Thomas v. Blocker, 4:18-CV-00812
| Decision Date | 13 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:18-CV-00812,4:18-CV-00812 |
| Parties | ANGEL LUIS THOMAS, SR., Plaintiff, v. COL. TYREE C. BLOCKER, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(Judge Brann)
Angel Luis Thomas, Sr., Norman E. Gregory, and Glenn Morris (collectively "Plaintiffs") filed this second amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint alleging that numerous individuals violated Plaintiffs' rights by forcing them to register as sex offenders.1 Plaintiffs raise claims for: (1) violations of their due process rights by requiring them to register as sex offenders without first providing a hearing; (2) unconstitutional retaliation against Plaintiffs for exercising their First and Fifth Amendment rights; (3) violations of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution; (4) defamation under state law; and (5) invasion of privacy under state law.2
Plaintiffs' involuntary registration as sex offenders occurred due to their prior criminal convictions. In 1991, Thomas was convicted in Pennsylvania state court of rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, aggravated assault, reckless endangering, and unlawful restraint; he remained continuously incarcerated for those convictions until January 2018.3 In 1994, Morris was convicted in Pennsylvania state court of rape and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, and was continuously incarcerated for those convictions from 1993 until 2018.4 Lastly, in 1983, Gregory was convicted in Pennsylvania state court of rape and indecent assault, and was continuously incarcerated for those convictions from 1982 until 2018.5
The history of Pennsylvania's sex offender registry law was discussed in some detail in Magistrate Judge Susan E. Schwab's November 2018 Report and Recommendation. Magistrate Judge Schwab recounted that Pennsylvania enacted its first sex offender registration law—commonly known as Megan's Law—in 1995, although that law was later struck down by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.6 After the law was struck down, Pennsylvania enacted a second registration law in 2000, and amended that law in 2004; the law was again struck down, andPennsylvania enacted yet another version of Megan's Law in 2012.7 In 2017, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania struck down the retroactive application of the 2012 version of Megan's Law.8
In response to that decision, Pennsylvania passed Act 10 of 2018 (H.B. 631) and Act 29 of 2018 (H.B. 1952) ("Act 29").9 Act 29 made Megan's Law retroactively applicable by applying that law to any individuals who were (1) convicted of a sexually violent offense between April 22, 1996 and December 20, 2012, or (2) "required to register with the Pennsylvania State Police under a former sexual offender registration law of this Commonwealth on or after April 22, 1996 but before December 20, 2012, [and] whose period of registration has not expired."10 The Pennsylvania General Assembly clarified that the sex offender registration provisions were non-punitive collateral consequences of an original conviction.11 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania thereafter concluded that Act 29 does not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws.12
As to the relevant federal law, the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, which in part contained the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA"), "was enacted to close the loopholes in previous sex offenderregistration legislation and to standardize registration across the states."13 "In response to previous legislation, by 1996 every state and the District of Columbia had mandatory sex offender registration laws, but SORNA creates a national sex offender registry with the goal of eliminating inconsistencies among state laws."14 "When Congress enacted SORNA, it was particularly concerned about the transient nature of many sex offenders and did not want to lose track of sex offenders when they moved from state to state."15 SORNA sought to ensure consistency among the states in their sex offender registry laws:
In 2011, SORNA's registration requirements were applied retroactively to all pre-SORNA offenders.20
Prior to filing the second amended complaint, Thomas filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, seeking an order requiring that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania remove his name from the sex offender registry.21 In November 2018, Magistrate Judge Schwab issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that this Court deny Thomas' motion for a preliminary injunction because he failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of his claims.22 Specifically, she recommended that, regardless of whether Thomas was required to register under Act29, he was required to register under SORNA and, thus, his claims had little likelihood of success.23
Magistrate Judge Schwab noted that SORNA requires sex offenders to "register, and keep the registration current, in each jurisdiction where the offender resides, where the offender is an employee, and where the offender is a student,"24 and that Thomas' crime of conviction undoubtedly qualifies as a sex offense under that statute.25 Moreover, SORNA was made to retroactively apply to offenses committed prior to SORNA's enactment and, thus, Thomas qualifies as a sex offender who is required under SORNA to register as a sex offender.26
Magistrate Judge Schwab rejected Thomas' arguments to the contrary. First, she determined, based on binding precedent, that the retroactive application of SORNA did not violate the nondelegation clause.27 Second, although Thomas argued that SORNA violates the Tenth Amendment's anticommandeering doctrine, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that SORNA was enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause and Congress' Spending Clause authority, meaning that it did not violate the anticommandeering doctrine.28 This Court adoptedthe Report and Recommendation in its entirety, and denied Thomas' subsequent motion for reconsideration.29
Thomas filed an interlocutory appeal of that decision;30 on appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed this Court's Order.31 In affirming this Court's Order, the Third Circuit likewise concluded that "[b]ecause Thomas was required by federal law to register as a sex offender, he is unlikely to succeed on the merits of his claim."32 In so concluding, the Third Circuit rejected all four of Thomas' arguments.
First, the Third Circuit determined that SORNA applies to individuals, as binding precedent has held that SORNA "imposes 'an independent and federally enforceable duty . . . on sex offenders to register.'"33 Second, the court noted that it had previously determined, in a published opinion, that SORNA's registration requirement is constitutional even though it applies to individuals who do not engage in interstate travel, "'because it is necessary and proper for carrying into execution Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.'"34 Third, the court rejected Thomas' assertion that, "because he claims to be exempted from registering as a sex offender under Pennsylvania's registration regime, state officials may not compel him to register under federal SORNA," since "a sex offender's 'federal duty toregister under [federal] SORNA was not dependent upon his duty to register under [state] law.'"35 Finally, the Third Circuit held that Thomas' anticommandeering clause "argument rings hollow" because Congress enacted SORNA using its spending power.36 Thomas petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, but the Supreme Court denied his petition.37
Defendants thereafter filed this motion for judgment on the pleadings.38 Defendants contend that judgment on the pleadings is warranted because the uncontested facts establish that Plaintiffs were required to register as sex offenders under Megan's Law SORNA.39 Defendants further argue that, because Plaintiffs were required to register as sex offenders, their claims fail as a matter of law.
Defendants argue that, first, Plaintiffs' due process claim fails because they received all the due process to which they were entitled when they were convicted of the underlying crimes.40 Second, Defendants contend that the retaliation claim also fails because (1) there can be no adverse action if registration was required and (2) there is no...
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