Theriot v. The Bldg. Trades United Pension Tr. Fund
| Decision Date | 27 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 18-10250 |
| Parties | DEBORAH THERIOT v. THE BUILDING TRADES UNITED PENSION TRUST FUND, ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
DEBORAH THERIOT
v.
THE BUILDING TRADES UNITED PENSION TRUST FUND, ET AL.
Civil Action No. 18-10250
United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana
July 27, 2022
SECTION I
ORDER & REASONS
LANCE M. AFRICK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Before the Court is a motion[1] by plaintiff Deborah Theriot (“plaintiff”) for leave to file a third amended complaint. Defendants, The Building Trades United Pension Trust Fund (“the Fund”) and The Pension Fund's Board of Trustees (“the Board”) (collectively, “defendants”), oppose[2] the motion with respect to the proposed amendments to paragraph 26 and Counts II, IV, and V. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the motion in part and deny the motion in part.
I. BACKGROUND
The Court has previously recounted the facts alleged in plaintiff's second amended complaint[3] in detail in its 2019 Order regarding defendants' motion to dismiss.[4] Robert A. Hamann (“Mr. Hamann”) participated in a pension plan (“the Plan”) sponsored and underwritten by the Fund and administered by the Board of Trustees.[5] Mr. Hamann died on December 30, 2016, and his wife, Audrey L. Hamann
(“Mrs. Hamann”) became entitled to post-retirement survival benefits by the express terms of the Plan.[6]
On January 11, 2017, Mrs. Hamann submitted her application for the postretirement survivor benefit to the Fund.[7] The application form allows the applicant to choose how she will receive her benefits: as a monthly annuity or as a lump sum equivalent.[8] The benefit illustration sheet explains:
You, the survivor, may instead elect to receive the benefit as an actuarially equivalent lump sum. If you initially elect a monthly benefit payment, you may elect at any time in the future to receive the remainder of the Post-Retirement Survivor benefit as a lump sum.[9]
Mrs. Hamann elected to receive her benefits under the monthly annuity option.[10]
In a letter dated March 1, 2017, Mrs. Hamann received notice that her application for survivor benefits had been approved and that she would receive monthly payments of $693.63.[11] The letter also advised Mrs. Hamann that she could elect to receive her benefits in a lump sum “at any time in the future.”[12] That same month, the Fund mailed Mrs. Hamann a change form whereby she could convert her monthly benefits into a lump sum payment.[13] The Fund instructed Mrs. Hamann to return the change form “by April 5, 2017 to receive the payment on May 1, 2017.”[14]
Mrs. Hamann completed and returned the change form, which the Fund received on April 4, 2017.[15] Mrs. Hamann passed away on April 5, 2017.[16]
After Mrs. Hamann's death, her daughter, Theriot, inquired about the lump sum payment.[17] The Court has previously recounted the extensive correspondence between Theriot and the Fund in great detail,[18] and summarizes only the most pertinent correspondences below.
The Fund sent Theriot a letter dated April 18, 2017 explaining that she was not entitled to the lump sum payment:
Plan documents state that the Joint and Survivor benefit is payable for the survivor's lifetime. Therefore[,] the payment dated April 1, 2017 was the final payment Mrs. Hamann was eligible to receive from this Fund. The paperwork Mrs Hamann submitted for a Lump Sum payment was for May 1, 2017 and would not be payable due to the fact that she was not living at that time.[19]
On January 5, 2018, Theriot's then-counsel wrote to the Fund requesting payment of the outstanding lump sum benefit.[20] On March 2, 2018, the Fund sent Theriot a letter offering its explanation as to why Theriot was not entitled to payment of the lump sum benefit and advising her that she had no right to appeal an adverse plan determination or file a lawsuit because such time to pursue a claim had expired.[21]
In response to multiple inquiries by Theriot's counsel, the Fund sent Theriot a letter on January 4, 2019, asserting that it treated Theriot's counsel's January 5, 2018 letter “in all respects like a claim or appeal” of benefits and that the March 2, 2018 letter included the necessary information that a claim or appeal denial must include to comply with ERISA procedural requirements.[22] The letter also advised Theriot that the Fund already fulfilled her request for a full copy of plan documents and that her request for review of the adverse benefits decision was untimely.[23]
Plaintiff's second amended complaint contains five counts: Count I, a claim for benefits, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B); Count II, failure to provide a full and fair review of an adverse benefits determination, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1133; Count III, failure to produce plan documents, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c); Count IV, breach of fiduciary duties, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3); and Count V, interference with protected rights, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1140.
On July 17, 2019, the Court granted, in part, defendants' motion to dismiss, dismissing Counts I and IV for failure to exhaust administrative procedures, and Counts II and V for failure to state a claim.[24] On November 4, 2019, the Court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing Count III.[25] On September 30, 2019, the Court denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration.[26]
Plaintiff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit determined that plaintiff did not fail to exhaust administrative remedies. Theriot v. Bldg. Trades United Pension Trust Fund, 850 F. App'x. 231, 239, 241 (5th Cir. 2021). The Fifth Circuit vacated this Court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and remanded the action to this Court, with instructions to refer plaintiff's claims to the Eligibility Committee for an initial benefits determination on the merits. Id. at 241-42. This Court remanded plaintiff's claims to the Fund for a benefits determination and stayed and administratively closed the action pending said determination.[27]
On February 11, 2022, the Fund notified plaintiff that her administrative appeal was denied.[28] The action was subsequently reopened in this Court,[29] and plaintiff filed the instant motion[30] for leave to file a third amended complaint.
Plaintiff seeks to amend her complaint to include several new allegations of procedural violations during the post-remand administrative review. Specifically, plaintiff proposes inserting a paragraph (“Paragraph 26”), which alleges that plaintiff's counsel was excluded from portions of the administrative proceedings, that the Fund discriminated against plaintiff during remand, and that the Fund's February 11, 2022 denial letter failed to comply with ERISA requirements.[31] Plaintiff incorporates these allegations into Count II, claiming that the lack of notice in the
February 2022 letter violated plaintiff's right to a “full and fair review,”[32] and Count IV, claiming that these new “procedural irregularities” were also breaches of the Fund's fiduciary duties.[33]
Defendants oppose the amendments to Paragraph 26, Count II, and Count IV based on their futility, arguing that the complaint as amended would be subject to dismissal.[34] Additionally, defendants, in sur-reply, seek the dismissal of Count V, in response to arguments raised by plaintiff in her reply memorandum.[35]
II. STANDARD OF LAW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that leave to amend pleadings “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Although Rule 15 “evinces a bias in favor of granting leave to amend,” it is not automatic. United States ex rel. Lin v. Mayfield, 773 F. App'x. 789, 790 (5th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted). A decision to grant leave is within the discretion of the trial court. Id. However, a “district court must possess a ‘substantial reason' to deny a request for leave to amend.” Id. (quoting Smith v. EMC Corp., 393 F.3d 590, 595 (5th Cir. 2004)). The “futility of the amendment” is one such reason. Id. “[A]n amended complaint is futile ‘if the complaint as amended would be subject to dismissal.'” Rohi v. Brewer (In re ABC Dentistry, P.A.), 978 F.3d 323, 325 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Varela v. Gonzales, 773 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2014)). Futility is evaluated “under the same standards
as a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).” Butler v. Denka Performance Elastomer, L.L.C., 16 F.4th 427, 437 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Villarreal v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 814 F.3d 763, 766 (5th Cir. 2016)).
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a district court may dismiss a complaint or part of a complaint when a plaintiff fails to set forth well-pleaded factual allegations that “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007). The complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). If the well-pleaded factual allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” then “the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)) (alteration in original).
In assessing the complaint, a court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and construe all factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999); Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 2010). “[T]he Court must typically limit itself to the contents of the pleadings, including attachments...
To continue reading
Request your trial