The United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee

• Decision Date: 15 March 1814
• Citation: 8 Cranch 398,3 L.Ed. 602,12 U.S. 398
• Parties: THE UNITED STATES v. 1960 BAGS OF COFFEE
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

12 U.S. 398

8 Cranch 398

3 L.Ed. 602

THE UNITED STATES v. 1960 BAGS OF COFFEE.

March. 15, 1814

Absent. WASHINGTON, J.

THIS was an appeal from the sentence of the Circuit Court for

the district of Maryland, which restared a quantity of coffee which had been seized and libelled for violating the non-intercourse act of March 1st, 1809, vol. 9, p. 243, § 4, & 5.

The Claimants in the Court below alleged, by way of plea, that the coffee was regularly entered and the duties secured according to law, after which, they became the purchasers for valuable consideration. They also denied that it was imported contrary to law.

The United States demurred to that part of the plea which states the purchase, &c. and took issue upon that part of the plea which denies the illegal importation. By the sentence of the district Court the demurrer was overruled, and the coffee restored; which sentence was affirmed in the Circuit Court, and the United States appealed to this Court.

The cause was elaborately argued, by the Attorney General, PINKNEY, for the United States, and by BOYD and HARPER, for the Claimants, at last term, and again at this.

The words of the statute, which create the forfeiture, are: 'That whenever any articles, the importation of which is prohibited by this act, shall, after the 20th of May next, be imported into the United States,' all such articles' 'shall be forfeited.'

PINKNEY, late Attorney General for the United States.

Two objections have been made to the claim of the United States, for this forfeiture.

1. That the right of the United States does not vest until seizure and condemnation, and

2. That the United States are bound by the act of their officer in receiving the duties and permitting the goods to be entered.

1. The forfeiture occurs at the moment of committing the offence. The statute says whenever the act is done, the thing shall be forfeited. No other time is mentioned. The seizure is the consequence of the forfeiture, not its cause. The thing is first forfeited, and then seized. The forfeiture immediately follows the offence. The seizure is merely to ascertain the fact. This is the plain construction, or rather the letter of the statute.

There is a distinction between forfeitures at common law, and those accruing under a statute. 3 Cranch, 351, United States v. Grundy & al.

In that case the Ch. Justice said, 'Where a forfeiture is given by a statute, the rules of the common law may be dispensed with, and the thing forfeited may either vest immediately, or on the performance of some particular act, as shall be the will of the legislature. This must depend upon the construction of the statute.' The reason why the Court decided in that case that the right to the ship did not vest in the United States immediately upon taking the false oath, was, that the United States had an alternative, either to take the vessel or its value, and until the United States had made their election, the right did not vest.

But there are two cases at common law, where the forfeiture relates back to the time of the offence and avoids intermediate alienations.—deodand, and suicide. So also in the case of felony and flight. So also in all cases where the punishment for the offence is the forfeiture of the thing by which the offence was committed, or where the punishment cannot be inflicted on the person. In treason and felony, the forfeiture of personal chattels is not the punishment but a corollary, or consequence of the disability imposed on the person. But in regard to lands, the forfeiture relates to the time of the offence committed. With regard to purchasers the rule is caveat emptor. This is said to be a hard case, but there are other cases equally heard depending on the same rule. If goods are deposited with a merchant to keep, and he sell them, unless in market overt, (and we have no market overt in this country) the sale is void and the owner may recover them from the purchaser who bought them without notice. This too is a hard case, but it is every days practice.

To show that the forfeiture attaches at the moment of the offence committed, he cited 5 T. R. 112, Wilkins v. Despard. Salk. 223 & 12 Mod. 92, Robert v. Withered. 1 T. R. 252, Lockyer v. Offley.

2. As to the second point, he said it was impossible to contend that the United States were bound by their officer's ignorance of the fact of the forfeiture when he received the duties and granted the permit.

BOYD, contra.

The demurrer admits that the coffee was properly entered, that the duties were paid, and that there was a bona fide sale and transfer of the coffee, for a valuable consideration, before seizure. A forfeiture cannot over-reach a bona fide sale to third person. That this is the rule at the common law is clearly proved by the very learned and elaborate argument of judge Winchester in giving his opinion in the case of the Anthony Mangin, (3 Cranch, 356) and the principle has been recognized by this Court in the same case (3 Cranch, 350, United States v. Grundy and al.) A forfeiture by statute is not more operative than a forfeiture at common law. There is no expression in the statute to justify the distinction. The common law says whenever a man shall commit treason or felony he shall forfeit his goods and chattels to the king.

Bona fide purchasers are favored at common law. 10 Ves. jr. 104, exparte Edwards—1 East. 94, 95—2 Esp. N. P. Ca. 734—12 Mod. 92—2 Cranch, 390—3 Cranch, 356—6 Cranch, 133—5 Bac. ab. 229. The forfeiture must be followed by seizure and condamnation before the property can vest in the United States. This principle has been decided by this Court in the St. Domingo cases, where the law being temporary and having expired after condemnation in the Court below and before hearing in this Court, the property was restored, which could not have been the case if the property was vested in the United States by the commission of the offence. If the title of the United States was complete at the time of the offence, and if the seizure was merely to ascertain the fact, the expiration of the law could not divest that title out of the United States, and this Court must have affirmed the sentence of condemnation. Yeaton and al. v. the United States, 5 Cranch, 281. If the United States had not discovered the offence for three years, the act of limitations would have barred their claim. 2 Cranch, 336, Adams v. Wood. If the coffee had been destroyed, the United States could not have recovered the duties, because the goods were not legally imported.

2. The United States are estopped from claiming the property by the acts of their officer, in granting the permit and receiving the duties. The acts of officers are to be favored. 16 Vin. 114, tit. Officers. 17 Vin. 153.

The permit to land the coffee, and the receipt for the duties are conclusive evidence to all the world, except the illegal importer, that the coffee was lawfully imported. If a Claimant encourage the vendee to buy, his claim shall be postponed to that of the purchaser. Sugden on Vendors, 480. Acceptance of rent is an admission of title. 18 Vin. 149. So here acceptance of the duties is an admission of a lawful importation. A purchaser is only bound to use reasonable diligence. He has only to ask whether there be a regular permit to land the goods, and whether the duties have been paid. If the officers were mistaken, and have given evidence of a good title, their mistake ought not to injure an innocent purchaser. 2 Br. C. C. 389—5 T. R. 118—1 T. R, 260—3 Cranch, 389, 390.

The inconveniences of such a rule would be intolerable—the utmost prudence could not prevent a man from loss.

In personal chattels, possession is the criterion of title, 13 Ves. jr. 121.

HARPER, on the same side.

This is a case of bona fide, purchase, for a valuable consideration without notice. It is presumed to be without notice, because the contrary does not appear. The only case supposed to be against us is that of Roberts v. Withered, 5 Mod. 191. 12 Mod. 92, Salk. 223. That was a case of detinue against the wrong-doer. There was no intervention of a purchaser without notice. The relation of the forfeiture to the time of the offence is never suffered to over-reach an innocent purchaser without notice. Relation is a fiction of law, which is never allowed to do injustice. Where a party not only conceals his claim, but gives out that the title is clear he shall be postponed. The permit was evidence on which the Claimant had a right to rely. No one can take advantage of his own act to injure another.

As to the common law doctrine of forfeiture, the cases of treason and felony furnish the general rule; the cases of deodand, suicide and flight are exceptions. In treason and felony the forfeiture is admitted not to relate to the fact committed. In the case of deodand, the exception to the rule is founded on the notoriety of the fact. In the case of suicide the reason for the exception is that there is no other mode of punishing the offence, and flight is an admission of the fact, and a withdrawing himself from punishment. Notoriety, confession, and the inability to inflict other punishment are the grounds of these exceptions to the general rule. In treason and felony, if the goods are sold bona fide without notice, the forfeiture relates back only to the conviction. Unimpeached possession is evidence of unimpeached title. This principle applies to forfeitures under a statute as well as to those at common law. The rule caveat emptor, is never applied to secret liens.

PINKNEY, in reply.

The letter of the act of congress is plain and express. The forfeiture is the necessary and immediate consequence of the offence. No other time is mentioned. He did not mean to say that the title of the United States is consummated until condemnation. But the forfeiture attaches by the commission of the offence, and over-reaches all intermediate acts. This doctrine is necessary for the public good, otherwise the...