Thibault v. Sessions

• Decision Date: 26 June 1894
• Citation: 59 N.W. 624,101 Mich. 279
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: THIBAULT v. SESSIONS ET AL.

59 N.W. 624

101 Mich. 279

THIBAULT v. SESSIONS ET AL.

Supreme Court of Michigan

June 26, 1894

Error to circuit court, Houghton county; Norman W. Haire, Judge.

Action by Joseph A. Thibault against Herbert A. Sessions and another. There was a judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring error. Affirmed.

W. F. Riggs, for appellants.

Chadbourne & Rees, for appellee.

HOOKER J.

The defendants appeal from a judgment in an action of libel brought against them by the plaintiff, who was a teacher in a parochial school at Lake Linden, in the county of Houghton. The alleged libel consisted of an article published in defendants' newspaper, a copy of which was set forth in the declaration, which is printed in the note. ^[1] Counsel for the plaintiff contend that the declaration states no cause of action, in that it does not allege what specific crime is imputed to the plaintiff. The caption of this article, set up in the declaration, says: "Two Lake Linden School Teachers Guilty of Horrible Crimes." The pleader adds by way of innuendo: "Meaning by said Lake Linden school teachers, the said plaintiff and others." Passing several sentences, which in a greater or less degree imply that indecent liberties had been taken at the school with the persons of pupils, we come to the following: "Messrs. Marchand and Golden, finding their boys very sick, questioned them closely as to the cause of it. At first they would tell nothing, and after severe threats they told how they had been used by Gignac, the head teacher. He had been guilty of the most atrocious proceedings against their persons. Last Sunday evening he first found about his own boy by information given by Messrs. Marchand and Golden. He couldn't face his own boy to ask him the questions, but, cautioning him to tell nothing but the truth he trusted the task of questioning the boy to a friend. The boy confessed that he, too, had been treated in the same manner. He added, too, that his son's health and constitution were ruined. On getting his son's confession, Mr. Joyal and his friend, after demands, found that Mr. Gregory's boy had been treated the same way. A committee of five waited on Fr. Mesnard, who was utterly prostrated by their statements." And again: "The Conglomerate reporter unearthed proofs that over twenty-five other cases, both girls and boys, have been so used by these teachers [meaning thereby the said plaintiff and others], striking some of the most respectable families of Lake Linden. These children range in age from 8 to 13 years. This work has been going on for 4 years, according to the information received by the Conglomerate. Gignac has been ably assisted in this horrible work. Two devils, Vandestine, Thibeau [meaning by the said Thibeau, the said plaintiff], the latter [meaning the said plaintiff], is now in Canada." The common understanding of this language would be that the principal, Gignac, had been guilty of indecent and criminal liberties and practices with the persons of his pupils, and that the plaintiff had assisted him therein, which language is clearly actionable per se. Bourreseau v. Journal Co., 63 Mich. 425, 30 N.W. 376; Belknap v. Ball, 83 Mich. 591, 47 N.W. 674; Randall v. Evening News Ass'n, 79 Mich. 278, 44 N.W. 783.

The defendants pleaded the general issue, accompanied by a notice, a copy of which is appended hereto. ^[2] After the opening of the case, and upon motion of the counsel for defendant, the notice was stricken from the files, except the fifth section. Defendants' counsel allege error upon this ruling, claiming that such notice set forth a qualified privilege on the part of defendants, making it incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove both falsity and malice. We do not discover in the notice any statement of fact that connected the plaintiff with the affair, except the following, viz.: "That teachers in the said school were in the habit of sending to saloons for liquors to be taken to the said school, to the knowledge of the plaintiff and the other teachers therein. That these defendants were credibly informed of the grossly immoral conduct of this plaintiff as a teacher in said school, and of his habit of having intoxicating liquors in said school, and of his immoral conduct in other respects while engaged as such teacher, and, the foregoing facts existing in said school, and believing the said facts to be true, published the alleged libelous article as a matter of great public interest and concern, and therefore insist that the article was privileged." In addition to the above it was alleged that Edward Vandestine, one of the teachers referred to, and a coteacher with plaintiff, had prosecuted defendants for libel, and that they had been acquitted. The defendants then, upon information that plaintiff knew that other teachers were in the habit of sending for liquor, to be taken to the school, and that he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct in the school (whatever that may mean), and of his habit of having intoxicating liquor in said school, and of his immoral conduct in other respects while engaged as such teacher, took the liberty of charging that he was guilty of indecent practices with his pupils. We think the circuit judge was right in holding that these things, if true, did not support the charge that was published, and he was therefore justified in striking the notice from the files. They constituted no defense to the charge. Before there is any occasion to discuss the question of privilege, something must appear upon the record to raise such privilege.

Objection was made to the introduction of three articles published by defendants after the publication counted upon. They were offered as tending to show malice. The first contained a letter from the plaintiff, demanding a retraction, which was refused. This was clearly admissible. The others, if read in the light of this and the articles sued upon, might have that tendency. Counsel say that the effect was to injure the defendants by getting their attacks upon Gignac and Vandestine before the jury. One of them reported an acquittal of defendants upon a charge of criminal libel, growing out of the affair, while the other apparently ascribed persecution as the motive actuating the plaintiff in pushing this action to a trial, after the disclosures made upon the trial of the criminal case. We cannot say that it was error to admit them.

Upon cross-examination the plaintiff was asked concerning his intimacy with Gignac and Vandestine, and his knowledge concerning the use of liquors in the school, and his own connection therewith, and his knowledge that the boys and girls of the school went to Gignac's room in the night. These questions were said to be asked to show the character of the plaintiff. The court permitted a searching examination upon his conduct and knowledge concerning what took place at the school, and defendants have no room for complaint that his character was not placed before the jury, so far as it could be ascertained by cross-examination.

Counsel complain that they were not permitted to show that the plaintiff had liquor in the school. The court repeatedly said that, if there was an expectation of connecting such liquor with the acts referred to in the article complained of, the evidence would be received; but counsel seem to have been contending that the giving of liquor to the children would have led up to or facilitated the acts of Gignac, and that would justify the statement that plaintiff assisted him in the commission of the acts alleged. The jury should not have been permitted to find that the defendant aided and abetted from that fact alone. Counsel were persistent in the effort to prove that plaintiff had liquor. The following colloquy shows that the court was disposed to admit the proof if it could be made material: "Mr. Riggs: That is very true. Ordinarily it would not, but, if there was drugged liquor there in the school, and it was used, and this witness knows of it, and, from the effect of the use of it, it became so notorious, as we expect to show it, I think we have a right to put it in. The Court: Now, you always stop right there. If you stop there, it hasn't anything to do with the case. It seems that it is the extent of the testimony. I have kept ruling on that right along all day long, and I am going to continue on ruling that way until I am convinced that I am wrong. The fact that drugged liquor was there, unless you can show that this man gave it to those children, and, in addition to that, aided these other men in committing this crime, I don't see how you can show that even that is material in the case. If, in a debauch, this man administered the liquor, and aided these other men in committing the crime, knowing it himself, being near where it was done, and knew all about it, then I presume you could charge that he assisted; but the mere fact of having liquor in the house, even if he gave it to the children, would have no tendency to show that he committed this crime, or assisted others in doing it. Q. Did Thibault ever give you any of that liquor? (Objected to as immaterial. Objection sustained.) Q. Did Mr. Thibault ever give you any drugged liquor? (Objected to as immaterial. Objection sustained.) Q. Do you know of your own knowledge of the horrible crime of sodomy being committed in that building? (Objected to as immaterial.) The Court: By whom,-by Thibault? If you put that on, I will allow the question; otherwise I will sustain the objection. Mr Riggs: Exception. Q. I understand you that you had some of that drugged liquor. Now, may it please the court, I wish to show by this witnesses that he was put in that condition, and in that condition that crime was committed upon him. The Court: By Thibault? If it was, you can show it. ...