Theriot v. Lasseigne

• Decision Date: 05 July 1994
• Citation: 640 So.2d 1305
• Parties: 93-2661 La
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 1305

640 So.2d 1305

93-2661 La. 7/5/94

Larry and Laura THERIOT, et al. v. Dean LASSEIGNE, et al.

No. 93-C-2661.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

July 5, 1994.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 15, 1994.

Charles E. Soileau, Bertrand & Soileau, Rayne, for applicants.

Edmond L. Guidry, III, Guidry & Guidry, St. Martinville, Barry J. Sallinger, and Victor James Versaggi, Lafayette, for respondents.

[93-2661 La. 1] KIMBALL, Justice. ^*

This suit arises out of a tragic traffic accident in the early morning hours of December, 1989, at the intersection of Main Street (La. Hwy. 31) and Bridge Street (La. Hwy. 96) in the Town of St. Martinville. ¹ A truck driven by Dean Lasseigne struck a car containing seven passengers, driven by Travis Courville, as it attempted a left turn onto Bridge Street heading south on Main Street. The impact, which was on the passenger's side, knocked the car into a post of a building at the corner. The passenger in the right front passenger's seat, Jarrod Courville, was killed instantly and the other occupants were seriously injured.

The parents of the passengers brought actions against Travis Courville; Dean Lasseigne; State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, the insurer of both Courville and Lasseigne; The City of St. Martinville; Teche Bank & Trust Company; and the State of Louisiana, Through the Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD). Prior to trial, settlement was reached with State Farm, The City of St. Martinville, and Teche Bank and Trust; in effect only DOTD remained as a defendant by the time of trial.

The cases were consolidated by the trial court and the issues of liability and damages were bifurcated. Plaintiffs brought actions against DOTD under theories of both negligence (La. [93-2661 La. 2] C.C. art. 2315) ² and strict liability (La.C.C. art. 2317). ³ Following a bench trial on the issue of liability, the trial court rendered judgment allocating sixty percent fault to Courville and forty percent to Lasseigne.

Plaintiffs appealed the judgment of the trial court, and the court of appeal reversed, finding manifest error on the part of the trial court. The court of appeal assigned thirty percent fault to Travis Courville and thirty percent fault to DOTD, and affirmed the trial court's assignment of forty percent fault to Dean Lasseigne. ⁴

After a thorough review of the record, finding no manifest error, we hereby reverse the court of appeal and reinstate the trial court's judgment. An examination of the entire record supports the trial court's finding that the cause of the accident is solely attributable to the negligence of Travis Courville and Dean Lasseigne.

On December 2, 1989, Travis Courville worked the three to eleven shift. After work, he went home, showered and changed clothes, and then picked up a twelve-pack of beer on the way to meet a friend at the Bandstand, a local nightspot. Courville testified he drank five or six beers between 11:30 P.M. and 2:00 A.M. At 2:00 A.M., when the Bandstand closed, Courville and a group of friends left for a party in his car. There were seven young people in Courville's two-door Honda Prelude, four in the back seat and three in the front. The front seating area consisted of two bucket seats. Terri Lynn Boudreaux, whom Courville was seeing at the time, was seated on the console between the seats which also housed the five speed manual stick shift.

Courville testified at trial that the radio was probably on, but he could not recall whether or not he was talking to Terri or anyone else immediately preceding the accident. The route to the party took Courville south down Main Street where he planned to turn left onto Bridge Street. Courville had driven down Main Street hundreds of times and had turned left onto [93-2661 La. 3] Bridge Street at this intersection many times.

At about the same time that Courville left the Bandstand, Dean Lasseigne left a local lounge where he was shooting pool that evening from about 8:15 P.M. until 1:50 A.M. Lasseigne testified he had consumed six to ten beers while at the lounge and had eaten nothing since lunch around noon. He admitted he had a "buzz" on and was feeling "high". ⁵

The intersection of Main and Bridge streets is what is known as an "offset intersection." The centerline of Main Street north of its intersection with Bridge Street lies approximately fifteen feet west of the centerline of Main Street south of its intersection with Bridge Street. The intersection is in a commercial area and there are parking lanes on the west side of Main Street both north and south of Bridge Street. The posted speed on this stretch of Main Street is 25 M.P.H. Both streets became part of the state highway system at least fifty years ago and the configuration of the intersection has been virtually unchanged since its early use, which according to testimony at trial, was probably as a wagon path to the church on the southeast corner of the intersection or to businesses in the area. There is a traffic light at the intersection which cycles green-yellow-red.

NOTE: OPINION CONTAINS TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE

[93-2661 La. 4] Lasseigne was headed north on Main Street on his way home when he stopped for a red light at the intersection of Main and Port streets, one block south of Bridge Street. When the light turned green, Lasseigne accelerated to between 35 and 50 M.P.H. as he approached the intersection of Main and Bridge Streets. At the same time, the light at the intersection of Main and Bridge streets also turned green as Courville approached the intersection heading south. Two vehicles preceded Courville through the intersection and continued south on Main Street. Courville was following one car length behind a black Chevrolet Blazer which had darkened windows preventing a following driver from seeing through the vehicle and perhaps detecting lights of other vehicles through the glass.

The offset of the intersection requires drivers proceeding straight through the intersection to move to the left after crossing the intersection. This movement can create temporary blind spots for the drivers behind them and can also obscure them from sight of vehicles heading north. This obscurement is increased when large vehicles, or as in this case, vehicles with darkly tinted windows, precede a turning vehicle through the intersection.

Courville did not come to a complete stop at the intersection, but looked south down Main Street to the extent his vision would allow, which he testified was sixty to ninety feet. Seeing nothing coming, he followed the Blazer through the intersection and proceeded to execute a left turn onto Bridge Street. Lasseigne, heading north, saw Courville's car only an instant before the collision. The passenger seated on the front right, Jarrod Courville, was killed instantly and the other passengers were seriously injured.

Plaintiffs argued DOTD was at fault by failing to maintain the intersection in reasonably safe condition. Also, plaintiffs contended that the misalignment or offset nature of the intersection allowed blind spots which were unreasonably dangerous to motorists and presented expert testimony in support of their contention.

In its reasons for judgment, the trial court recognized that at this particular intersection the offset of the lanes allows blind spots caused by preceding vehicles that can obscure the approach of oncoming vehicles which are too close for a left turn to be made safely. However, the trial court noted that a left turning driver has a duty to wait the few seconds necessary to have a clear view so as to safely negotiate the turn. The trial court recognized that blind spots can occur at all intersections depending on the relative sizes and positions of the vehicles and [93-2661 La. 5] that preceding vehicles create blind spots on virtually all highways. Additionally, the trial court concluded that it is impossible to design a highway free from all blind spots and, thus, the misalignment of the intersection did not create an unreasonable risk of harm to left turning motorists. Significantly, the trial court found the cause of the accident and of plaintiffs' damages to be the concurrent negligence of Travis Courville and Dean Lasseigne and assigned one hundred percent fault to the two drivers. We find implicit in the court's finding and assignment of fault that a breach of duty by DOTD was not a cause-in-fact of the accident.

Plaintiffs brought this suit against DOTD under theories of both negligence and strict liability. Under either theory, the duty owed is the same and a finding of cause-in-fact is essential to the assessment of liability. ⁶ Ryland v. Liberty Lloyds Ins. Co., 93-1712 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So.2d 1289 (La.1994). Cause-in-fact is usually a "but for" inquiry which tests whether or not the injury would have occurred "but for" the defendant's substandard conduct. Faucheaux v. Terrebonne Consol. Govt., 615 So.2d 289 (La.1993). A finding of no cause-in-fact ends the inquiry into liability.

Cause-in-fact is a factual question to be determined by the factfinder. Cay v. DOTD, 93-0887 (La. 1/14/94), 631 So.2d 393 (La.1994). A court of appeal may not set aside a trial court's finding of fact in the absence of "manifest error" or unless it is "clearly wrong." Sistler v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 1106 (La.1990). In order to reverse a factfinder's determinations of fact, an appellate court must review the record in its entirety and meet the following two-part test as set out by this court in Stobart v. State, Through DOTD, 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La.1993):

1) An appellate court must find from the record that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding of the trial court, and

2) the appellate court must further determine that the record establishes that the factfinder is clearly wrong (manifestly erroneous).

[93-2661 La. 6] See also Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120, 1127 (La.1987).

In reversing the trial court, ...