The United States v. Isaac Morris

• Citation: 39 U.S. 464,14 Pet. 464,10 L.Ed. 543
• Parties: THE UNITED STATES v. ISAAC MORRIS
• Decision Date: 01 January 1840
• Court: United States Supreme Court

39 U.S. 464

14 Pet. 464

10 L.Ed. 543

THE UNITED STATES v. ISAAC MORRIS.

January Term, 1840

ON a certificate of division from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.

The defendant, Isaac Morris, was indicted under the second and third sections of the act entitled 'An Act in addition to an Act entitled 'An Act to prohibit the carrying on the Slave-trade from the United States to any foreign Place or Country," approved on the 10th of May, 1800.

The first count of the indictment charges that the defendant did, on the high seas, from the 15th day of June, until the 26th day of August, in the year 1839, voluntarily serve on board of the schooner Butterfly, a vessel of the United States; employed and made use of in the transportation of slaves from some foreign country or place to some other foreign country or place: the said defendant being a citizen of the United States.

The second count charges, that the defendant did, on the high seas, from the 15th day of June to the 26th day of August, voluntarily serve on board of the schooner Butterfly, being a foreign vessel employed in the slave-trade: the defendant being a citizen of the United States.

It was proved, on the trial, on the part of the prosecution, that the schooner Butterfly, carrying the flag of the United States, and documented as a vessel of the United States, (her register being dated the 24th day of May, 1839, and issued by the collector of New Orleans to Nathan Farnsworth, a citizen of the United States, as owner,) was boarded and examined, on the 26th day of August, 1839, on the high seas, in latitude 5°25' north, longitude 30° east, near Cape St. Paul's, on the coast of Africa, by the British brig of war Dolphin, on suspicion of being a Spanish vessel engaged in the slave-trade, in contravention of the treaty between Great Britain and Spain for the suppression of the slave-trade. That on such examination, the vessel was found to be on her voyage from Havana, in the island of Cuba, which port she had left on the 27th day of July, 1839, bound to St. Thomas, in the island of Principe, near the coast of Africa; that the vessel had on board twenty-four large leagers capable of containing each from two hundred and fifty to three hundred gallons of water; eighteen of these were in shocks, that is, the staves were in bundle not fitted; four of them contained water, and two contained bread; there was a quantity of plank stowed away in the hold, similar to the planks used in framing slave-decks, but this plank could not have been fitted as a slave-deck until the vessel had discharged her cargo; and that such leagers and slave-decks were commonly found to be a part of the equipments and fittings of vessels engaged in the slave-trade on the coast of Africa; that she had on board a full cargo, consisting of various commodities, adapted either to the traffic in negroes, or to any lawful trade carried on by trading vessels upon the coast of Africa; that the prisoner was in command of the vessel; that he was described in the ship's papers, and represented himself as a citizen of the United States; that the rest of the ship's company were represented in the crew-list as Spaniards, or Portuguese, who had been shipped at Havana; that there were also on board fourteen Spaniards who had been received at Havana as passengers; that the cargo had been shipped at the same place, and according to the invoice and bill of lading was to have been delivered at St. Thomas, in the island of Principe, aforesaid, and appeared, by the documents, to be owned by persons residing at Havana; that two log-books, one in English and the other in Spanish, were found on board; that various documents in the Spanish language were also found on board; that under these circumstances, the vessel was captured by the Dolphin, suspecting the same to be Spanish property, and sent for adjudication to Sierra Leone to be proceeded against in the Mixed Commission Court at that place, which Court declined taking cognisance of the case on account of the vessel being documented as an American vessel; that she was then sent to the port of New York, to be dealt with by the authorities of the United States as they might think proper.

No slaves were found on board the vessel at the time of her capture; and it was testified by the witnesses for the prosecution, that from the cargo and situation in which the vessel was found, no slaves could have been carried or transported in her at any time during the voyage on which she was then engaged: that it would have been necessary to have discharged the cargo before slaves could have been taken on board: that the vessel was short of water, having only about eleven gallons on board when she was captured: and that Cape St. Paul's is a common watering place on that coast, being about five hundred miles distant from the island of Principe.

Upon the foregoing state of facts, the judges were divided in opinion upon the four following questions; which were presented on the facts aforesaid for their decision:

1st. Whether it is necessary, in order to constitute the offence denounced in the second section of the act of the 10th of May, 1800, above referred to, that there should be an actual transportation or carrying of slaves in the vessel of the United States on board of which the party indicted is alleged to have served.

2d. Whether it is necessary, in order to constitute the offence denounced in the third section of the act of the 10th of May, 1800, above referred to, that there should be an actual transportation or carrying of slaves in a foreign vessel, on board of which the party indicted is alleged to have served.

3d. Whether the voluntary service of an American citizen on board a vessel of the United States, on a voyage commenced with the intent that the vessel should be employed and made use of in the transporting or carrying of slaves from one foreign country or place to another, is in itself, and where no slaves had been transported in such vessel, or received on board her, an offence under the said second section.

4th. Whether the voluntary service of an American citizen, on board a foreign vessel, on a voyage commenced with the intent that the vessel should be employed and made use of in the transportation and carrying of slaves, from one foreign country or place to another, is in itself, and where no slaves had been transported in such vessel, or received on board her, an offence under the said third section.

Which points were stated under the direction of the Court, at the request of the counsel for the parties in the cause, and ordered to be certified into the Supreme Court of the United States, pursuant to the act in such cases made and provided.

The case was argued by Mr. Gilpin, Attorney General of the United States, for the plaintiffs; and by Mr. Nelson, for the defendant. Mr. Philip Hamilton submitted a written argument for the defendant.

Mr. Gilpin, for the United States.

The questions that present themselves in this case are these:

1. Whether the voluntary service on board of an American vessel, on a voyage commenced with the intent that she shall be employed in the transportation and carrying of slaves, is a violation of the second section of the act of 10th May, 1800, (1 Story's Laws, 780,) without any slaves being actually transported or carried.

2. Whether the voluntary service on board of a foreign vessel, on a voyage commenced with the intent that she shall be employed in the slave-trade, is a violation of the third section of the same act, without any slaves being actually transported or carried.

In the construction of a statute, the first inquiry is, what was the intention of the legislature? The second, whether that intention is so clearly expressed as to embrace within its prohibition the acts complained of.

I. The whole scope of the enactments of Congress shows their intention to punish every American citizen who engages in the slave-trade. As early as 1794, they passed an act 'to prohibit carrying on the slave-trade.' 1 Story's Laws, 319. This was followed, in 1800, by an additional act for the same purpose. 1 Story's Laws, 780. In 1807, and in 1818, acts were passed, 'to prohibit the importation of slaves into the United States.' 2 Story's Laws, 1050. 3 Story's Laws, 1698. In 1819, additional prohibitions against 'the slave-trade' were adopted. 3 Story's Laws, 1752. And, finally, in 1830, it was declared to be piracy. 3 Story's Laws, 1798. This series of acts evinces the evident intention of Congress to prevent the slave-trade, the traffic; whether to the United States, or to foreign countries.

When we examine the particular provisions of these various laws, the same intention is yet more apparent. The fitting out of vessels for the trade, their sailing outward, their employment in the actual traffic, their bringing slaves to the United States, or taking them to foreign ports, are all matters of minute regulation. No citizen can fit out or equip a vessel for the slave-trade, either in any part of the United States, or in any other place, to sail from the United States; nor can he hold any property, directly or indirectly, in a vessel engaged in transporting slaves between two foreign countries; nor can a vessel sail from the United States to engage in such traffic; and if she clears out for the coast of Africa, security against her engaging in such traffic may be required, and must be given. 1 Story's Laws, 319. 780. 3 Story's Laws, 1698. These are provisions to guard against, prevent, and punish the preparatory or previous steps connected with this traffic. Again, the President is to cause an armed vessel to cruise on the African coast, and to bring into our ports all American vessels intended to transport slaves; severe penalties are provided against any citizens who shall there take slaves on board, or transport them to a foreign country, or to the United States; or be found...