Thies v. Renner, No. 47

CourtSupreme Court of South Dakota
Writing for the CourtROBERTS; BIEGELMEIER; BIEGELMEIER
Citation78 S.D. 617,106 N.W.2d 253
PartiesLevi THIES, John W. Gustafson and Elmer Brockel, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Myrtle A. RENNER, Orval Kightlinger, Karl Mitzel, Campbell County Board of Education, a Public Corporation of the State of South Dakota, and the Mound City Common School Districtefendants and Respondents.
Decision Date23 November 1960
Docket NumberD,No. 47,No. 9869

Page 253

106 N.W.2d 253
78 S.D. 617
Levi THIES, John W. Gustafson and Elmer Brockel, Plaintiffs
and Appellants,
v.
Myrtle A. RENNER, Orval Kightlinger, Karl Mitzel, Campbell
County Board of Education, a Public Corporation of the State
of South Dakota, and the Mound City Common School District
No. 47, Defendants and Respondents.
No. 9869.
Supreme Court of South Dakota.
Nov. 23, 1960.

Page 254

[78 S.D. 619] Chas. E. Gorsuch, Aberdeen, for plaintiffs and appellants.

C. W. Renz, Erwin L. Wiest, Herreid, for defendants and respondents.

ROBERTS, Presiding Judge.

This action for injunctive relief was instituted on January 8, 1960, by three residents, property owners and taxpayers of that territory which previous to a reorganization was known as Valley Common School District No. 13 hereinafter referred to as District No. 13. In the early part of January, 1959, proceedings were initiated to create Mound City School District No. 47 to include District No. 13 and three other school districts in Campbell County. Plaintiffs contend that defendant Campbell County Board of Education failed to comply with certain statutory requirements in purportedly creating a reorganized district to include District No. 13 and transferring its property and assets to the reorganized district. The trial court granted a motion to dismiss on the ground among others that an appeal was the proper remedy available to the plaintiffs to review proceedings of the county board of education and that an action for injunctive relief would not lie. Plaintiffs appeal.

It is the contention of the plaintiffs that the Campbell County Board of Education lacked jurisdiction to proceed with the reorganization and that a court of equity in a direct proceeding brought for that purpose could review the matter. Plaintiffs alleged two acts of illegality. They first allege that defendant Board did not prepare and adopt a master plan for reorganization. The second is that a sufficient number of signers was not obtained in District No. 13. They further allege in their complaint that unless the legality of the reorganization be considered by the court the transfer of the property and assets of District No. 13 will deprive plaintiffs of property without due process of law. There are also incorporating allegations, by reference, of all the files and records of the Campbell County Board of Education.

[78 S.D. 620] SDC 1960 Supp. 15.20 is entitled 'School District Organization'. It is this chapter that provides for the consolidation of school districts or any alteration in their boundaries. The last section in that chapter, 15.2023, conferring a right of review of matters provided in the chapter, reads: 'Any party feeling aggrieved by any decision of the county board, the State Superintendent, or the State Board of Education involving the preparation and approval of the master plan or involving any other decision which such boards or State Superintendent are obligated or empowered to make under the provisions of this chapter shall be entitled to appeal such decision within ninety days to the Circuit Court and from there to the Supreme Court under the same limitations and procedures provided by law for appeal of all school board decisions.' This procedure was not followed by the plaintiffs. The crucial question argued is whether the alleged illegalities in the proceedings of defendant board which resulted in a reorganization of the four school districts and the adjustment of their assets, debts and liabilities because of the change may be raised by an action for injunctive relief or whether the appeal

Page 255

provided by statute was the exclusive remedy of the plaintiffs.

The Legislature in the exercise of its power to establish and maintain a system of public schools may vest authority in proper boards or officers to create, organize, or alter school districts. Snow v. South Shore Independent School Dist., 66 S.D. 379, 283 N.W. 530 and cases cited. The alteration of school districts in such manner as the Legislature prescribes is purely administrative and is not the taking of property and statutes in authorizing such changes do not deny equal protection or due process of law. See Stephens v. Jones, 24 S.D. 97, 123 N.W. 705. The following statement in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 28 S.Ct. 40, 46, 52 L.Ed. 151, quoted with approval in Williams v. Book, 75 S.D. 173, 61 N.W.2d 290, is equally applicable to the alteration of school districts: 'The state, * * * may take without compensation such property, hold it itself,...

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13 practice notes
  • Stene v. School Bd. of Beresford Independent School Dist., No. 68 of Union County, Nos. 11174
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of South Dakota
    • April 2, 1973
    ...of their contention that the levies were excessive. Olson v. Pulaski Common School District, 77 S.D. 416, 92 N.W.2d 678; Thies v. Renner, 78 S.D. 617, 106 N.W.2d 253. The fact that their appeals were timely taken from the board's transfer decisions does not afford them another opportunity t......
  • Dunker v. Brown County Bd. of Ed., Nos. 10009
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of South Dakota
    • April 15, 1963
    ...Its actions in regard thereto do not come within the due process clause of either the state or federal constitutions. Thies v. Renner, 78 S.D. 617, 106 N.W.2d 253. By the act here involved the legislature delegated that function to the County Board of Education. The actions of the Board in ......
  • Anderson v. Kennedy, No. 61-2
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of South Dakota
    • April 6, 1978
    ...to show cause was held on June 28, 1977. The trial court denied the interlocutory injunction on the authority of Thies v. Renner, 1960, 78 S.D. 617, 106 N.W.2d 253, ruling that the only relief available to the appellants was by an appeal from the Board's action under SDCL The Board opened t......
  • Builders Supply Co., Inc. v. Carr, No. 12051
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of South Dakota
    • March 1, 1979
    ...an order for judgment on the pleadings even though the motion was not in strict compliance with SDCL 15-6-12(c). Thies v. Renner, 1960, 78 S.D. 617, 106 N.W.2d 253. A motion to dismiss is an expeditious remedy to test the legal sufficiency of a pleading and deals only with questions of law ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
13 cases
  • Stene v. School Bd. of Beresford Independent School Dist., No. 68 of Union County, Nos. 11174
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of South Dakota
    • April 2, 1973
    ...of their contention that the levies were excessive. Olson v. Pulaski Common School District, 77 S.D. 416, 92 N.W.2d 678; Thies v. Renner, 78 S.D. 617, 106 N.W.2d 253. The fact that their appeals were timely taken from the board's transfer decisions does not afford them another opportunity t......
  • Dunker v. Brown County Bd. of Ed., Nos. 10009
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of South Dakota
    • April 15, 1963
    ...Its actions in regard thereto do not come within the due process clause of either the state or federal constitutions. Thies v. Renner, 78 S.D. 617, 106 N.W.2d 253. By the act here involved the legislature delegated that function to the County Board of Education. The actions of the Board in ......
  • Anderson v. Kennedy, No. 61-2
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of South Dakota
    • April 6, 1978
    ...to show cause was held on June 28, 1977. The trial court denied the interlocutory injunction on the authority of Thies v. Renner, 1960, 78 S.D. 617, 106 N.W.2d 253, ruling that the only relief available to the appellants was by an appeal from the Board's action under SDCL The Board opened t......
  • Builders Supply Co., Inc. v. Carr, No. 12051
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of South Dakota
    • March 1, 1979
    ...an order for judgment on the pleadings even though the motion was not in strict compliance with SDCL 15-6-12(c). Thies v. Renner, 1960, 78 S.D. 617, 106 N.W.2d 253. A motion to dismiss is an expeditious remedy to test the legal sufficiency of a pleading and deals only with questions of law ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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