Thomas S. By Brooks v. Morrow

Decision Date18 September 1984
Docket NumberNo. C-C-82-418-M.,C-C-82-418-M.
Citation601 F. Supp. 1055
PartiesTHOMAS S., by his next friend, Joyce BROOKS, Plaintiff, v. Sarah MORROW, Secretary, North Carolina Department of Human Resources; Allen Childress, in his official capacity as guardian for the plaintiff; Benjamin Carpenter, Director, Gaston County Department of Social Services; James Melton, Director, Gaston-Lincoln Area Mental Health Program; Harley B. Gaston, Jr., David Beam, David Hollifield, James Forrester, Dean Carpenter, Robert Heavner, and Porter McAteer, in their official capacity as Gaston County Commissioners, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina

Edward G. Connette, Charlotte, N.C., Roger Manus, Carolina Legal Assistance for Mental Health, Raleigh, N.C., and Theodore O. Fillette, Legal Services of Southern Piedmont, Inc., Charlotte, N.C., for plaintiff.

Wilson Hayman, Reginald L. Watkins, Asst. Atty. Gen., William F. O'Connell, Sp. Deputy Atty. Gen., Walter M. Smith, Associate Atty., North Carolina Dept. of Justice, Raleigh, N.C., Catherine C. Stevens, R.T. Wilder, Jr., Mullen, Holland & Cooper, Jeff Trepel, Gastonia, N.C., and Robert H. Gage, Cox & Gage, Morganton, N.C., for defendants.

ORDER

McMILLAN, District Judge.

I.

Paul Caldwell, next friend of plaintiff Thomas S., filed this suit on July 7, 1982, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for Thomas S. under federal and state law. Paul Caldwell later became employed by defendants, and Joyce Brooks now serves as next friend.

Thomas S., a twenty-year-old Gaston County resident, has been diagnosed as suffering from, inter alia, schizophrenia and borderline mental retardation, and is incapable of either living independently or managing his own affairs. Given up for adoption at birth, Tom spent his first eighteen years in approximately forty different foster homes and institutions while in the custody of the Gaston County Department of Social Services (DSS). DSS shuffled Tom through so many placements during his youth (see deposition of Dannette Rosenberg, pp. 10-15) because there were no appropriate community-based treatment facilities available in Gaston County during this period (defendant Morrow's answer, ¶ 17; defendant Carpenter's answer, ¶ 13).

Soon after Tom's eighteenth birthday, DSS succeeded in having Tom declared legally incompetent, and defendant Allen Childress, Regional Adult Mental Health Specialist of the Department of Human Resources (DHR), Division of Mental Health, Mental Retardation, and Substance Abuse Services, was thereafter appointed guardian under the authority of N.C.G.S. §§ 122-24.1 and 35-1.28. Because Childress considered Tom's then-current placement inappropriate, Childress caused Tom to be admitted to the "R" (mental retardation) unit at Broughton Hospital on March 15, 1982.

Four months after Tom was institutionalized at Broughton, his next friend brought this suit against state and local officials seeking judicial declaration that Tom's rights under the United States Constitution and under state law had been denied by defendants, and seeking prospective injunctive relief to remedy the alleged wrong. The complaint alleged that, under federal and state law, Tom is entitled to more appropriate treatment of his condition in a less restrictive, community-based setting. On May 26, 1983, plaintiff and two of the local defendants agreed to a special treatment plan funded by those defendants which provided appropriate community-based treatment for Tom until March 1, 1984. That agreement was incorporated into a judgment, and, because of that judgment, the court deferred ruling on all parties' motions for summary judgment. The court designated the case as inactive until February 1, 1984. Since the consent judgment was filed, Tom has been shifted to at least three additional placements. He is now being housed in the Gaston County detoxification facility because there is no place else for him to go. Letter from plaintiff's counsel, Edward G. Connette (filed August 29, 1984).

Meanwhile, the parties, and others, have filed a number of additional motions. All parties have renewed their motions for summary judgment. Other mentally impaired persons have moved that they be allowed to intervene, and have joined plaintiff in a motion to amend the complaint and to certify a class. The local defendants have moved that, in the event a statewide class is certified, all claims against the local defendants be severed from the class action case.

On August 15, 1984, the court heard argument on those motions.

II.

All pendent state law claims should be dismissed. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984), is dispositive of those claims. Pennhurst held that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from adjudicating pendent claims against state officials based on those officials' alleged violations of state law.

Also in Pennhurst, however, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the established principle that federal courts do have jurisdiction to grant relief against state officials based on those officials' alleged violations of federal law. Id., at ___, 104 S.Ct. at 911; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). "In such cases this Court is vested with the constitutional duty to vindicate `the supreme authority of the United States'...." Pennhurst, ___ U.S. at ___, fn. 17, 104 S.Ct. at 912, fn. 17.

III.

Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment based on his constitutional claims against defendants.

A

Plaintiff claims that his liberty — a substantive right arising solely under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution —has been denied by the defendants. The seminal case on this "substantive due process" claim is Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982). Youngberg discussed "the substantive rights of involuntarily committed mentally retarded persons under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution." Id., at 314, 102 S.Ct. at 2457.

Although Youngberg discussed the constitutional rights of a severely retarded, institutionalized individual, the standards outlined in that case are appropriate to this case. The parties are in dispute about whether Tom is mentally retarded, but they agree that he suffers from mental impairments which prevent him from living independently and which necessitated the appointment of a guardian. Tom is not now institutionalized, but he was so placed at the time the suit was filed, and, as a ward of the state, Tom at any time may be required to return to Broughton, if his guardian so directs. Therefore, Tom is like the plaintiff in Youngberg insofar as the state has control over Tom's liberty and care.

The holding in Youngberg dictates that defendants Morrow and Childress are responsible for ensuring that plaintiff retains the liberty to which he is entitled solely under the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendant Childress, regional specialist for DHR, was plaintiff's guardian and caused plaintiff to be admitted to Broughton on March 15, 1982. Defendant Morrow is Secretary of DHR and is responsible for the administration of DHR as well as the supervision of county departments of social services.

Morrow and Childress, like the institution officials in Youngberg, are responsible for the legitimate restraints on plaintiff's liberty resulting from plaintiff's mental incompetency and wardship; also like the defendants in Youngberg, Morrow and Childress are charged with the responsibility that these legitimate restraints are no more restrictive than necessary.

Liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment include safety, liberty from bodily restraint, and "minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint." Id. at 319, 102 S.Ct. at 2460.

The training to which plaintiff is entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment is that which is "reasonable" in light of the "balance between `the liberty of the individual' and `the demands of an organized society.'" Id. at 320, 102 S.Ct. at 2460. "In determining what is `reasonable' — in this and in any case presenting a claim for training by a State — we emphasize that courts must show deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified professional." Id. at 322, 102 S.Ct. at 2461.

The decision to treat a certain way, if made by a professional, is presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.

Id. at 323, 102 S.Ct. at 2462. This court, therefore, in determining the training or treatment to which plaintiff is entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment, must look for guidance to the professional judgment and decisions of those who examined and treated him.

Defendants recently have been filing affidavits asserting, at least in part, that plaintiff has a behavioral problem which makes it difficult to treat him. See, e.g., affidavit of James B. McKelvey, dated August 30, 1984; affidavit of Rudy Cannon, dated August 27, 1984. The court fails to see how that fact can excuse defendants from providing the treatment to which plaintiff is entitled. People with problems are rarely easy to deal with. If plaintiff were "normal," then he would not need the treatment the professionals say he needs. The solution to whatever behavioral problems plaintiff may have is not to place him inappropriately in a detoxification facility; it is to provide him with appropriate treatment.

The overwhelming weight of professional opinion concerning the appropriate treatment needs of Thomas S. appears to be consistent with the recommendations formulated by the R Unit treatment team as set forth in the psychological evaluation dated November 22, 1982, and signed by Staff Psychologist William R. Wellborn, III:

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