Thomas & Bullis v. Stricker Land & Timber Co., Inc.

• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: FOURNET, Justice.
• Citation: Thomas & Bullis v. Stricker Land & Timber Co., Inc., 181 La. 784, 160 So. 413 (La. 1935)
• Decision Date: 04 March 1935
• Docket Number: 33126
• Parties: THOMAS & BULLIS v. STRICKER LAND & TIMBER CO., Inc

160 So. 413

181 La. 784

THOMAS & BULLIS v. STRICKER LAND & TIMBER CO., Inc

No. 33126

Supreme Court of Louisiana

March 4, 1935

Rehearing Denied April 1, 1935

Appeal from Seventh Judicial District Court, Parish of Concordia; R R. Reeves, Judge.

Suit by Thomas & Bullis against the Stricker Land & Timber Company Inc. From an adverse judgment, plaintiffs appeal.

Affirmed.

G. P. Bullis, of Vidalia, for appellants.

Hugh Tullis, of Vidalia, Paul G. Borron, of Plaquemine, and Ackland H. Jones, of Woodville, Miss., for appellee.

OPINION

FOURNET, Justice.

This is a suit to establish title to real estate in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 38 of 1908, where neither claimant is in actual possession, with the alternative plea that, in the event the court should find the property in dispute to be in the possession of defendant, the court then should treat the matter as a petitory action.

The basis of plaintiffs' claim is a tax sale and deed, dated June 19, 1926, for the unpaid taxes of the year 1925, covering land assessed in the name of G. W. Armstrong, which is described as follows: "Batture on Boyd's Island, Sand-Bar, situated in Concordia parish, La."

For the purpose of this decision, it will be unnecessary to discuss the several exceptions. Suffice it to say that in response to an exception of vagueness, the plaintiffs amended their original petition and described the land claimed by them, by virtue of said tax title, as all the lands "that lie within an immense bend or bow in the Mississippi river and is bounded north, west and south by the Mississippi river, east by the boundary line between the States of Louisiana and Mississippi, being all of the land within said boundaries except sections 65, 66 and 67 and 68 of Township 5 North Range 9 East, which is included within said boundaries."

Defendant filed an exception of no cause or right of action which was referred to the merits.

In the trial, the deed under which defendant acquired the property was offered in evidence. It developed that defendant was in possession of the lands claimed by the plaintiffs at the time of the institution of this suit. Necessarily, under the plaintiffs' own pleadings, they must resort to a petitory action and establish their title as required by Code of Practice, art. 44.

Defendant contends that its title is not in issue until plaintiffs have proved an apparently valid title in themselves, and that the alleged tax sale did not convey any title whatsoever to any property belonging to plaintiffs, for the reason that the description of the property purporting to be conveyed in the tax deed is too vague, uncertain, and indefinite.

The settled jurisprudence of this state is that the title of the defendant in a petitory action is not at issue until the plaintiff has proved an apparently valid title in himself. See Smith v. Chappell, 177 La. 311, 148 So. 242; Mecom v. Graves, 148 La. 369, 86 So. 917.

Now the question, therefore, for our determination is whether or not the description in the tax deed of plaintiffs is sufficient to identify the property or to make it susceptible of identification.

Section 1 of Act No. 140 of 1890 provides that:

"For the purpose of taxation and tax sales it shall be sufficient to assess and describe all property according to such a description as will reasonably identify the property assessed; such as designating the tract or lot by the name by which it is commonly known, or by the number or letter by which it may be usually designated upon the regular assessment rolls, or upon an official or...