Thigpen v. Dodd's Truck Lines, Inc.
| Decision Date | 14 August 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 34780,34780 |
| Citation | 498 S.W.2d 816 |
| Parties | Thurellen THIGPEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DODD'S TRUCK LINES, INC., a corporation, Defendant-Respondent. . Louis District, Division One |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Igoe & Igoe, St. Louis, for plaintiff-appellant.
Moser, Marsalek, Carpenter, Cleary, Jaeckel, Keaney & Brown, St. Louis, for defendant-respondent.
From an adverse jury verdict and judgment in her personal injury action, the plaintiff has appealed. We affirm.
On May 12, 1971 Thurellen Thigpen, the plaintiff, was sitting in a parked vehicle on Wright Street near its intersection with Broadway in St. Louis. A truck owned by the defendant and operated by one of its agents turned into Wright from Broadway and struck the left rear fender of the parked vehicle. Plaintiff alleged in her petition that as a result of the collision she sustained permanent injuries over a major part of her body, particularly to her neck, back, chest and knees. She claimed medical expenses in the approximate sum of $1,500.00 and future medical expenses. In addition, she alleged she had been caused to lose time from her regular employment resulting in a loss of earnings in the approximate sum of $1,000.00, and that she would lose future wages not capable of being ascertained. Describing generally the effect of the trauma, she charged in her petition that the function of the parts of her body which had previously been described and her ability to work and to labor had been greatly impaired and diminished.
At the time of interrogating the jury panel on voir dire and in his opening statement defendant's counsel admitted the occurrence of the collision and stated that defendant was not disputing that it had 'some responsibility' for the occurrence of the accident. The only thing that defendant was disputing was 'the severity of this injury, the type of injury, and her (plaintiff's) present condition.'
The first contention raised on this appeal by the plaintiff is that the trial court erred in permitting defendant's counsel to inquire as to the reason for plaintiff's termination of employment at St. John's Mercy Hospital in November of 1971. This occurred during cross-examination of the employment manager of the hospital who was brought into court by subpoena duces tecum calling for the hospital's work and payroll records of the plaintiff. The court allowed defendant's counsel to develop the fact that the employment records indicated plaintiff had been discharged subsequent to her return to work after the accident because of sleeping on duty. In support of her contention of error, plaintiff states that since she had returned to her regular duties by September 2, 1971 and did not claim damages for diminished ability to work after that time, the issue as to her termination of employment was entirely collateral to the issues in the case. She submits that the overwhelming prejudicial effect of the development of this fact concerning her discharge for sleeping on duty far outweighed any probative weight the collateral issue of plaintiff's ability to work in November of 1971 might have had.
We cannot recognize any merit in this first point raised by plaintiff. At the time the cross-examination occurred, the pleadings, as previously recited, alleged permanent injury with impairment of her earning capacity and a diminished ability to work in the future. She affirmatively stated in her petition that she would in the future be required to lose further time and sums. It should also be noted that this cross-examination occurred during the early part of the trial of the case. The employment manager of the hospital had been preceded by plaintiff's physician and a witness who produced work records of the plaintiff. Her physician had testified that plaintiff would be troubled all her life by low back pain resulting from the accident. And even subsequent to the challenged cross-examination plaintiff testified that she could no longer perform many of the duties required of her in her work. Considering these facts and the pleadings, it is clear that the impairment of plaintiff's earning ability was a significant and important element of her claim for damages. Since she had raised the issue of her future earning capacity,...
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Carthen v. Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis
...192, 198 (Mo.App.1977); Yellow Service Co. v. Human Development Corp., 539 S.W.2d 713, 714 (Mo.App.1976); Thigpen v. Dodd's Truck Lines, Inc., 498 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Mo.App.1973). This point does not comply with the rules. We will, however, consider it, and attempt to determine their complain......
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Cain v. Buehner and Buehner
...Yellow Service Company, Inc. v. Human Development Corp. of St. Louis, 539 S.W.2d 713, 714 (Mo.App.1976); Thigpen v. Dodd's Truck Lines, Inc., 498 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Mo.App.1973). Although Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he is bound by the same rules as a party represented by counsel. Williams......
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Mays v. Penzel Const. Co., 56464
...subject to a limiting instruction. Dyer v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 378 S.W.2d 570, 581 (Mo.1964); Thigpen v. Dodd's Truck Lines, 498 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Mo.App.1973). Moreover, a trial court commits reversible error if it fails to give a withdrawal instruction when evidence raises a fal......
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Parker v. Pine
...and extent of cross-examination will not be disturbed on appeal unless abuse of discretion is clearly shown. Thigpen v. Dodd's Truck Lines, Inc., 498 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Mo.App.1973); Krez v. Mickel, 431 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Mo.1968). No hard and fast rule can be laid down regarding the extent cro......