Thomas Jefferson Found., Inc. v. Jordan

• Citation: 200 So.3d 645
• Decision Date: 12 February 2016
• Docket Number: 1140586.,1140528
• Parties: THOMAS JEFFERSON FOUNDATION, INC. v. James JORDAN, Sara Jordan Muschamp, and William Jordan, as representative of the estate of Emma K. Jordan, deceased. James Jordan, Sara Jordan Muschamp, and William Jordan, as representative of the estate of Emma K. Jordan, deceased. v. Thomas Jefferson Foundation, Inc.
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

200 So.3d 645

THOMAS JEFFERSON FOUNDATION, INC.

v.James JORDAN, Sara Jordan Muschamp, and William Jordan, as representative of the estate of Emma K. Jordan, deceased.

James Jordan, Sara Jordan Muschamp, and William Jordan, as representative of the estate of Emma K. Jordan, deceased.

v.Thomas Jefferson Foundation, Inc.

1140528

1140586.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Feb. 12, 2016.

John W. Hargrove, Andrew B. Johnson, and Anne Knox Averitt of Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Birmingham, for appellant/cross–appellee Thomas Jefferson Foundation, Inc.

Robert H. Rutherford of Burr & Forman LLP, Birmingham; and E. Allen Dodd of Scruggs, Dodd & Brisendine Attorneys, P.A., Fort Payne, for appellees/cross–appellants James Jordan, Sara Jordan Muschamp, and William Jordan, as representative of the estate of Emma K. Jordan, deceased.

MAIN

, Justice.

James Jordan, Sara Jordan Muschamp, and William Jordan, as representative of the estate of Emma K. Jordan, deceased (hereinafter referred to collectively as “the plaintiffs”), sued Thomas Jefferson Foundation, Inc. (“TJF”), in the DeKalb Circuit Court, stating the following counts: (1) misrepresentation; (2) “slander, libel, and trade infringement”; (3) fraud; (4) wantonness; (5) suppression; (6) negligence; (7) breach of contract; and (8) tortious interference with business relations. Only the enumerated claims (6), (7), and (8) above were presented to the jury; the remaining claims were disposed of before the case went to the jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of TJF on all three counts, and the trial court entered a judgment on the jury's verdict.

The plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial, arguing, in pertinent part, that TJF did not disclose that it had insurance and that, therefore, “the venire was not properly qualified as to insurance.” The plaintiffs' brief, at 4. The trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial and vacated its prior judgment, basing its new ruling solely on the plaintiffs' argument that the trial court, believing there was no insurance, had erroneously prevented the plaintiffs from conducting voir dire on the issue of insurance. TJF appeals, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred in granting the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial. The plaintiffs have cross-appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in granting TJF's Rule 50(a), Ala. R. Civ. P

., motion for a judgment as a matter of law (“JML”)¹ and dismissing, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs' suppression claim. We reverse the trial court's judgment insofar as it granted the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial, and we affirm the trial court's judgment insofar as it granted TJF's motion for a JML on the plaintiffs' suppression claim.

I. Facts and Procedural History

TJF is a nonprofit organization that owns and curates a museum in Monticello, the historic home of Thomas Jefferson, located near Charlottesville, Virginia. Visitors to Monticello can view items that were once the property of Thomas Jefferson, reproductions of items that were once the property of Thomas Jefferson, and “period pieces,” which, although not the property of Thomas Jefferson, were made during his lifetime. Some of the items on display at Monticello are owned by TJF, and some items are on loan from individuals. TJF conducts continuous research on Jefferson's life, including research regarding property thought to have been owned by him. This research (1) can confirm that a particular item is authentic and/or that it was once owned by Jefferson; (2) can confirm that a particular item is not authentic and/or that it was not once owned by Jefferson; and (3) can reveal that items once thought to be authentic and to have been the property of Jefferson (two issues relevant in this case) are, in fact, not authentic and/or are not property previously owned by him.

In 1957, Juliet Graves Cantrell, a resident of Rome, Georgia, lent TJF a piece of furniture known as a “filing press” for display at Monticello. The plaintiffs claim that it is undisputed that the filing press once belonged to Jefferson. Cantrell also owned a piece of furniture known as a “dressing

table,” which was thought to have been the property of Jefferson, although Cantrell's belief apparently was never officially confirmed. Cantrell passed away sometime in or about 1976 and bequeathed the filing press, which was then on loan to TJF, and the dressing table to Emma. In 1977, Emma lent TJF the dressing table for use in the museum. Certain documents entitled “loan agreements” were executed with TJF when the filing press and, later, the dressing table, were lent to TJF, and there were subsequent loan agreements executed by Emma,² James, and Sara.³

The loan agreements for the filing press and the dressing

table executed in 1976 and 1977, respectively, were silent as to whether TJF had the authority to perform any “conservation” work on the furniture without first obtaining permission from Emma, James, and/or Sara, the owners of the property; however, in 1977, Sara drafted a letter to TJF granting it permission to perform conservation work on the dressing table. The 1976 loan agreement governing the filing press was replaced by a new loan agreement in 1987, which stated that TJF could not perform any conservation work on the filing press without James's permission. The 1977 loan agreement governing the dressing table was replaced by a new loan agreement in 1988, which stated that TJF could not perform any conservation work on the dressing table without Sara's permission. However, TJF had already performed conservation work on the filing press in 1983 and on the dressing table in 1984, without first receiving authorization from either James or Sara, prior to the execution of the 1987 and 1988 loan agreements that expressly required James's and/or Sara's permission to perform any conservation work on the furniture.

In November 2007 (30 years after the loan agreements were executed in 1976 and 1977), the plaintiffs removed the furniture from Monticello and shipped it to Sotheby's, an antiques auction house located in Manhattan, New York, to be sold at auction. Thereafter, Sotheby's “research consultants” investigated the authenticity of the dressing

table and questioned whether it had actually been owned by Jefferson. Sotheby's consultants also determined that the filing press was not in sufficiently original condition to be offered for bid. Therefore, Sotheby's declined to place either piece of furniture for sale at auction; according to the plaintiffs, Sotheby's found that the value of the dressing table had been “destroyed” and that the filing press then had a market value of $20,000 to $30,000, whereas “its fair market value would be around $4 million,” the plaintiffs' brief, at 21, had it not been the subject of the conservation work by TJF. In any event, Sotheby's identified TJF as the most likely purchaser of the furniture if it were to be sold at auction. Accordingly, James and Sara offered to sell the furniture to TJF; however, according to the plaintiffs, TJF declined to purchase the furniture “at a price commensurate with the fair market value of the ... furniture.” The plaintiffs then sued TJF, alleging that, “[a]s a proximate result of the aforesaid acts [, i.e., the allegedly unauthorized conservation work on the furniture by TJF], the plaintiffs are unable to sell the subject chattels for their true market value that could only have been achieved at a Sotheby's auction.”

As stated above, only the plaintiffs' claims of negligence, breach of contract, and tortious interference with business relations were presented to the jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of TJF, and the trial court entered a judgment on that verdict. However, the trial court subsequently granted the plaintiffs' Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P

., motion for a new trial and vacated its previous judgment. TJF appeals from the trial court's order granting the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial; the plaintiffs cross-appeal from the trial court's order granting TJF's motion for a JML as to their suppression claim.

II. Standards of Review

A. Motion for a New Trial

“When the court grants a motion for a new trial on grounds other than a finding that the verdict is against the great weight or preponderance of the evidence, this Court's review is limited.

“ ‘ “It is well established that a ruling on a motion for a new trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge. The exercise of that discretion carries with it a presumption of correctness, which will not be disturbed by this Court unless some legal right is abused and the record plainly and palpably shows the trial judge to be in error.” ’

“Curtis v. Faulkner Univ., 575 So.2d 1064, 1065–66 (Ala.1991)

(quoting Kane v. Edward J. Woerner & Sons, Inc., 543 So.2d 693, 694 (Ala.1989), quoting in turn Hill v. Sherwood, 488 So.2d 1357, 1359 (1986) ).”

Baptist Med. Ctr. Montclair v. Whitfield, 950 So.2d 1121, 1125–26 (Ala.2006)

.

B. Motions for Judgments as a Matter of Law

“ ‘The standard of review applicable to a ruling on a motion for [a JML] is identical to the standard used by the trial court in granting or denying [that motion]. Thus, in reviewing the trial court's ruling on the motion, we review the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, and we determine whether the party with the burden of proof has produced sufficient evidence to require a jury determination.

“ ‘....

“ ‘... In ruling on a motion for a [JML], the trial court is called upon to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to submit a question of fact to the jury; for the court to determine that it was, there must have been “substantial evidence” before the jury to create a question of fact. “[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.” ’

“American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 624 So.2d 1362, 1366–67 (Ala.

...