Thibodeau v. Connecticut Co.

• Decision Date: 20 May 1952
• Citation: 89 A.2d 223,139 Conn. 9
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: THIBODEAU v. CONNECTICUT CO. et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 223

89 A.2d 223

139 Conn. 9

THIBODEAU v.CONNECTICUT CO. et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

May 20, 1952.

Snow G. Munford, Hartford, for appellants(defendants).

A. Arthur Giddon, Hartford (Morton E. Cole and Cyril Cole, Hartford, on the brief), for appellee(plaintiff).

Before BROWN, C. J., and JENNINGS, BALDWIN, INGLIS and O'SULLIVAN, JJ.

INGLIS, Associate Justice.

In this action for the wrongful death of a ten-year-old boy, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.From the judgment rendered thereon the defendants have appealed, assigning error in various rulings on evidence and in the charge.

The plaintiff claimed to have proved the following facts: On the north side of Burnside Avenue in East Hartford, near a bus stop of the defendant company, were three driveways entering upon a large open area used as a turnabout space for the defendant company's buses.The area had a surface composition of earth with blue stone crushed into it.A public road extended northerly from the east and center entrances.There was a standard highway stop sign at the center entrance, and the entire area had the appearance of an open public roadway.

On the morning of September 9, 1950, one of the company's buses, operated by the defendant Czellecz, turned into the area through the center entrance and came to a stop facing in a westerly direction.About that time, the plaintiff's decedent rode his bicycle into the area and stopped at a point behind and to the right of the bus.Suddenly the bus backed, cutting to its right in an arc, and struck and ran over the boy, killing him instantly.The company had promulgated a rule that its operators should not back their buses 'if possible to avoid doing so.'About the time of the accident, it was the practice of some bus operators to leave the area by way of the west exit, thereby avoiding the necessity of backing, and there was no physical obstacle to prevent their doing so.If the operator of the bus had kept a proper lookout, he could easily have seen the deceased before striking him.The boy's death was a result of the negligence of the defendants.

The defendants' claims of proof pertinent to the issues on this appeal are the following: The bus operator had kept a proper lookout, but in spite of that he had not seen the boy until after the collision.The instructions from the Connecticut Company to its operators with reference to using the turnabout area were to enter it, face west, then back up in a generally northeast direction and drive out through the center entrance.The turnabout area was private property owned by Case Brothers, Inc.It had been used by the Connecticut Company for at least nine years.The company had made repairs to the surface of the area about twice a year and had caused snow to be removed from it in winter.The town of East Hartford had done nothing to keep it in repair.At the time of the accident it was deeply rutted.It did not have the appearance of a public road.

The defendants claim error in six rulings on evidence.One of them was the exclusion of a question propounded by the defendants on the cross-examination of Peter Norman: 'Do you own this house you live in?'Before objection could be made the witness answered 'No.'The witness' wife had testified earlier that she had given the Connecticut Company permission to use her property and that she had no objection to its buses going over her property so that they might go out through the west entrance without backing.The defendants claimed the excluded question on the ground that the answer to it would show that Mrs. Norman had nothing to say about the use of the property.The question clearly was irrelevant for that purpose.The fact that Mr. Norman did not own the property was not evidence that his wife did not own it.

At another point in the trial, Raymond Ransom, superintendent of the defendant company, was asked: 'Does your company have permission from Case Bros. to use this area?'The question was ruled out.If the defendants were trying to prove that the company had either a license or an easement to use the property, the proper way would have been to produce the written agreement, if there were any, or to ask for the conversation in which they claimed the license or easement had been granted.To ask whether 'permission' had been given called for a conclusion on the part of the witness.The question, therefore, was improper.Morache v. Greenberg, 116 Conn. 549, 550, 551, 165 A. 684;Swayne v. Felice, 84 Conn. 147, 150, 79 A. 62;Chatfield v. Bunnell, 69 Conn. 511, 520, 37 A. 1074;Young v. Newark Fire Ins. Co., 59 Conn. 41, 46, 22 A. 32.The same witness was also asked what the company had done with respect to the condition of the turnabout area during the past nine years.The question was claimed for the purpose of establishing that the company had permission from Case Brothers to use the space.If it is assumed that the answer would have been that the company had made repairs to the surface of the area, that, without more, would not constitute evidence that CaseBrothers had granted an easement or license.The question was properly excluded as irrelevant.

The fourth ruling claimed as error was the sustaining of an objection to a question asked by the defendants of the vice president of Case Brothers, Inc.The question was: 'Was any permission given the ...