Thiele v. Kennedy, 73--164

• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: DIXON; STOUDER; STOUDER
• Citation: 309 N.E.2d 394,18 Ill.App.3d 465
• Parties: Dorothy S. THIELE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bernard J. KENNEDY and the County of Peoria, Defendants-Appellants.
• Docket Number: No. 73--164,73--164
• Decision Date: 29 March 1974

Page 394

309 N.E.2d 394 18 Ill.App.3d 465 Dorothy S. THIELE, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Bernard J. KENNEDY and the County of Peoria, Defendants-Appellants. No. 73--164. Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District. March 29, 1974.

[18 Ill.App.3d 466]

Page 395

Eugene L. White, Peoria, for defendants-appellants.

Jack C. Vieley, Peoria, for plaintiff-appellee.

DIXON, Justice.

This action was brought to recover damages occasioned by the alleged willful and wanton conduct of each defendant in the maintenance and supervision of Peoria County Jail. After a jury verdict for plaintiff, Dorothy S. Thiele, the Circuit Court of Peoria County entered judgment on the verdict in amount of $5000. This appeal is from that judgment.

The plaintiff alleged that while she was an inmate in the jail certain other inmates inflicted bodily harm upon her. She claimed that the defendant, Bernard J. Kennedy, Sheriff of Peoria County and defendant County of Peoria were each guilty of willful and wanton acts in allowing plaintiff to be exposed to allegedly dangerous persons. Defendants denied the acts charged and further claimed the benefit of statutory immunity from such a cause of action.

The basic issue is whether plaintiff's claim is barred by the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 85, par. 1--101 et seq.)

[18 Ill.App.3d 467] Plaintiff's cause of action is that defendants were each guilty of willful and wanton conduct in one or more of the following:

1. Allowed and permitted certain dangerous and violent persons to roam free and about the same tier of the jail where the plaintiff was even though the defendants knew of the dangerous and violent tendencies of said persons.

2. Allowed certain dangerous persons to remain alone and unguarded with the plaintiff without the presence and supervision of a matron.

3. Failed to lock said dangerous persons in separate cells.

4. Allowed certain dangerous persons the use and possession of a broom.

5. Failed to take the necessary precautions in order to protect the health and safety of the plaintiff and prevent injury and harm to her.

Section 2--201 of the Act provides that 'except as otherwise provided by Statute, a public employee serving in a position involving the determination of policy or the exercise of discretion is not liable for an injury resulting for his act or omission in determining policy when acting in the exercise of such discretion even though abused.' This immunity is the most significant protection afforded public employees by the Immunity Act. If the more specific immunities set forth in other sections of the Act do not apply, an employee's liability is governed and limited by its general terms. If he acts 'in determining policy when acting in the exercise of discretion even though abused' the employee is not liable for injuries he inflicts in the course of his official duties. And

Page 396

by virtue of section 2--109, the same protection from liability extends to the public entity for which the employee is working. If the employee is immune, so is his employer. Woodman v. Litchfield Community Sch. District No. 12, 102 Ill.App.2d 330, 242 N.E.2d 780.

Section 2--201 incorporates in statutory form all or at least a substantial part of existing case law governing employee immunities. The principle is that public officers...