Thomas ex rel. Silva v. City of Blue Island
| Decision Date | 05 March 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 15 C 11183 |
| Parties | BETH THOMAS, individually and on behalf of the ESTATE OF ROBERT THOMAS SILVA, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF BLUE ISLAND, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:
On December 11, 2015, Plaintiff Beth Thomas, individually and on behalf of the Estate of Robert Thomas Silva, brought this lawsuit against Defendants City of Blue Island, Illinois ("Blue Island") and Blue Island Police Officers Michael Cornell and Kevin Sisk alleging constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims pursuant to the Court's supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Before the Court are Defendants' motions for summary judgment brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). For the following reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' summary judgment motions. The remaining claims in this lawsuit include Plaintiff's state law intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Defendant Cornell as alleged in Count IV and Plaintiff's respondeat superior and indemnification claims against Blue Island in Counts VI and VII.1
Plaintiff Beth Thomas is the mother of Robert Silva ("Robby"), an 11-year-old boy, who was killed by a hit-and-run driver while sledding with friends in Blue Island on December 1, 2005. Defendant Michael Cornell ("Cornell") has been the Acting Chief of Police for the Blue Island Police Department ("BIPD") since May 2013. (Id. ¶ 4.) At the time of the hit-and-run until July 15, 2008, Defendant Cornell was a Detective Sergeant for the BIPD. (Id. ¶ 5.) The BIPD began investigating the hit-and-run on the day of the accident, and as the Detective Sergeant, Defendant Cornell was in charge of overseeing the entire hit-and-run investigation. Doug Hoglund was the BIPD's Chief of Police at the time of the hit-and-run accident until May 2012. (Id. ¶ 8.)
In April 2007, Plaintiff learned that Vince Kolodziej ("Kolodziej") may have been involved in her son's death. (Defs.' Stmt. Facts ¶ 12; R. 75-2, Pl.'s 5/7/12 Letter to Chief Hogund, at 2.) In particular, Plaintiff heard from one of Kolodziej's family members that Kolodziej was possibly involved in the hit-and-run accident and was living in Florida. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 14.) During the Silva investigation, Plaintiff gave Defendant Cornell "information regarding Kolodziej and individuals he may have had contact with, or been in contact with, as well as information regarding Jennifer Riley," who was Koldoziej's girlfriend. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 18.)
On March 27, 2007, Defendant Cornell and Detective Ismael Haro went to Riley's house to interview her about Kolodziej's whereabouts at the time of the hit-and-run accident. (Id. ¶ 18.) Defendant Cornell came away from the interview with concerns about Riley's truthfulness. (Id.) Two days after interviewing Riley, Defendant Cornell requested that she come down to the police station to take a polygraph test. (Id. ¶ 19.) A Cook County Sheriff's Department Detective, Richard Williams, conducted the polygraph examination of Riley. (Id.) DefendantCornell testified that based on a conversation he had with Williams, he believed that Riley had told the truth during her polygraph test. (Id. ¶ 22.) On March 31, 2007, Defendant Cornell drafted a report stating that Riley had passed the polygraph test. (Id. ¶ 23; Pl.'s Stmt. Facts ¶ 18.) Defendant Cornell also told Chief Hoglund that Riley passed the polygraph examination. (Pl.'s Stmt. Facts ¶ 20.) Nonetheless, on April 2, 2007, Williams issued a letter containing his formal conclusion stating that Riley's polygraph examination was inconclusive. (Defs.' Stmt. Facts ¶ 24; Pl.'s Stmt. Facts ¶ 19.) Also, at some point during the Silva investigation, Defendant Cornell approached Plaintiff telling her that her son's death was "just an accident" and that she needed to move on. (Pl.'s Stmt. Facts ¶ 40.)
After the 2007 Riley polygraph examination, the BIPD did not exclude Kolodziej as a suspect, and continued investigating him, including interviewing members of Kolodziej's family and continuing a dialogue with the Cook County State's Attorney's Office about charging Kolodziej with a crime. (Defs.' Stmt. Facts ¶ 29.) That being said, Chief Hoglund testified that the fact that the BIPD thought Riley passed the polygraph examination could have set the investigation on a different course because it might indicate that Kolodziej was not involved. (Pl.'s Stmt. Facts ¶ 21.) Chief Hoglund also testified that after he reviewed the Silva investigation file in 2012, he concluded that Defendant Cornell had falsified and misrepresented Riley's polygraph findings. (Id. ¶ 24.)
In the interim, on July 15, 2008, Defendant Cornell's direct involvement in the Silva investigation ended because he left the Detective Division to become the BIPD's Deputy Chief. (Defs.' Stmt. Facts ¶ 31; Pl.'s Stmt. Facts ¶ 4.) Thereafter, Detective Haro took over as head of the Detective Division reporting directly to Chief Hoglund. (Id. ¶ 32.) In March 2009, Plaintiff contacted Detective Haro to ask him to take a fresh look at her son's case, and after talking toDetective Haro, Plaintiff knew that Kolodziej was still a suspect. (Id. ¶¶ 33, 34.) In October 2009, Plaintiff met with BIPD Officers Bernadine Rzab and Jeff Werniak, at which time they talked about Kolodziej as a person of interest. (Id. ¶ 35.) While Officer Rzab was investigating the Silva hit-and-run, she discovered that although the BIPD policy is to keep investigation files in the detective division, Defendant Cornell had kept the Silva investigation file in his desk drawer until 2009 when Officer Rzab asked for it. (Pl.'s Stmt. Facts ¶¶ 9, 12-15.) Thereafter, Officer Rzab corrected Defendant Cornell's March 2007 polygraph report by indicating that Riley's polygraph examination was inconclusive. (Defs.' Stmt. Facts ¶ 26.)
In 2012, due to Detective Haro's concerns about the deficiencies in the Silva investigation and the inconsistencies in the 2007 Riley polygraph reports, he requested that the South Suburban Major Crimes Task Force ("Task Force") assist in the Silva investigation, after which Chief of Police Hoglund authorized the Task Force's involvement. (Id. ¶¶ 38, 39.) The Task Force investigators located Kolodziej in Florida, and traveled to Texas and Florida to interview witnesses and Kolodziej. (Id. ¶ 43.) In Florida, the Task Force took Kolodziej into custody, interviewed him for several hours, and administered a polygraph or stress test, but did not have sufficient probable cause to charge Kolodziej with any criminal wrongdoing in connection with Robby Silva's death. (Id. ¶ 44.) In addition, the Commander of the Task Force testified that there was no evidence that Defendant Cornell intentionally falsified the 2007 Riley polygraph report and that there was no evidence that Defendant Cornell intentionally covered-up information in connection with the Silva investigation. (Id. ¶¶ 41, 42.) The Task Force's investigation into Silva's death remains open. (Id. ¶ 45.)
On or about May 7, 2012, Plaintiff wrote a letter to Chief Hoglund asserting that Defendant Cornell mishandled the Silva investigation. (Defs.' Stmt. Facts ¶¶ 46, 47.) In thatletter, Plaintiff stated that she had long suspected that Defendant Cornell did not investigate her son's case properly. (Id. ¶ 48.) On December 17, 2014, Detective Haro filed a whistleblower lawsuit in Cook County Circuit Court against Defendants Cornell and Sisk, Haro v. City of Blue Island, 2014-L-013012 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Law Division). (Id. ¶ 55.) In his lawsuit, which is still pending, Detective Haro alleges retaliation in relation to the Silva investigation, highlighting the investigation file's inconsistencies and Defendant Cornell's false polygraph report. (Id.)
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). In determining summary judgment motions, "facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a 'genuine' dispute as to those facts." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). After "a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party 'must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (quotation omitted). If the non-moving party "'fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial,' summary judgment must be granted." Blow v. Bijora, Inc., 855 F.3d 793, 797-98 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).
In Count I of her Complaint, Plaintiff brings a constitutional claim based on the deprivation of her right to judicial access due to Defendant Cornell's alleged concealment of important facts about the criminal investigation into her son's death. The First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution protect an individual's right to pursue legal redress for claims that have a reasonable basis in law and fact. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 414-15, 122 S.Ct. 2179, 153 L.Ed.2d 413 (2002); Rossi v. City...
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