The William Windom
| Decision Date | 28 April 1896 |
| Citation | 73 F. 496 |
| Parties | THE WILLIAM WINDOM. v. THE WILLIAM WINDOM. MARMANN |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
Duffy & Maguire, for libelant.
Lyon & Lenehan, for claimant.
The questions discussed by counsel on the hearing of the exceptions to the libel filed in the above-entitled case arise upon the following facts: The Iowa Iron Works, a corporation created under the laws of the state of Iowa, and engaged in the building and equipping of steam vessels, its principal place of business being at Dubuque, Iowa, entered into a contract with the United States for the construction of a steel-hulled propeller, intended for use in connection with the revenue service of the government. Until completed and accepted by the United States, the title and ownership of the vessel remained in the Iowa Iron Works. Some time since, the hull of the vessel being sufficiently completed, the boat was launched, and placed in what is known as the 'Ice Harbor,' at Dubuque, the same being part of the Mississippi river, and the boat was formally named the William Windom, and the work of completing the vessel was proceeded with. After the boat had been launched as stated one Peter Marmann, at the request of the owner of the boat, performed labor as a machinist in completing the equipment of the boat, and on the 28th day of September, 1895, he filed the libel in this case to enforce a lien for the amount due him for the work and labor by him done as stated, upon the ground that the statutes of Iowa gave him a lien upon the vessel, which he could enforce by a proceeding in rem in this court as a court of admiralty. A warrant of arrest was duly issued, under which the marshal seized the boat, and thereupon the Iowa Iron Works, as the owner thereof, intervened as claimant, and released the boat by executing a bond in the usual form. The claimant now excepts to the libel upon several grounds, the first being that the court, as a court of admiralty, has not jurisdiction; that for labor done or material furnished in building a boat no remedy can be had in admiralty, because, in effect, the contract therefor is to be performed on the land, and is not maritime in its substance or nature, and that, when the labor was done by libelant, the construction of the boat had not been completed to such an extent that it could be recognized as a boat or vessel, within the meaning of the term as used in the law maritime; and, further, even if the first ground of exception, to wit, that of want of jurisdiction, should be overruled, that it appears from the libel that the work and labor performed by libelant was performed in the home port, and therefore, under the maritime law, no lien upon the vessel was created thereby, and that the statutes of Iowa do not give or create a lien for such work and labor, and, there being no lien existing in favor of libelant, there is not foundation for a proceeding in rem, and therefore the libel must be dismissed.
The first question to be considered is that of jurisdiction, or in other words, the question is whether this court, as a court of admiralty, has jurisdiction to enforce, by a proceeding in rem, a lien claimed by one who has furnished material or performed work or labor in the original construction of a vessel intended to ply upon waters within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States. The primary point to be determined is whether the contract, express or implied, upon which the material was furnished or labor was done, so far pertained to matters of commerce and navigation as to be deemed a maritime contract. In Ferry Co. v. Beers, 20 How. 393, was presented the question whether a court of admiralty would have jurisdiction over a proceeding in rem to recover a sum due for the construction of the hull of a vessel, and it was held that the jurisdiction did not exist, it being said in...
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Pacific Surety Co. v. Leatham & Smith Towing & Wrecking Co.
...L.Ed. 487. The fact that the vessel is launched when materials were furnished does not make the contract therefor maritime. The William Windom (D.C.) 73 F. 496, and cases cited. Where contract is maritime in part only, and adjudication of nonmaritime subject-matter is required, it is not wi......