Thibodeau v. State
| Decision Date | 12 September 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 13047,13047 |
| Citation | 298 N.W.2d 818 |
| Parties | Floyd John THIBODEAU, Petitioner and Appellant. v. STATE of South Dakota, Appellee. . Considered on Briefs |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Thomas M. Frankman of Willy, Pruitt, Matthews, Hurd, Farrell, Frankman & Johnson, Sioux Falls, for petitioner and appellant.
Mark Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for appellee; Mark V. Meierhenry, Atty. Gen., Pierre, on the brief.
Petitioner appeals from an order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm.
Petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder. See State v. Thibodeau, 89 S.D. 404, 233 N.W.2d 326 (1975). Jury Instruction Number 13 at petitioner's trial provided:
The term "premeditated design to effect the death" as used in the foregoing definition of murder means an intention, purpose or deliberation to kill or take the life of the person killed, distinctly formed and existing in the mind of the perpetrator before committing the act resulting in the death of the person killed.
A statute of this state provides that a premeditated design to effect death sufficient to constitute murder may be formed instantly before committing the act by which it is carried into execution. It is further provided that such design to effect death may be inferred from the fact of killing unless the circumstances raise a reasonable doubt whether such design existed. Such an inference is nothing more than a permissible deduction from the evidence and it is for the jury to determine whether or not such an inference is to be made in view of the facts and circumstances shown. (emphasis added)
Petitioner argues that the italicized portion of this instruction shifted the burden of proof of premeditated design to petitioner and created a conclusive presumption in violation of the due process clause. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979).
We considered an almost identical instruction in State v. Cody, 293 N.W.2d 440 (S.D.1980). We held:
Appellant maintains that the instruction shifted to him the burden of disproving an element of the crime charged, in violation of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). We disagree. The instruction embodied not that of a conclusive or mandatory presumption, but merely that of a permissible inference from which the jury was at liberty to draw its own conclusion after considering all the evidence presented. Cf. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Chamley
...that the perpetrator's intent was to "arouse or produce sexual gratification" in himself or his victims. Id.; see also, Thibodeau v. State, 298 N.W.2d 818, 819 (S.D.1980) (State must prove every element of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt). ¶55 In its findings of fact and conclus......
-
State v. Smith
...must prove each and every element of both rape and sexual contact, which included the identity of the perpetrator. Thibodeau v. State, 298 N.W.2d 818, 819 (S.D.1980). Evidence that is relevant to the charge of sexual contact is that of the alleged perpetrator's intent. State v. Champagne, 4......
-
State v. Eagle Star, 19439
...disagree. ¶26 It is well settled the State must prove every element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Thibodeau v. State, 298 N.W.2d 818, 819 (S.D.1980); State v. Cody, 293 N.W.2d 440, 452 (S.D.1980). See also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 ......