Thomas Adams v. Benjamin Cowen

• Decision Date: 01 October 1898
• Docket Number: No. 113,113
• Citation: 20 S.Ct. 668,177 U.S. 471,44 L.Ed. 851
• Parties: THOMAS M. ADAMS and E. C. Means, Administrators, with the Will Annexed, of Tomas W. Means, Petitioners , v. BENJAMIN R. COWEN, Evan F. Williams, and A. S. Frazer, Trustees. of
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

177 U.S. 471

20 S.Ct. 668

44 L.Ed. 851

THOMAS M. ADAMS and E. C. Means, Administrators, with the Will Annexed, of Tomas W. Means, Petitioners,

v BENJAMIN R. COWEN, Evan F. Williams, and A. S. Frazer, Trustees.

No. 113 of October Term, 1898.

Argued January 9, 10, 1899.

Affirmed by Divided Court May 22, 1899. [See Book 43, p. 1188.]

Leave granted to file petition for rehearing May 22, 1899.

Rehearing granted October 30, 1899.

Reargued January 10, 11, 1900.

Decided April 16, 1900.

On November 16, 1891, the respondents, trustees for the wife and children of William Means, filed their bill in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kentucky against the petitioners as administrators (with the will annexed) of Thomas W. Means, deceased, and John Means, a son of said Thomas W. Means. The case passed to hearing in that court upon pleadings and proofs, and resulted in a decree, on July 31, 1895, in favor of the defendants, dismissing the bill. From such dismissal the plaintiffs appealed to the circuit court of appeals for the sixth circuit, which court, on February 8, 1897, reversed the decree of dismissal, and entered a decree in favor of the plaintiffs. 47 U. S. App. 439, 78 Fed. Rep. 536, 24 C. C. A. 198, 47 U. S. App. 676, 80 Fed. Rep. 448, 25 C. C. A. 547. On May 24, 1897, a petition was filed in this court for a certiorari, which was allowed, and on December 6, 1897, the certiorari and return were duly filed. At the October term, 1898, of this court, after argument and on May 22, 1899, the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals was affirmed by a divided court. Thereafter, upon petition, a rehearing was ordered, and the case was argued at the present term before a full bench.

The facts are these: Thomas W. Means, a resident of Ashland, Kentucky, died there on June 8, 1890, leaving an estate consisting chiefly of personal property, which was appraised (including the notes of his son, William Means for $136,035.75) at $752,302.44. He left four children, John Means, William Means, Margaret A. Means, and Mary A. Adams, and one grandson, Thomas M. Culbertson, the only child of a deceased daughter. Some ten years prior to his death, and on July 20, 1880, he made a will, in which, after provisions for the payment of his debts, funeral expenses, and expenses of administration, were these two items:

'Item 4. I give, devise, and bequeath all the residue and remainder of my estate, personal, real, and mixed, wherever situated or located, of which I shall die possessed, to be equally divided among my four children, John Means, William Means, Mary A. Adams, and Margaret A. Means, and my grandson, Thomas M. Culbertson (son and sole heir of my deceased daughter, Sarah Jane Culbertson), who shall be living at the time of my decease, and the issue of any child now living, and of said grandson, who may then have deceased, such issue taking the share to which such child or grandson would be entitled if living. But said share given, devised, and bequeathed to said grandson or his issue is to be held in trust as hereinafter provided, and to be subject to the provisions hereinafter contained as to said grandson's share.

'Item 5. I have made advances to my said children which are charged to them respectively on my books, and I may make further advances to them respectively, or to some of them, and to my said grandson, which may be charged on my books to their respective accounts. I desire the equal provision, herein made for said children, and the provision for said grandson, to be a provision for them respectively, in addition to said advances made and that may hereafter be made, and that in the division, distribution, and settlement of my said estate said advances made and that may hereafter be made, be treated, not as advancements, but as gifts not in any manner to be accounted for by my said children and grandson, or any of them, or the issue of any of them.'

Thomas W. Means was a prosperous iron manufacturer, who had, as stated, accumulated in his lifetime a large estate. For many years he had been in the habit of letting his children have money. This he had been doing for at least twenty-five years before the making of the will. This money was not given to them in equal sums at regular or irregular intervals. In other words, he was not making a partial and equal distribution of his estate in advance of his death, but the money was paid to or for one or another of his children as occasion seemed to call for it. Accounts were entered with each of these children in his books, and the money thus paid to or for them was charged against them in these accounts, so that upon the face of the books they stood as debtors to him for the amounts so charged. The amounts thus charged were sometimes large. The accounts were often reduced by money or property returned to the father. So the father dealt separately with each child, letting him or her have money whenever in his judgment the interest of the child called for it. He was helping them in their business, paying their debts, and otherwise using his large properties for their benefit. At the same time the accounts were kept in his books in such a way as to indicate that he retained a claim against each child for the balance shown on such account. He made memoranda on his books, such as this at the head of John's account: 'This account and the accounts of William Means and Mary A. Adams are not to be charged with interest when final settlement is made, or at any time. Thomas W. Means.' With that as the relation between himself and children, Thomas W. Means made the will containing the two items above quoted. He was then seventy-seven years old. At the date of the will the accounts showed the following debtor balances:

John.............. $79,214 36

William............ 58,409 54

Mrs. Adams......... 51,207 48

Margaret........... 39,120 78

Mrs. Culbertson.... 29,609 82

In 1888 a bank in Cincinnati, of which William was president, failed, a failure which brought financial ruin to William. To relieve him from the embarrassment and dangers whch threatened by reason of such failure, a large sum of money was paid out by Thomas W. Means for William's benefit. The question presented in this case is whether the money thus paid out is to be held a part of William's share of his father's estate, or whether it is to be deducted from the estate and the division made of the balance between the five legatees.

Mr. Lawrence Maxwell, Jr., for petitioners.

Messrs. Judson Harmon, J. J. Glidden and H. P. Whitaker for respondents.

Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court:

The primary question is upon the construction of the fifth item of the will of Thomas W. Means. If there had been no such item of course all sums due from the children and grandchild to the father and grandfather would be part of the property of his estate and to be counted in determining the sum to be divided among the five in accordance with item 4. But item 5 evidently contemplated that some amounts were to be deducted from the gross sum of the decedent's property before a division was to be made. What were those deductions? What did the testator intend should be deducted? For, in the absence of some absolute and controlling rule of law to the contrary, the intentions of a testator, as deduced from the language of the will, construed in the light of the circumstances surrounding him at the date of its execution, always control as to the disposition of the estate. Without entering into any discussion we make these quotations from prior decisions of this court. In Smith v. Bell, 6 Pet. 68, 8 L. ed. 322, it was said by Chief Justice Marshall:

'The first and great rule in the exposition of wills, to which all other rules must bend, is that the intention of the testator expressed in his will shall prevail, provided it be consistent with the rules of law. [Davie v. Stephens] 1 Dougl. 322; [Perrin v. Blake] 1 W. Bl. 672. This principle is generally asserted in the construction of every testamentary disposition. It is emphatically the will of the person who makes it, and is defined to be 'the legal declaration of a man's intentions which he wills to be performed after his death.' 2 Bl. Com. 499. These intentions are to be collected from his words and ought to be carried into effect if they be consistent with law. In the construction of ambiguous expressions, the situation of the parties may properly be taken into view. The ties which connect the testator with his legatees, the affection subsisting between them, the motives which may reasonably be supposed to operate with him and to influence him in the disposition of his property, are all entitled to consideration in expounding doubtful words and ascertaining the meaning in which the testator used them. . . . No rule is better settled than that the whole will is to be taken together, and is to be so construed as to give effect, if it be possible, to the whole. . . . Notwithstanding the reasonableness and good sense of this general rule, that the intention shall prevail, it has been sometimes disregarded. If the testator attempts to effect that which the law forbids, his will must yield to the rules of law. But courts have sometimes gone farther. The construction put upon words in one will has been supposed to furnish a rule for construing the same words in other wills; and thereby to furnish some settled and fixed rules of construction which ought to be respected. We cannot say that this principle ought to be totally disregarded; but it should never be carried so far as to defeat the plain intent, if that intent may be carried into execution without violating the rules of law. It has been said truly ([Gulliver v. Poyntz] 3 Wils. 141) 'that cases on wills may guide us to general rules of construction; but unless a case cited be in every respect directly in point, and agree in every circumstance, it will have little or no weight with the court, who...