Thibodeau v Design Group One Architects

• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Maynard
• Citation: Thibodeau v Design Group One Architects, 781 A.2d 363, 64 Conn. App. 573 (Conn. App. 2001)
• Decision Date: 31 July 2001
• Docket Number: 20724
• Parties: NICOLE ANN THIBODEAU v. DESIGN GROUP ONE ARCHITECTS, LLC AC 20724 THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

NICOLE ANN THIBODEAU v DESIGN GROUP ONE ARCHITECTS, LLC

AC 20724

THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

Argued April 4, 2001

July 31, 2001

Gary E. Phelan, with whom, on the brief, was Elaine Rubinson, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Michael D. O'Connell, with whom were Diane C. Mokriski and on the brief, Julia B. Morris, for the appellee (defendant).

Schaller, Flynn and Dupont, Js.

Dupont, J.

Opinion

The plaintiff, Nicole Ann Thibodeau, appeals from the summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, Design Group One Architects, LLC. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly determined as a matter of law that the statutory scheme of the Fair Employment Practices Act (act), General Statutes §§ 46a-51 et seq., bars a cause of action for wrongful discharge based on pregnancy if an employer has fewer than three employees.¹ We hold that there is a public policy in Connecticut against sex discrimination in employment sufficiently expressed in statutory and constitutional law to allow a cause of action for discrimination based on pregnancy. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are necessary to our resolution of the plaintiff's appeal. In April, 1997, the defendant hired the plaintiff as a receptionist, secretary and bookkeeper. She was an at-will employee. At all times relevant, the defendant employed two individuals and had three principals. The act applies only to those employers with three or more employees. General Statutes §§ 46a-51 (10).

The plaintiff notified the defendant of her pregnancy in December, 1997. The defendant terminated the plaintiff's employment on or about April 28, 1998. The plaintiff filed a two count complaint on November 5, 1999, alleging wrongful termination of her employment in violation of public policy and a violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The complaint alleged that the defendant had terminated the plaintiff ''as a result of her doctor appointments,'' which reason contravened public policy. In its answer, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff's termination stemmed from her performance deficiencies. The defendant, alternatively, denied that the plaintiff could avail herself of Connecticut's public policy or federal public policy against pregnancy discrimination as embodied in General Statutes §§ 46a-60 (a) (7) and in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e (k), respectively.

On January 14, 2000, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the public policy proffered by the plaintiff did not apply to the facts of the case and, therefore, that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. On March 31, 2000, the court granted the defendant's motion and rendered judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendant as to count one, which alleged wrongful discharge. Because the court determined that the defendant did not wrongfully discharge the plaintiff in violation of public policy, the second count, alleging a violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, necessarily failed. See Magnan v. Anaconda Industries, Inc., 193 Conn. 558, 479 A.2d 781 (1984).² Thus, the court rendered summary judgment as to both counts. This appeal followed.

We first set forth the applicable standard of review. Summary judgment is appropriate ''if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'' Practice Book §§ 17-49. Where, as here, the court has rendered judgment as a matter of law, our review of that conclusion is plenary. Trimel v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospital Rehabilitation Center, 61 Conn. App. 353, 356, 764 A.2d 203, cert. granted on other grounds, 255 Conn. 948, 769 A.2d 64 (2001). As a reviewing court, we must therefore determine whether the trial court's legal conclusions are legally and logically correct, and find support in the record. Id. Mindful of those basic principles, we now consider the issue on appeal.

The plaintiff argues that although the number of employees that the defendant employs has precluded her from statutory redress, she nonetheless can maintain a cause of action for wrongful termination of employment in violation of public policy. The plaintiff argues that Connecticut has a public policy against pregnancy discrimination in employment irrespective of the number of employees. That public policy finds its derivations, according to the plaintiff, in both statutory and constitutional law.

The defendant agrees that a public policy against pregnancy discrimination in employment exists, but counters that such policy does not extend to every employee in the state. The defendant maintains that the court correctly held that the relevant provisions of the act articulate a more limited public policy against such job discrimination, restricting the breadth of the policy to employers with three or more employees. The defendant also argues, as the court stated in its memorandum of decision, that the constitution of Connecticut cannot provide the basis for any public policy against pregnancy discrimination in this case because no state action was involved. We disagree with the characterization by the court and by the defendant of Connecticut's public policy.

In its memorandum of decision, the court recognized the existence of a factual dispute concerning the plaintiff's termination. The plaintiff asserted that her pregnancy precipitated her discharge, whereas the defendant insisted that it was her poor job performance. The court held, however, that even if the plaintiff's allegation accurately identified the reason for her termination, an at-will employee has no cause of action for wrongful discharge when an employer of fewer than three persons fires her on the ground of pregnancy. Our examination and consideration of existing case law lead us to a different conclusion.

In Connecticut, an employer and employee have an at-will employment relationship in the absence of a contract to the contrary. Employment at will grants both parties the right to terminate the relationship for any reason, or no reason, at any time without fear of legal liability. Beginning in the late 1950s, however, courts began to carve out certain exceptions to the atwill employment doctrine, thereby giving rise to tort claims for wrongful discharge. Certain employer practices provoked public disfavor, and unlimited employer discretion to fire employees eventually yielded to a more limited rule. In Connecticut, the traditional employment at-will doctrine is subject to certain limitations. The present case implicates a public policy exception similar to the one that our Supreme Court recognized in Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980).

In Sheets, the plaintiff was a quality control director and operations manager. During the course of his employment, the plaintiff noticed certain deviations from specifications on the defendant's product labels. Those deviations violated statutory provisions, and the plaintiff notified his employer of the mislabeling of products. The defendant terminated the plaintiff several months later. The plaintiff alleged that his dismissal violated an implied contract of employment, violated public policy and was malicious. Id., 473±n74.

Our Supreme Court addressed ''whether to recognize an exception to the traditional rules governing employment at will so as to permit a cause of action for wrongful discharge where the discharge contravenes a clear mandate of public policy.'' Id., 474. The court found it significant that the plaintiff in Sheets had responsibility for product quality control. Id., 479. Moreover, the legislature had established a public policy of consumer protection. Id. The court did not rest the decision on the violation of a statute governing public policy, stating: ''We need not decide whether violation of a state statute is invariably a prerequisite to the conclusion that a challenged discharge violates public policy. Certainly when there is a relevant state statute we should not ignore the statement of public policy that it represents.'' Id., 480. Even in the absence of a state statute, there is a growing receptivity to recognize as actionable tort claims for wrongful discharge by an employer arising out of termination for an employee's refusal to commit perjury, for filing a workers' compensation claim, for engaging in union activity or for serving on a jury. Id., 476±n77. The court determined that a cause of action for wrongful discharge will lie when the former employee can demonstrate an improper reason for the discharge, ''a reason whose impropriety is derived from some important violation of public policy.'' Id., 475. Sheets warns, however, that courts should proceed cautiously in their consideration of whether a public policy violation exists. Id., 477.

Later cases test and define the limits of ''an important violation of public policy.'' Id., 475. Because of the vagueness that inheres in the concept of public policy; Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., 200 Conn. 676, 680, 513 A.2d 66 (1986); we must make a case-by-case analysis of employee claims in such cases. Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588±n89, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). As background for the present case, we discuss cases in which the factual scenarios legitimately implicate public policy concerns and cases that do not.

In Morris, the defendant employer cited misappropriation of company funds as its reason for the plaintiff employee's termination. The plaintiff had brought an action in tort for wrongful discharge, claiming that his employer's false accusations of criminal conduct violated public policy. Our Supreme Court determined that the plaintiff's claim of wrongful discharge did not fall within the narrow Sheets exception to the terminable at-will rule because ...