Thomas v. Baird

• Decision Date: 23 April 1969
• Citation: 433 Pa. 482,252 A.2d 653
• Parties: Geraldine L. THOMAS, Administratrix of the Estate of Edward E. Thomas, Deceased, Appellant, v. Ronald G. BAIRD, Individual Defendant, and Pennsylvania Trunpike Commission, Defendant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 653

252 A.2d 653

433 Pa. 482

Geraldine L. THOMAS, Administratrix of the Estate of Edward E. Thomas, Deceased, Appellant, v. Ronald G. BAIRD, Individual Defendant, and Pennsylvania Trunpike Commission, Defendant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

April 23, 1969.

Joseph N. Cascio, Fike, Cascio & Boose, Somerset, for appellant

Robert G. Rose, Spence, Custer, Saylor, Wolfe & Rose, Johnstown, for appellees.

Before BELL, C.J., and JONES, COHEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS and POMEROY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

BELL, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from an Order of the Court of Common Pleas sustaining defendant's preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer.

The plaintiff alleged that at about 9:30 A.M. on July 26, 1966, the defendant Ronald G. Baird was operating a maintenance truck along the Pennsylvania Turnpike. The truck was owned by Baird's employer, the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, and, at the time the accident occurred, Baird was acting within the scope of his employment.

The plaintiff further alleged that Baird brought his truck to a stop in the right, or slow, lane of west-bound traffic, disembarked from the truck and was standing on the running board. No precautions were taken to warn traffic coming from the truck's rear. Plaintiff's decedent was operating a tractor- trailer in a westerly direction on the turnpike and, rounding a curve in the highway to his right, suddenly came upon defendant's truck. The decedent had no opportunity to stop his vehicle, and was killed in the ensuing collision.

The plaintiff, as administratrix of decedent's estate, brought this action in trespass to recover for decedent's death under the Pennsylvania statutes. The defendant Turnpike Commission then filed preliminary objections alleging that the Commission is an instrumentality of the Commonwealth engaged in a governmental function and, as such is immune from liability in trespass for injuries and damages resulting from the torts or negligence of its officers or employees. The lower Court sustained the preliminary objections.

Plaintiff acknowledges that our decision in Rader v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 407 Pa. 609, 182 A.2d 199, controls the present case and supports the Order of the lower Court, but asks us to reconsider and overrule that decision. The plaintiff in Rader was injured when his automobile skidded and collided with a guard rail; in his complaint he alleged that the defendant Turnpike Commission allowed ice to accumulate on the turnpike and negligently failed to spread ashes or other abrasive materials thereon or to post a warning of the icy condition. In Rader we held that the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission was an instrumentality of the Commonwealth engaged in a governmental function and hence immune from liability for the negligence of its employees.

The plaintiff in the instant case does not raise any arguments or contentions which were not adequately and fully considered and rejected in Rader. Moreover, Rader has been cited with approval by our Court several times, and its rationale applied to other factual situations.

For example, we granted sovereign immunity to the General State Authority (Roney v. General State Authority, 413 Pa. 218, 219, 196 A.2d 349); to the Delaware River Port Authority (Anderson Appeal, 408 Pa. 179, 187, 182 A.2d 514); and to the State Highway and Bridge Authority (Eidemiller, Inc. v. State Highway and Bridge Authority, 408 Pa. 195, 182 A.2d 911).

Rader is firmly established as the law of Pennsylvania and no convincing reasons have been advanced for overruling it or changing the law.

Order affirmed.

ROBERTS, J., files a dissenting Opinion.

EAGEN, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

ROBERTS, Justice (dissenting).

It is both necessary and unfortunate that I must once again vigorously dissent to this Court's continuing blind adherence to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Harker v. D. & H. Building Wreckers, Inc., 429 Pa. 655, 241 A.2d 73 (1968) (dissenting opinion); Dillon v. York City School District, 422 Pa. 103, 109, 220 A.2d 896, 899 (1966) (dissenting opinion). The time is long past for this Court to join those twelve other jurisdictions which have recently abrogated the doctrine. See Stone v. Arizona Highway Commission, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963); Muskopf v. California Hospital District, 55 Cal.2d 211, 11 Cal.Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457 (1961); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130, 60 A.L.R.2d 1193 (Fla.1957); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89, 86 A.L.R.2d 469, cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968, 80 S.Ct. 955, 4 L.Ed.2d 900 (1959); Brinkman v. City of Indianapolis, 231 N.E.2d 169 (Ind.App.Ct.1967); Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738, 10 A.L.R.3d 1362 (Ky.1964); Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962); Brown v. City of Omaha, 183 Neb. 430, 160 N.W.2d 805 (1968); McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820, 88 A.L.R.2d 1313 (1960); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962); Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968). It can be said with all due respect to those who originally promulgated the rule years ago that the doctrine is 'no longer just, reasonable, nor defensible' and that the 'reasons underlying the traditional wide-sweeping rule of sovereign immunity have virtually disappeared in modern...