Thibodeau v. Am. Baptist Churches Of Conn.

• Decision Date: 27 April 2010
• Docket Number: No. 30260.,30260.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Timothy THIBODEAUv.AMERICAN BAPTIST CHURCHES OF CONNECTICUT et al.

120 Conn.App. 666

994 A.2d 212

Timothy THIBODEAUv.AMERICAN BAPTIST CHURCHES OF CONNECTICUT et al.

No. 30260.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 24, 2009.

Decided April 27, 2010.

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Timothy Thibodeau, pro se, the appellant (plaintiff).

James F. Sullivan, for the appellee (named defendant).

BISHOP, BEACH and HENNESSY, Js.

BEACH, J.

The first amendment to the constitution of the United States and article first, § 3, of the constitution of Connecticut prohibit the state's involvement in the internal doctrinal matters of religious organizations. The first amendment, however, does not necessarily confer to religious organizations immunity from liability arising from tortious conduct.¹ Though courts may not intervene in or authoritatively decide doctrinal matters, courts necessarily must decide whether, in a given case, abstention is appropriate. Here, the plaintiff, Timothy Thibodeau, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion to dismiss his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction filed by the defendant American Baptist Churches of Connecticut ². The plaintiff claims that the court improperly dismissed his complaint ³. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, as alleged by the plaintiff and reasonably garnered from the record, are relevant to our resolution of his appeal. The plaintiff, an ordained Baptist minister, sought employment through the services of the defendant. The defendant is a regional organization of American Baptist congregations. The defendant does not ordain ministers, but it recognizes ordinations performed by member churches. It also provides placement services for ordained ministers.

The plaintiff's involvement with the defendant began in approximately 1977. From 1977 until 1987, the plaintiff was a member of a Baptist church in Ashford, and in 1988, he became a member of Community Baptist Church of Manchester. In 1982, the plaintiff graduated from college, and in 1989, he graduated from Yale Divinity School with a master of divinity degree. In 1990, the plaintiff was ordained by Community Baptist Church of Manchester, a member affiliate of the defendant. His ordination made him eligible for employment opportunities through the defendant. Apparently, the defendant provided a clearinghouse whereby congregations seeking ministers could obtain information about available ministers. Over time, the defendant became concerned about the plaintiff's fitness for the ministry. It decided to “flag” his profile and decided not to circulate it to congregations seeking ministers.

In May, 2007, the self-represented plaintiff filed a four count, fourth revised complaint, which alleged breach of an implied contract on a theory of promissory estoppel, defamation, “deceit and fraud” and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The defendant moved to dismiss all counts of the plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The defendant argued that the first amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 3, of the Connecticut constitution restrict the government's power to intrude into ecclesiastical matters and to interfere with a church's governance of its affairs. The defendant further argued that a court's consideration of the merits of the plaintiff's allegations, as pleaded, would result in an impermissible entanglement of the court in matters related to the defendant's doctrines and internal affairs, such as a minister's qualifications to serve as a minister and to obtain employment as a minister in a religious organization. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. It reasoned that it was “without jurisdiction to determine whether the plaintiff's ordination as a Baptist minister should be recognized by the [defendant] or to review whether he has been treated fairly by the [defendant] with respect to recognition of his ordination.” This appeal followed.

On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the court improperly granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because his complaint raises only secular issues that do not require a court to interpret religious doctrine or practices. The defendant asserts that in order for a court to consider any of the causes of action alleged in the plaintiff's complaint, it would need to consider competing views of whether the plaintiff was fit to serve as an American Baptist minister, which question necessarily requires an inquiry into the defendant's internal policies, religious doctrine and procedures.

We first set forth our standard of review. “A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction.... [O]ur review of the court's ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [determination] of the motion to dismiss will be de novo.... When a ... court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light.... In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bagg v. Thompson, 114 Conn.App. 30, 37-38, 968 A.2d 468 (2009). “A motion to dismiss admits all facts well pleaded and invokes any record that accompanies the motion, including supporting affidavits that contain undisputed facts.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Henriquez v. Allegre, 68 Conn.App. 238, 242, 789 A.2d 1142 (2002).⁴

I

The first amendment to the United States constitution, applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution; see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940); provides in pertinent part: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof....” U.S. Const., amend. I. A brief overview of the religion clauses of the first amendment as they are applicable to the present case may be helpful.⁵ “The first amendment to the United States constitution protects religious institutions from governmental interference with their free exercise of religion.” Rweyemamu v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 98 Conn.App. 646, 648, 911 A.2d 319 (2006), cert. denied, 281 Conn. 911, 916 A.2d 51, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 886, 128 S.Ct. 206, 169 L.Ed.2d 144 (2007).

“[T]he first amendment has been interpreted broadly to severely [circumscribe] the role that civil courts may play in resolving ... disputes concerning issues of religious doctrine and practice.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DeCorso v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc., 78 Conn.App. 865, 875-76, 829 A.2d 38, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 931, 837 A.2d 805 (2003). “Under both the free exercise clause and the establishment clause, the first amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving disputed issues of religious doctrine and practice.” Id., at 880, 829 A.2d 38. By contrast, exercise of governmental authority is permissible if it (1) has a secular purpose, (2) neither inhibits nor advances religion as its primary effect and (3) does not create excessive entanglement between church and state. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971). “Under ‘excessive entanglement’ analysis, civil tort claims requiring courts to review and to interpret religious doctrine and practices are barred by the first amendment.” DeCorso v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc., supra, at 877, 829 A.2d 38; see also Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 721-23, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976) (holding that first amendment barred judicial consideration of bishop's wrongful discharge claim).

Freedom of religion is guaranteed not only to individuals but also to churches, and church organizations which have “power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.” Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116, 73 S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952). In the nineteenth century, the United States Supreme Court enunciated principles limiting the role of civil courts in resolving religious controversies. In 1871, prior to “judicial recognition of the coercive power of the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment to protect the limitations of the [f]irst [a]mendment against state action;” id., at 115, 73 S.Ct. 143; the Supreme Court in Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1871), held that “the rule of action which should govern the civil courts, founded in a broad and sound view of the relations of church and state under our system of laws, and supported by a preponderating weight of judicial authority is, that, whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them.” At least since then, the Supreme Court consistently has held that civil courts are prohibited by the first amendment from adjudicating disputes turning on church policy and administration or on religious doctrine and practice.⁶ See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, supra, 426 U.S. at 708-709, 96 S.Ct. 2372; Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 446-47, 89 S.Ct. 601, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, supra, at 114-16, 73 S.Ct. 143; Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16, 50 S.Ct. 5, 74 L.Ed. 131 (1929). In short, “[as a] general rule ... religious...