Thomas Mann Post No. 81 of the American Legion v. Knudsen Family Ltd. P'ship

• Citation: 2022 MT 150
• Decision Date: 26 July 2022
• Docket Number: DA 21-0402
• Parties: THOMAS MANN POST NO. 81 OF THE AMERICAN LEGION, DEPARTMENT OF MONTANA, a Montana public benefit corporation, and the TOWN OF CULBERTSON, a political subdivision of the State of Montana, Plaintiffs, Counterdefendants, and Appellees. v. KNUDSEN FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Defendant, Counterclaimant, and Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Montana

2022 MT 150

THOMAS MANN POST NO. 81 OF THE AMERICAN LEGION, DEPARTMENT OF MONTANA, a Montana public benefit corporation, and the TOWN OF CULBERTSON, a political subdivision of the State of Montana, Plaintiffs, Counterdefendants, and Appellees. v. KNUDSEN FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Defendant, Counterclaimant, and Appellant.

No. DA 21-0402

Supreme Court of Montana

July 26, 2022

Submitted on Briefs: April 13, 2022

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fifteenth Judicial District, In and For the County of Roosevelt, Cause No. DV-16-13 Honorable David Cybulski, Presiding Judge

For Appellant: Emily Jones, Jones Law Firm, PLLC, Billings Montana

For Appellee American Legion: Gregory G. Schultz, Jeffrey R Kuchel, Crowley Fleck PLLP, Missoula, Montana

For Appellee Town of Culbertson: Laura Christoffersen Christoffersen &Knierim, P.C., Culbertson, Montana

JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA, J.

¶1 Defendant and Counterclaimant Knudsen Family Limited Partnership ("KFLP") appeals the following: (1) the February 18, 2021 Order granting summary judgment to Thomas Mann Post No. 81 of the American Legion, Department of Montana ("Legion") and denying KFLP's motion for summary judgment against the Town of Culbertson ("Town"); (2) the July 26, 2021 Order awarding costs and attorney fees to Legion; and (3) the September 7 2021 Final Judgment quieting title in favor of Legion by the Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Roosevelt County. We restate and address the following issues:

1. Whether the scope of the Town Strip easement is limited to the express terms of the written instrument granting a right-of-way only for a water pipeline and access thereto.

2. Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Legion by finding the existence of an implied easement by preexisting use.

3. Whether the District Court abused its discretion in granting attorney fees without holding an evidentiary hearing.

¶2 We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3 KFLP owns and operates a ranch in Roosevelt County. This action concerns a property dispute as to whether Legion has an easement across KFLP's property to access Legion Park, located along the banks of the Missouri River in Culbertson.

History of Ownership

¶4 Prior to 1911, Augusta Bruegger owned the real property now owned by KFLP and Legion. In 1911, Bruegger conveyed a tract of land to Valley County ("County Strip") following a petition to open a new public highway. The County Strip was granted "to that purpose and for the use of such highway." In 1913, Bruegger granted an express easement to the Town. The easement ("Town Strip") is described in relevant part as:

A right of way only (together with the right of access thereto at all reasonable times and places) for that certain pipeline of the second party over and upon the northeast quarter . . ., and being a strip of land twenty (20) feet wide, to-wit, ten (10) feet wide on each side of the center line of the water main pipe of the Town of Culbertson, as the same is now located and constructed ....

The County Strip and Town Strip easements are indicated in the image below:

(Image Omitted) ¶5 At some point prior to 1944, James and Edna Swindle obtained the property from Bruegger, Edna Swindle's mother. In 1944, the Swindles donated to Legion a parcel of their property ("Legion Park Parcel") along the Missouri River for use as a park in tribute to returning service members from World War II. The document of conveyance did not include an express easement to access the Legion Park Parcel. At the time the Swindles severed the parcel from their property, an existing road ("Access Road"), also used as the driveway to their home, provided access to the Legion Park Parcel. The Access Road overlaps the Town Strip and a portion of the County Strip.

¶6 In 1956, the Swindles conveyed the real property to Archie Lewis by deed, eventually recorded in 1963. In 1991, Wayne and Janice Knudsen took title to the real property, described as:

Township 27 North, Range 56 East, M.P.M.: Section 4: NW¼ NW¼, Lots 1 and 3, portions of Lots 2 and 5

Township 28 North, Range 56 East, M.P.M.: Section 33: E½SW¼, W½SE¼

In 2010, Wayne and Janice Knudsen conveyed the property to KFLP by a quit claim deed, which expressly noted the Town Strip and County Strip easements.

¶7 From severance and creation of the park in 1944, Legion and the public have accessed the Legion Park Parcel along the Access Road. The Access Road commenced at the northwest corner of the Legion Park Parcel, traveled about 400 feet over Section 4 of KFLP's property, then crossed into Section 33 overlapping a portion of the County Strip, and continued over the Town Strip heading northwest, finally connecting to Road 1020 and exiting the KFLP property at the northwest corner of Section 33. In 1992, the Access Road was realigned, as pictured below, to accommodate the installation of irrigation pivots on the KFLP property.

(Image Omitted)

¶8 After the Swindles donated the Legion Park Parcel, Legion constructed a hall open to the public, which served as its headquarters until the 1950s. In the 1960s, Legion installed a shed for public nature observation. The park has frequently been used by the Legion members, Boy Scouts, and the public for civic events, camping, hunting, and nature observation.

¶9 In 1994, Legion and Miles Knudsen, a member of KFLP, entered into an agreement wherein Knudsen agreed to move the existing Access Road effective January 1, 1995. The agreement recognized the historic use of the Access Road by Legion and that its use as ingress and egress to the Legion Park Parcel would continue for Legion and its invitees, subject to Legion's permission. Knudsen never relocated the road.

¶10 Beginning in the mid to late 1990s, Knudsen began impeding access to the Legion Park Parcel. In 2016, Knudsen installed a locked gate over the Access Road to prevent Legion, its invitees, and the public from accessing the Legion Park Parcel.

¶11 In August 2016, Legion brought this action to quiet title and to obtain a declaratory judgment that it owns an easement across KFLP's property for public access to the Legion Park Parcel. The Town joined the suit, seeking to quiet title to the Town Strip granted in 1913 by Bruegger. KFLP answered the Complaint, denying Legion had an easement across its property. KFLP filed counterclaims for quiet title against Legion and the Town.

¶12 On February 18, 2021, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Legion and denied KFLP's summary judgment motion against the Town. The District Court held that Legion had an implied easement by preexisting use, and in the alternative, the undisputed facts established a prescriptive easement or an easement by necessity. The District Court granted judgment in favor of the Town after finding that "[t]aken together, the Town Strip and the County Strip constitute a publicly-owned roadway."

¶13 On February 26, 2021, following the grant of summary judgment in its favor, Legion moved for an award of attorney fees and costs. In its brief opposing the award, KFLP requested an evidentiary hearing on the reasonableness of any attorney fees granted. KFLP also noted its request for a hearing in an April 19, 2021 email to the District Court. The District Court, after noting "[n]either party has requested a hearing," awarded Legion its costs, and as supplemental relief under § 27-8-313, MCA, granted Legion its attorney fees, concluding the amount sought was "reasonable" and supported by Legion's counsel's detailed affidavit.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶14 We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Waters v. Blagg, 2008 MT 451, ¶ 8, 348 Mont. 48, 202 P.3d 110, overruled on other grounds by Earl v. Pavex, Corp., 2013 MT 343, 372 Mont. 476, 313 P.3d 154. Legal conclusions and mixed questions of law and fact are also reviewed de novo. Waters, ¶ 8 (citations omitted).

¶15 A district court's award of reasonable attorney fees is a discretionary act we will not reverse absent an abuse of discretion. Rothing v. Kallestad, 2007 MT 109, ¶ 53, 337 Mont. 193, 159 P.3d 222 (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

1. Whether the scope of the Town Strip easement is limited to the express terms of the written instrument granting a right-of-way only for a water pipeline and access thereto.

¶16 KFLP argues the District Court's findings of fact regarding the Town Strip are clearly erroneous because they exceed the scope expressed in the written instrument of conveyance. KFLP asserts that by declaring that the Town Strip and County Strip "[t]aken together" constitutes "a publicly-owned roadway," the District Court incorrectly transformed a right-of-way utility easement into a public roadway owned by the Town in fee simple. On appeal, the Town concedes that the water pipeline easement "granted in 1913 by Augusta Bruegger remains 'as is,'" and argues the District Court did not expand the scope of the easement.

¶17 "Where an easement is specific in nature, the breadth and scope of the easement are strictly determined by the actual terms of the grant." Mason v. Garrison, 2000 MT 78, ¶ 21, 299 Mont. 142, 998 P.2d 531 (citing Bridger v. Lake, 271 Mont. 186, 191, 896 P.2d 406, 408 (1995); § 70-17-106, MCA; Titeca v. State, 194 Mont. 209, 214, 634 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1981)). If the grant of an easement "is specific in its terms, it is decisive of the limits of the easement." Titeca, 194 Mont. at 214, 634 P.2d at 1159 (quoting 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses § 73, at 479).

¶18 On appeal, the Town and KFLP, in all material respects, are in agreement: the terms of the 1913 written easement define the scope of the Town...