The v. First Presbyterian Church

Decision Date22 February 2017
Docket NumberCase Number: 115182
Citation2017 OK 15
PartiesJOHN DOE (a pseudonym for the Plaintiff), Plaintiff/Appellant, v. THE FIRST PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH U.S.A. OF TULSA, OKLAHOMA, and JAMES D. MILLER, Defendants/Appellees.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court

NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.

ON APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TULSA COUNTY

HONORABLE DAMAN H. CANTRELL

DISTRICT JUDGE

¶0 Appellant filed suit against Appellees, a church and its minister, alleging torts and breach of contract after he was baptized and notice of his baptism was published on the internet, resulting in his alleged kidnapping and torture by extremists while travelling in Syria. The trial court sustained Appellees' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Appellant appeals.

ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT IS AFFIRMED

G. Steven Stidham, Levinson, Smith & Huffman, P.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellant.

John H. Tucker and Denelda Richardson, Rhodes, Hieronymus, Jones, Tucker & Gable, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendants/Appellees.

COMBS, C.J.:

¶1 The question presented to this Court is whether the church autonomy doctrine, rooted in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, bars the courts from considering Plaintiff's claims against Defendants/Appellees. We hold that it does.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 This appeal originates from a lawsuit filed by Plaintiff/Appellant John Doe (a pseudonym for Plaintiff) (hereinafter, "Appellant") against Defendants/Appellees The First Presbyterian Church of U.S.A. of Tulsa, Oklahoma, and James D. Miller (hereinafter, "Appellees") alleging breach of contract, negligence, and outrage. Appellant alleges he was born in Syria into the Muslim Faith, but for most of his adult life has resided in the United States. As part of what he refers to as his westernization, Appellant made the decision to convert from Islam to Christianity.

¶3 The precise relationship between Appellant and Appellees is disputed, but it is undisputed that Appellant was baptized at his own request at The First Presbyterian Church U.S.A. of Tulsa, Oklahoma (FPC) by James D. Miller (Miller). Appellant alleges he made Appellees aware of the need for confidentiality throughout the conversion process, as he was planning to return to Syria shortly thereafter. Appellant's baptism took place on December 30, 2012, during a service that was open to members and guests of the church, but was not televised. It is undisputed that Appellant was not and never became a member of FPC, before or after his baptism.

¶4 Appellant alleges he travelled to Syria almost immediately after his baptism, arriving in Damascus on January 2, 2013. Appellant asserts he was confronted by radical Muslims in Damascus in mid-January, 2013, who had heard of his conversion on the internet. Appellant alleges he was kidnapped, and informed by his kidnappers they were going to carry out his death sentence as a result of his conversion from Islam.

¶5 Appellant alleges he was tortured for several days before he was able to escape captivity, killing his paternal uncle in the process. As a result, he asserts he is now wanted for murder in Syria. Appellant alleges he was able to clandestinely make it back to the United States, where he faces continuous death threats. Appellant asserts he suffered numerous physical injuries and psychological damage, all proximately caused by Appellees' publication of his baptism, in contravention of promises they supposedly made to him that it would be kept confidential.

¶6 Appellant filed suit against Appellees in the District Court of Tulsa County on June 9, 2014, alleging breach of contract, negligence, and outrage. On July 2, 2014, Appellees moved to dismiss Appellant's petition, pursuant to 12 O.S. 2011 § 2012(B)(6), for failure to state claims upon which relief could be granted. Appellees asserted: 1) the First Amendment barred all Appellant's claims because the conduct alleged by Appellant related to Appellees' constitutionally-protected religious practices; 2) Appellant's negligence claim failed because Appellees owed no legal duty to Appellant; 3) Appellant's breach of contract claim failed because absent consideration there was no contract; 4) Miller could not be held personally liable for breach of contract in his capacity as an agent of FPC; and 5) Appellant's claim for emotional distress through the tort of outrage had to be dismissed because the allegations, even if true, did not rise to the level of outrage required by Oklahoma law. Appellant filed an objection and response to Appellees' motion to dismiss on July 22, 2014, and Appellees replied on August 8, 2014.

¶7 On October 24, 2014, the trial court denied Appellees' motion to dismiss. The trial court noted the complex issues involved, and determined that early in the litigation process, it "cannot find any of these claims such that it would be impossible for facts to be presented that would make relief possible to the Plaintiff as is required by Oklahoma law." Opinion and Order on Motion to Dismiss, r. 5, p. 10. After the trial court's decision, Appellees' filed their answer to Appellant's petition on December 18, 2014.

¶8 On October 16, 2015, Appellees filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to 12 O.S. 2011 § 2012(B)(1), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Appellees asserted the district court lacked jurisdiction over ecclesiastical matters, which included the theology, usage and customs, and written laws of the church that controlled the ritual and publication of Appellant's baptism. Appellees attached several exhibits to their motion to support their contentions. Appellant filed a response on October 30, 2015, asserting: 1) he never consented to FPS' ecclesiastical jurisdiction; 2) First Amendment protection applies only to religious beliefs, not actions based on them such as the publication of his baptism; and 3) his claims against Appellees did not interfere with FPS' beliefs, customs, or practices. Appellees filed a reply on December 1, 2015, asserting: 1) Appellant's claim he did not consent to ecclesiastical jurisdiction was not supported by the evidence; and 2) baptism was a sacrament fundamental to FPS' beliefs and the procedures established by the church constitution and practice conformed to those beliefs.

¶9 On June 17, 2016, the trial court granted Appellees' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court noted there exists an exception to subject matter jurisdiction over ecclesiastical matters, which it chose to refer to as the religious autonomy doctrine but which federal courts such as the Tenth Circuit have commonly referred to as the church autonomy doctrine. After examining federal and state cases on the subject, the trial court determined FPS' practice of the sacrament of baptism gave it ecclesiastical jurisdiction over questions centered on the performance of the sacrament. The trial court determined this included, pursuant to the Presbyterian Constitution, Book of Order, and church practices, the public nature of the sacrament and its publication online. Accordingly, the trial court determined it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Appellant's claims, tortious and contractual, based on the performance and publication of his baptism.

¶10 Appellant appealed, filing his petition in error with this Court on July 18, 2016. Appellant alleged three issues to be raised on appeal: 1) did the district court err by ruling that the publication of Appellant's name and baptism on the internet constituted an ecclesiastical matter over which it had no jurisdiction, in spite of alleged promises of confidentiality made to Appellant; 2) did the trial court err by ruling it had no jurisdiction over the common law torts allegedly committed by the Appellees; and 3) even assuming the trial court lacked jurisdiction over FPS, did it err by finding it lacked jurisdiction over Miller for his torts, as an employee of the church. Appellees filed their response on August 3, 2016, and on that same date filed a motion to retain the appeal. This Court granted Appellees' motion to retain on August 17, 2016, and the cause was assigned to this office on August 18, 2016.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶11 The standard of review for questions concerning the jurisdictional power of the trial court to act is de novo. Dilliner v. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe, 2011 OK 61, ¶12, 258 P.3d 516; Jackson v. Jackson, 2002 OK 25, ¶2, 45 P.3d 418; Samman v. Multiple Injury Trust Fund, 2001 OK 71, ¶8, 33 P.3d 302. There was argument before the trial court as to whether Appellees' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 12 O.S. Supp. 2012 § 2012(B)(1) should have been converted, specifically into one for summary judgment due to the attachment of evidentiary materials. However, attachment and consideration of evidentiary materials does not require conversion of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to 12 O.S. Supp. 2012 § 2012(B)(1). See State ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. Lucas, 2013 OK 14, nn.9-10, 297 P.3d 378.

¶12 A separate issue, and one not raised on appeal, is whether a motion to dismiss under 12 O.S. Supp. 2012 § 2012(B)(1) was the proper vehicle for Appellees' claims. Several of the Federal Circuits are in agreement that use of the church autonomy doctrine is more appropriately considered as a challenge to the sufficiency of a plaintiff's claims under Rule 12(B)(6), likening it to a defense of qualified immunity. See Petruska v. Gannon University, 462 F.3d 294, 302-03 (3rd Cir. 2006); Elvig v. Clavin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 955 (9th Cir. 2004); Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colorado, 289 F.3d 648, 654-55 (10th Cir. 2002). However, where the secular courts are asked to interfere in purely ecclesiastical decisions, this Court has indicated that the subject matter jurisdiction of the...

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