunk of the value of five dollars, one package of yarn of the value of five dollars, one package of silk of the value of five dollars, one roll of ribbons of the value of five dollars, one package of muslin of the value of five dollars, and six pairs of hose of the value of five dollars; which said goods, wares and merchandise, belonged to the ship Bristol, the said ship then being in distress and cast away on a shoal of the sea on the coast of the state of New York, within the southern district of New York. On this indictment the prisoner was arraigned, and plead not guilty, and put himself upon his country for trial.

It was admitted that the goods mentioned in the indictment, and which belonged to the said ship Bristol, were taken above high water mark, upon the beach, in the county of Queens; whereupon the question arose, whether the offence committed was within the jurisdiction of the court; and on this point the judges were opposed in opinion.

Which said point upon which the disagreement happened, was stated under the direction of the judges of the court, at the request of the counsel for the United States, and of Lawrence Coombs, parties in the cause; and ordered to be certified unto the Supreme Court at the next session, pursuant to the act in such case made and provided.

The case was argued by Mr. Butler, attorney general of the United States. No counsel appeared for the defendant.

Mr. Butler stated that no jurisdiction could exist over the case, unless it was given by the acts of congress. The first crimes act of the United States, of 1790, and the act of 1825, showed the object of congress to have been to prevent the perpetration of such crimes as those charged against the defendant. The penalties imposed by the first act, were found to be too heavy. The act of 1825 was passed, and many offences were included in it which were in the first law. These offences were those which might be committed 'on the high seas, and out of the jurisdiction of a particular state.' But the 9th section omits the limitation of 'the high seas,' &c.

The ship must be cast away, or be in distress, or be wrecked in the admiralty jurisdiction; and if any person steals goods belonging to her, the punishment attaches. In this case, it was admitted that the ship was in the condition described in the act; but the goods were above high water mark when stolen.

The rest of the section shows that the object of congress was to include cases above high water mark. 'Showing false lights' would, in most cases, be on the shore and in places above the tide.

No serious doubt of the power of congress to punish such offences can exist. The power given by the constitution to regulate commerce, necessarily includes the power to protect the goods which are the subject of commerce; and it is of no consequence whether the commerce is foreign or domestic.

The view which congress entertained of this power, is shown by its legislation in the first crimes act; in which, aiding or advising in piracy, is made punishable. These are acts which, in many cases, would be done on shore. All that is necessary is, that the matter which is the subject of the prosecution, shall be connected with, or have grown out of commerce.

Mr. Justice STORY delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a case, certified upon a division of opinion of the judges of the circuit court, for the southern district of New York. The case, as stated in the record, is as follows:

Lawrence Coombs was indicted under the 9th section of the act, entitled 'An act more effectually to provide for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States, and for other purposes,' approved the 3d of March, 1825; for having, on the 21st of November, 1836, feloniously stolen, at Rockaway Beach, in the southern district of New York, one trunk of the value of five dollars, one package of yarn of the value of five dollars, one package of silk of the value of five dollars, one roll of ribbons of the value of five dollars, one package of muslin of the value of five dollars, and six pairs of hose of the value of five dollars, which said goods, wares and merchandise, belonged to the ship Bristol, the said ship then being in distress, and cast away on a shoal of the sea, on the coast of the state of New York, within the southern district of New York. On this indictment the prisoner was arraigned, and plead not guilty; and put himself upon his country for trial.

It was admitted, that the goods mentioned in the indictment, and which belonged to the said ship Bristol, were taken above high water mark, upon the beach, in the county of Queens; whereupon, the question arose whether the offence committed was within the jurisdiction of the court; and on this point the judges were opposed in opinion.

Which said point, upon which the disagreement has happened, is stated above, under the direction of the judges of said court, at the request of the counsel for the United States, and Lawrence Coombs, parties in the cause, and ordered to be certified unto the Supreme Court at the next session, pursuant to the act in such case made and provided.

The ninth section of the act of 1825, ch. 276, on which the indictment in the present case is founded, is in the following words: 'That if any person shall plunder, steal, or destroy any money, goods, merchandise, or other effects from, or belonging to, any ship or vessel, or boat, or raft which shall be in distress, or which shall be wrecked, lost, stranded, or cast away upon the sea, or upon any reef, shoal, bank, or rocks of the sea, or in any place within the admiralty or maritime jurisdiction of the United States; or if any person or persons shall wilfully obstruct the escape of any person endeavouring to save his or her life from such ship or vessel, boat or raft, or the wreck thereof; or if any person shall hold out or show any false light or lights, or extinguish any true light, with intention to bring any ship or vessel, boat or raft, being or sailing upon the sea, into danger or distress, or shipwreck; every person so offending, his or their counsellors, aiders or abettors, shall be deemed guilty of felony; and shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by a fine, not exceeding five thousand dollars, and imprisonment and confinement at hard labour, not exceeding ten years, according to the aggravation of the offence.' 3 Story's Laws of the U. S. 2001. The indictment, as has been already stated, charges the offence to have been committed on Rockaway Beach; and as is admitted, above high water mark.

Before we proceed to the direct consideration of the true import and interpretation of this section, it seems highly important, if not indispensable, to say a few words as to the constitutional authority of congress to pass the same. For if, upon a just interpretation of the terms thereof, congress have exceeded their constitutional authority, it will become our duty to say so; and to certify our opinion on the points submitted to us, in favour of the defendant. On the other hand, if the section admits of two interpretations, each of which is within the constitutional authority of congress, that ought to be adopted which best conforms to the terms and the objects manifested in the enactment, and the mischiefs which it was intended to remedy. And again, if the section admits of two intended to remedy. And brings it within, and the other presses it beyond the constitutional authority of congress, it will become our duty to adopt the former construction; because a presumption never ought to be indulged, that congress meant to exercise or usurp any unconstitutional authority, unless that conclusion is forced upon the Court by language altogether unambiguous. And, accordingly, the point has been presented to us under this aspect, in the argument of the attorney general, on behalf of the government.

There are two clauses of the constitution which may properly come under review, in examining the constitutional authority of congress over the subject matter of the section. One is, the delegation of the judicial power, which is declared to extend 'to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.' The other is, the delegation of the power 'to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states;' and, as connected with these, the power 'to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing power,' &c.

In regard to the first clause, the question which arises is, what is the true nature and extent of the admiralty jurisdiction. Does it, in cases where it is dependent upon locality, reach beyond high water mark? Our opinion is, that in cases purely dependent upon the locality of the act done, it is limited to the sea, and to tide waters, as far as the tide flows; and that it does not reach beyond high water mark. It is the doctrine which has been repeatedly asserted by this Court; and we see no rason to depart from it. Mixed cases may arise, and indeed often do arise, where the acts and services done are of a mixed nature; as where salvage services are performed partly on tide waters, and partly on the shore, for the preservation of the property saved; in which the admiralty jurisdiction has been constantly exercised to the extent of decreeing salvage. That this is a rightful exercise of jurisdiction by our...