Thomas Martin v. District of Columbia No 190 Clarence Brandenburg v. District of Columbia No 191
| Decision Date | 11 March 1907 |
| Docket Number | 191,Nos. 190,s. 190 |
| Citation | 205 U.S. 135,51 L.Ed. 743,27 S.Ct. 440 |
| Parties | THOMAS R. MARTIN, Plff. in Err., v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. NO 190. CLARENCE A. BRANDENBURG, Plff. in Err., v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. NO 191 |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. Edwin C. Brandenburg, George E. Sullivan, and Clarence A. Brandenburg for plaintiffs in error.
[Argument of Counsel from page 135 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Francis H. Stephens and Edward H. Thomas for defendant in error.
[Argument of Counsel from page 136 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:
These are writs of certiorari to test the validity of assessments for the widening of an alley in Washington under the act of Congress of July 22, 1892, chap. 230 (27 Stat. at L. 255), as amended by the act of August 24, 1894, chap. 328 (28 Stat. at L. 501). The writs were quashed by the supreme court of the District and the judgments affirmed by the court of appeals. 26 App. D. C. 140, 146. The principal case is that of Brandenburg, the owner of land taken for the widening. That of Martin raises questions as to the rights of a mortgagee of the same land. The main issue is upon the constitutionality of the act. The statute authorizes the commissioners of the District to condemn, open, widen, etc., alleys upon the presentation to them of a plat of the same accompanied by a petition of the owners of more than one half of the real estate in the square in which such alley is sought to be opened, etc., or in certain other cases. After prescribed preliminaries the commissioners are to apply to the marshal of the District to impanel a jury of twelve disinterested citizens, and the marshal is to impanel them, first giving ten days' notice to each proprietor of land in the square. The jury is to appraise the damages to real estate and also is to 'apportion an amount equal to the amount of said damages so ascertained and appraised as aforesaid,' including fixed pay for the marshal and jury, 'according as each lot or part of lot of land in such square may be benefited by the opening, widening, extending, or straightening such alley,' with certain deductions. The amendment authorizes the commissioners to open minor streets, to run through a square, etc., whenever, in the judgment of said commissioners, the public interests require it.
The law is not a legislative adjudication concerning a particular place and a particular plan, like the one before the court in Wight v. Davidson, 181 U. S. 371, 45 L. ed. 900, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 616. It is a general prospective law. The charges in all cases are to be apportioned within the limited taxing district of a square, and therefore it well may happen, it is argued, that they exceed the benefit conferred, in some case of which Congress never thought and upon which it could not have passed. The present is said to be a flagrant instance of that sort. If this be true, perhaps the objection to the act would not be disposed of by the decision in Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. 197 U. S. 430, 49 L. ed. 819, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 466. That case dealt with the same objection, to be sure, in point of form, but a very different one in point of substance. The assessment in question there was an assessment for grading and paving, and it was pointed out that a legislature would be warranted in assuming that grading and paving streets in a good-sized city commonly would benefit adjoining land more than it would cost. The chance of the cost being greater than the benefit is slight, and the excess, if any, would be small. These and other considerations were thought to outweigh a merely logical or mathematical possibility on the other side, and to warrant sustaining an old and familiar method of taxation. It was emphasized that there should not be extracted from the very general language of the 14th Amendment, a system of delusive exactness and merely logical form.
But when the chance of the cost exceeding the benefit grows large, and the amount of the not improbable excess is great, it may not follow that the case last cited will be a precedent....
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