Thiersaint v. Dep't of Homeland Sec.
| Decision Date | 25 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | 18-cv-12406-DJC |
| Parties | EMMANUEL THIERSAINT, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
EMMANUEL THIERSAINT, Plaintiff,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY et al., Defendants.
No. 18-cv-12406-DJC
United States District Court, D. Massachusetts
January 25, 2022
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Denise J. Casper United States District Judge.
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Emmanuel Thiersaint (“Thiersaint”) has filed this lawsuit against the United States, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) (collectively, the “United States”), the Suffolk County Sheriff's Department (“SCSD”), and William Chambers (“Chambers”) (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging violations of the Federal Tort Claims Act (the “FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1346, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (the “Rehabilitation Act”), the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12189 (the “ADA”) and constitutional violations. D. 1.[1] Thiersaint has moved for partial summary judgment against the United States, D. 144, and for summary judgment against SCSD, D. 149.
Defendants have also moved for summary judgment. D. 153, D. 160, D. 164. For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES Thiersaint's partial motion for summary judgment against the United States, D. 144, DENIES Thiersaint's motion for summary judgment against SCSD, D. 149, ALLOWS SCSD's motion for summary judgment, D. 153, ALLOWS the United States' motion for summary judgment, D. 160, and ALLOWS Chambers' motion for summary judgment, D. 164.
II. Standard of Review
The Court grants summary judgment where there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the undisputed facts demonstrate that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A fact is material if it carries with it the potential to affect the outcome of the suit under applicable law.” Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2000). The movant bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Carmona v. Toledo, 215 F.3d 124, 132 (1st Cir. 2000); see Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant meets its burden, the non-moving party may not rest on the allegations or denials in its pleadings, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986), but must come forward with specific admissible facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Borges ex rel. S.M.B.W. v. Serrano-Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2010). The Court “view[s] the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, drawing reasonable inferences in his favor.” Noonan v. Staples, Inc., 556 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2009).
“Cross-motions for summary judgment do not alter the basic Rule 56 standard, but rather simply require [the Court] to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not disputed.” Adria Int'l Grp., Inc. v. Ferre Dev., Inc., 241 F.3d 103, 107 (1st Cir. 2001). “When facing cross-motions for summary judgment, a court must rule on each motion independently, deciding in each instance whether the moving party has met its burden under Rule 56.” Dan Barclay, Inc. v. Stewart & Stevenson Servs., Inc., 761 F.Supp. 194, 197-98
(D. Mass. 1991).
III. Factual Background
Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed. These facts are drawn from the various statements of undisputed material facts, D. 146, 151, D. 162, D. 174, each party's response to the same, D. 187, D. 192, D. 194, D. 197, D. 209, and the documents attached thereto.
Thiersaint is a lawful permanent resident of the United States who immigrated from Haiti in 1994. D. 146 ¶ 1; D. 187 ¶ 1. Following a serious car accident in 1997, Thiersaint's right leg was amputated above the knee, D. 146 ¶ 13; D. 187 ¶ 13. Between February and April 2016, Thiersaint used a wheelchair. D. 146 ¶ 15; D. 187 ¶ 15. Thiersaint has also experienced significant symptoms of depression, including suicidal thoughts, since the early 2000s and first sought psychiatric care in 2003 following a suicide attempt. D. 146 ¶ 20; D. 187 ¶ 20.
On February 5, 2016, DHS and ICE detained Thiersaint to remove him from the United States. D. 146 ¶ 3; D. 187 ¶ 3. ICE initially detained Thiersaint at Franklin County House of Correction (“FCHC”) in Greenfield, Massachusetts from February 5 to February 18, 2016. D. 146 ¶ 5; D. 187 ¶ 5.
A. Detention at SCHC and LaSalle
On February 18, 2016, Thiersaint arrived at Suffolk County House of Correction (“SCHC”), run by the SCSD, and was housed there in the Medical Housing Unit (“MHU”) until February 29, 2016. D. 151 ¶ 29; D. 197 ¶ 29. Naphcare, Inc. (“Naphcare”), the contracted medical provider for the SCHC, determined during Thiersaint's initial screening that he would be housed in the MHU, D. 151 ¶ 37; D. 197 ¶ 37, given his “recent fall in November of 2015, his above the knee amputation, his recent mobility issues regarding his broken prosthesis, and wheelchair use, ” he should be admitted to the MHU. D. 197 ¶ 37 (citing D. 156-27 ¶¶ 9, 17). Thiersaint was kept
in the MHU partly due to concerns about whether he was able to “transfer” himself from his wheelchair to the shower, toilet or other facilities. D. 151 ¶ 45; D. 197 ¶ 45. While housed in the MHU, Thiersaint was permitted no more than one hour per day to engage in recreational activities. D. 151 ¶ 40; D. 197 ¶ 40. Chambers was an ICE deportation officer who served as the ICE liaison between ICE detainees and staff at SCHC. D. 166 ¶¶ 1-2; D. 186 ¶¶ 1-2.
Although Thiersaint claims he requested placement with the general population, D. 151 ¶ 43, he did not file any sick slips, submit a grievance or a written request for accommodation during this period. D. 174 ¶ 52; D. 194 ¶ 52. On February 24 or February 27, 2016, Thiersaint was cleared to return to general population in Building 8 but remained housed in the MHU at the SCHC until his departure for another facility a few days later on February 29, 2016. D. 151 ¶¶ 47-48; D. 197 ¶¶ 47-48.
On February 29, 2016, Thiersaint was transported from SCHC to Newark International Airport, D. 162 ¶ 33; D. 192 ¶ 33, which entailed ground transportation from Connecticut to Newark, New Jersey, D. 162 ¶ 35; D. 192 ¶ 35. Once in Newark, Thiersaint was flown to Alexandria, Louisiana and detained at LaSalle ICE Processing Center (“LaSalle”) from February 29, 2016 to March 3, 2016. D. 151 ¶ 7; D. 197 ¶ 7; D. 196-5 at 10. Thiersaint claims he was not assisted during his ground transport from Connecticut to New Jersey, D. 1 ¶¶ 68-72, or when he disembarked from the aircraft in Louisiana, Id. ¶ 79.
B. Transport to Krome North Service Processing Center
On March 3, 2016, Thiersaint was transported from LaSalle via the Alexandria International Airport in Louisiana and the Miami International Airport in Florida. D. 146 ¶ 23; D. 187 ¶ 23. When Thiersaint boarded the plane at Alexandria International Airport, ICE officers used a specialized chair to help Thiersaint board. D. 146 ¶ 33; D. 187 ¶ 33. Thiersaint and the
United States dispute whether Thiersaint was assisted in deplaning the aircraft upon arrival from Miami and whether Thiersaint had to drag himself down the stairway step by step. D. 146 ¶¶ 33-37, 41; D. 187 ¶¶ 33-37, 41. Thiersaint and the United States also dispute whether Thiersaint was placed into a wheelchair after descending the stairs to reach a van that would transport Thiersaint to Krome. D. 146 ¶ 49; D. 187 ¶ 49. The van ICE used to transport him from airport in Miami to Krome was a non-wheelchair accessible van. D. 146 ¶ 50; D. 187 ¶ 50. Thiersaint claims he was forced to board the van by placing pressure on his left leg, turning around, sitting on the ground and crawling into the van. D. 146 ¶ 70. The United States claims that once at the bottom of the stairs, Thiersaint was placed into a wheelchair and Miami HUB officers assisted him to a van. D. 187 ¶ 70.
At the time, the United States contracted with CSI Aviation, Inc. (“CSI”) to provide air charter flight services for ICE Air Operations (“IAO”) flights originating out of Miami and Alexandria. D. 187 ¶ 23. According to the ICE Air Operations Handbook, “[f]or safety reasons, detainees who are unable to board the aircraft on their own will not be boarded on the aircraft without authorization in advance from the ICE FOIC and/or the IAO [ICE Air Operations] SDDO.” D. 146 ¶ 30; D. 187 ¶ 30. The Handbook also states that ““[t]ransport chairs are available for detainees with decreased mobility or paralysis. Under these circumstances, detainees will need to be transported with wheelchairs, crutches, and/or any other available medical assistance equipment to final destinations. Officers will not carry detainees aboard the aircraft.” Id. ¶ 31.
C. Detention at Krome North Service Processing Center
On Thiersant's March 3, 2016 arrival at Krome, a detention facility in Miami owned and operated by ICE, an ICE Health Service Corps (“IHSC”) employee conducted a screening of Thiersaint and completed his medical intake form. Thiersaint was then placed in Krome's MHU,
D. 146 ¶¶ 75, 79; D. 187 ¶¶ 75, 79, where he spent the entirety of his detention there from March 3 to March 17, 2016, D. 146 ¶ 80; D. 187 ¶ 80. The parties dispute whether Thiersaint was required to be in his MHU cell for twenty or more hours per day, D. 146 ¶ 81; D. 187 ¶ 81, although they do not dispute that Thiersaint was permitted to have recreation with other individuals in the MHU, D. 146 ¶ 82; D. 187 ¶ 82.
While detained at Krome's MHU, Thiersaint was placed on fall precautions, with his bed set to the lowest position with both side rails up, and he was advised to notify staff if he needed assistance ambulating or if he had any medical concerns. D. 162 ¶ 111; D. 192 ¶ 111. He had access to the law library, which he used on several occasions, although Thiersaint disputes whether his access was to the same extent of those in the general...
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