Thomas v. Alabama Council On Human Relations, Inc.

• Decision Date: 15 January 2003
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 01-F-1236-N.,CIV.A. 01-F-1236-N.
• Citation: 248 F.Supp.2d 1105
• Parties: Louis THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. ALABAMA COUNCIL ON HUMAN RELATIONS, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

248 F.Supp.2d 1105

Louis THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. ALABAMA COUNCIL ON HUMAN RELATIONS, INC., Defendant.

No. CIV.A. 01-F-1236-N.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Eastern Division.

January 15, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Roianne Houlton Conner, Law Office of Roianne Houlton Conner, Montgomery, AL, for Louis Thomas, plaintiff.

Albert Loring Vreeland, II, Michael L. Thompson, Lehr, Middlebrooks, Price & Proctor, P.C., Birmingham, AL, for Alabama Council on Human Relations, Inc., defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

FULLER, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Louis Thomas, filed a Complaint (Doc. #1) on October 22, 2001, bringing claims of race discrimination arising out of the termination of his employment and treatment he allegedly received prior to the termination of his employment pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq ("Title VII").¹ On November 21, 2001, Defendant, Alabama Council on Human Relations, Inc., filed an Answer (Doc. # 5). This cause is presently before the court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 15) filed on October 18, 2002, and Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Affidavit (Doc. #21) filed on November 27, 2002. After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant law, and the record as a whole, the Court finds, for the reasons set forth in this Memorandum Opinion, that Alabama Council's Motion for Summary is due to be GRANTED and the Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Affidavit is due to be GRANED in part and DENIED AS MOOT in part.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The Court exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), 28 U.S.C § 1343 (civil rights), and 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended). The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and the Court finds adequate allegations in support of both personal jurisdiction and venue.

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The party asking for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). On the other hand, a court ruling on a motion for summary judgment must believe the evidence of the non-movant and must draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence in the non-moving party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). After the nonmoving party has responded to the motion for summary judgment, the court must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

IV. FACTS

The court has carefully considered all deposition excerpts and documents submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion. The submissions of the parties, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, establish the following facts:

A Background

Defendant is a state-wide, private, nonprofit organization that acts both as an advocate and a service delivery program whose goal is the promotion and implementation of programs that improve economic conditions, education, and racial relationships for all people. Nancy Spears (hereinafter "Spears") served as the Director of the Defendant's programs at all times relevant to this lawsuit. Plaintiff, an African-American male, who began fulltime employment with the Defendant as its Building and Grounds Supervisor on October 14, 1997. During Plaintiffs employment, his job title and responsibilities changed somewhat as discussed below. Plaintiff was primarily employed in Opelika where Defendant operated a Head Start Program.

B. The Termination of Plaintiffs Employment

Plaintiffs primary complaint in this lawsuit arises out of the termination of his employment relationship with Defendant on June 19, 2001. Plaintiffs account of the events leading up to the termination of his employment relationship with the Defendant is set forth below. Because he had not received a raise in two years, Plaintiff approached his immediate supervisor, Michelle Pugh (hereinafter "Pugh") about whether he would be receiving a raise in 2001. He believed he was entitled to a raise due to an increase in his workload.

After initially asking Pugh about whether he would be getting a raise, Plaintiff had a meeting on the issue with Pugh and Spears.² As it happened, this meeting occurred on a day when Plaintiff had left his work site without signing out to make some purchases at Lowe's. Plaintiffs failure to sign out violated Defendant's procedures, and it is a work rule violation for which Plaintiff had previously been counseled.³ Spears decided not to give Plaintiff a raise in June of 2001, because, in her view, he was not complying with Defendant's procedures despite repeated warnings to conform his conduct to those procedures. In this meeting, Spears told Plaintiff that he was not going to get a raise because he had violated procedures.

Some period of time later, on June 15, 2001, Plaintiff discovered that he had not been given a raise that he believed he deserved. He confronted his immediate supervisor, Pugh about this fact. She said that she would look into it. Plaintiff was angry and told her that he was going home for the remainder of that work day. He also told Pugh that if he did not receive a raise he was going to resign. Plaintiff intended this threatened resignation as a bluff which he hoped would cause Defendant to give him the raise he was due, but he never told anyone in Defendant's employ that he was not serious about resigning. Pl's Dep. at p. 101, line 22 through p. 102, line 7. Later on that day, Plaintiff had a telephone conversation with Pugh to see if she had straightened out the problem with his raise, and she told him she was still working on it.

The next day on which Plaintiff was scheduled to work was June 18, 2001. On that day, Plaintiff had another telephone conversation with Pugh. She told him that she had not been able to secure a raise for him yet. He told her that he was not coming in to work. On the following day, June 19, 2001, Plaintiff called Pugh again and said that he was not coming in because he did not feel that he was being treated right. Pugh told Plaintiff he was "messing up."

Pugh told Spears that Plaintiff said he would quit if he did not receive a raise and that he had left work at noon on Friday, June 15, 2001, and did not return to work on Monday, June 18, 2001. Spears understood Plaintiffs statement and actions as they had been relayed to her by Pugh to mean that Plaintiff had resigned his position, and she decided to accept his resignation. On June 19, 2001, Spears sent a certified letter to Plaintiff informing him that Defendant accepted his resignation.

On June 20, 2001, Plaintiff learned about of the certified letter from Spears accepting his resignation. He had previously scheduled an appointment to see his doctor because he was not feeling well and because he believed that he would need a medical excuse for his absences from work. Plaintiff saw his doctor, and the doctor provided Plaintiff with a note excusing him from work for the entire week which began on June 18, 2001. Plaintiff immediately faxed this medical excuse to Spears. Plaintiff tried to talk to Spears about the situation, but she asked him to turn in his keys and leave the premises.

C. Plaintiffs Complaints Relating To His Treatment Prior To The Termination Of His Employment

Plaintiffs remaining complaints in this lawsuit have to do with his dissatisfaction with the way in which he claims he was treated prior to the termination of his employment. In this regard, he raises several issues: events which he contends constituted a demotion, a disciplinary probation he received, and comments made to him by Little and Spears which he considered to be racist or harassing.

1. Plaintiff's Demotion

When Defendant hired Plaintiff in October of 1997, his immediate supervisor was Terry Mount (hereinafter "Mount"). Plaintiff has not articulated any complaints about how Mount treated him. In October of 1998, Ken Little ("Little") replaced Mount as Plaintiffs direct supervisor. Little remained Plaintiffs direct supervisor until Little resigned after Spears refused to raise his salary. Defendant hired Pugh to replace Little on January 29, 2001, and she became Plaintiffs direct supervisor around the time Little left....