Thenew Bedford Dry Dock Co v. Purdy

• Decision Date: 27 February 1922
• Docket Number: JACK-O-LANTERN,No. 131,131
• Parties: THENEW BEDFORD DRY DOCK CO. v. PURDY
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

258 U.S. 96

42 S.Ct. 243

66 L.Ed. 482

THE JACK-O-LANTERN. NEW BEDFORD DRY DOCK CO.

v PURDY.

No. 131.

Argued Jan. 27, 1922.

Decided Feb. 27, 1922.

Messrs. George R. Farnum and Lee M. Friedman, both of Boston, Mass., for appellant.

Mr. George L. Dillaway, of Boston, Mass., for appellee.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 96-97 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Claiming a lien under Act of Congress approved June 23, 1910 (chapter 373, 36 Stat. 604; Comp. St. §§ 7783-7787),¹ and seeking to recover for work done and supplies furnished in pursuance of a contract with the owner of the Jack-O-Lantern, appellant libeled the vessel. The libel was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. If the agreement between the parties is maritime, there was jurisdiction, otherwise there was none.

The facts are not in dispute. They were stated as follows by the District Court:

'The Jack-O-Lantern was originally a car float of the usual type, something over 200 feet long, with neither motive power nor steering gear, and having two lines of track on her single deck. The claimant bought her and proceeded to convert her into a steamer to be used for amusement purposes. The tracks were removed, the deck relaid to make a dancing floor, a large house, or superstructure, was built, inclosing most of the deck, and containing a dance hall, rooms, balconies, etc. Steering apparatus and a steam plant of the propeller type, for propulsion, were also installed.

'For the purpose of carrying out these changes the contract now before the court was made between the claimant and the libelant. It covers, generally speaking, all the woodwork involved in the changes above outlined. The libelant did not install the power plant, but it did prepare the vessel for it. The scow was towed to the libelant's yard for the work to be done. The engine and boilers were there installed. As they were not yet in working condition when the vessel left the libelant's yard she was towed away.' 266 Fed. 562.

Upon these facts it held that the contract was not one for repairs or supplies, but for original construction, and therefore nonmaritime within the doctrine of Thames Towboat Co. v. The Francis McDonald, 254 U. S. 242, 41 Sup. Ct. 65 , 65 L. Ed. 245:

'In rebuilding operations the test is whether the identity of the vessel has continued, or has been extinguished.' 'The matter turns, as I view it, upon a question of fact; and upon the facts stated I think it clear that the identity of the car float which was delivered to the libelant was completely lost by the conversion into an amusement steamer under the contract in suit. It is true that the hull is substantially unchanged; but mere identity of hull is not sufficient to preserve the identity of the vessel.' 'The Jack-O-Lantern, with her dance hall, rooms, and power plant, self-propelled and able to maneuvre, is an essentially different vessel from the car float, which furnished the hull.'

In support of this conclusion McMaster v. One Dredge (D. C.) 95 Fed. 832, and The Dredge A (D. C.) 217 Fed. 617, 629, 630, were cited.

It is not always easy to determine what constitutes repairs as opposed to original construction. A contract for the former is maritime; if for the latter, it is not....