Thomas v. Brandywine Hosp.

• Decision Date: 18 February 2022
• Docket Number: 5:21-cv-03288
• Parties: LUANN THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. BRANDYWINE HOSPITAL, LLC and TOWER HEALTH, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

LUANN THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. BRANDYWINE HOSPITAL, LLC and TOWER HEALTH, Defendants.

No. 5:21-cv-03288

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

February 18, 2022

OPINION

Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. United States District Judge

Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, ECF No. 16 - Granted in part, Denied in part

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter involves employment law claims by Plaintiff Luann Thomas against her former employers, Defendants Brandywine Hospital, LLC and Tower Health. Thomas asserts that her termination violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) insofar it was based on her disabilities. In addition Thomas alleges that her termination violated the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Following Defendants' first motion to dismiss, Thomas filed an Amended Complaint. Defendants now move to dismiss the Amended Complaint in its entirety.

Following a review of the motion and the allegations in the Amended Complaint, this Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss in part and denies it in part. Thomas' claims for ADA discrimination, ADA retaliation, hostile work environment, and FMLA retaliation may proceed as pleaded. Thomas' claim for FMLA interference is dismissed with prejudice.

II. BACKGROUND^[1]

Thomas was employed by Defendants from October 2018 until approximately February 17, 2021. See Am. Compl ¶ 14, ECF No. 14. From October 2018 to April 2020, she was employed as a phlebotomist. See id. ¶ 15. From April 2020, Thomas was employed as an Emergency Room Technician. See id. ¶ 17. During her employment, Thomas suffered from bipolar disorder and anxiety. See id. ¶ 22. Thomas informed Debra Rose, Director of Emergency and Thomas' supervisor, and Human Resources Associates Dina Criniti and Rebecca Parks of her medical conditions in or about October of 2020. See id. ¶ 23.

Around that same time, Thomas was admitted to the hospital for tachycardia. See Id. ¶ 25. Thomas requested and was approved for FMLA leave from October 3, 2020 until October 13, 2020. See id. Thomas returned to work on October 13, 2020. See id. ¶ 30. Upon returning to work, Thomas was informed that Rose and Criniti had a “reasonable suspicion” that Thomas was using illegal or non-prescribed narcotics. See id. Based on this suspicion, Thomas was removed from the schedule and placed on medical leave from October 14, 2020 until October 31, 2020. See id. ¶¶ 30, 32.

Thomas underwent a drug screen and provided Defendants a list of her medications. See id. ¶¶ 33-34. Defendants also required that Thomas be cleared by a psychiatrist and a cardiologist before returning to work. See id. Thomas' drug screen was negative for any illegal narcotics or non-prescribed medications, and she returned to work on or about November 3, 2020. See id. ¶ 34. Thomas alleges that Rose continued to scrutinize Thomas' work, monitor her every move, and make comments regarding her conditions. See id. ¶¶ 38-43. On February 11, 2021, Rose accused Thomas of slurring her words and falling asleep while on break. See Id. ¶ 48. As a result, Thomas was again required to undergo a drug test. See id. ¶ 50.

On February 15, 2021, Thomas' drug screen was again negative for illegal narcotics or non-prescribed medication. See id. ¶ 51. On February 17, 2021, Thomas was contacted by the Human Resources Director, who told Thomas that she was terminated. See id. ¶ 52. Thomas alleges that the reasons Defendants provided for her termination included her incapacity to do her job and use of profanity. See id. Thomas alleges that these bases are untrue. See id.

Thomas filed the instant matter on July 23, 2021, alleging claims under both the ADA and FMLA against Defendants. See Compl., ECF No. 1. In an Opinion and Order dated December 14 2021, this Court partially granted Defendants' motion to dismiss Thomas' Original Complaint. See Op. 12/14/21, ECF No. 12; Order 12/14/21, ECF No. 13. Thereafter, Thomas filed an Amended Complaint. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 14. Therein, she alleges claims for ADA discrimination, ADA retaliation, hostile work environment, FMLA interference, and FMLA retaliation. See id. Defendants now move to dismiss the entirety of Thomas' Amended Complaint. See Mot., ECF No. 16. Following a series of responses and replies, the motion is ready for review. See Resp., ECF No. 17; Reply, ECF No. 18.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss - Review of Applicable Law

In rendering a decision on a motion to dismiss, this Court must “accept all factual allegations as true [and] construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Only if “the ‘[f]actual allegations . . . raise a right to relief above the speculative level'” has the plaintiff stated a plausible claim. Id. at 234 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. (explaining that determining “whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense”). “In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents.” See Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)).

B. Discrimination under the ADA - Review of Applicable Law

“No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). “The term ‘covered entity' means an employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2). An “employer” is defined as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A). To state a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, ^[2] a plaintiff must also show: “(1) he is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodations by the employer; and (3) he has suffered an otherwise adverse employment decision as a result of discrimination.” Gaul v. Lucent Techs., 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998). “Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” See Stouch v. Township of Irvington, 354 Fed.Appx. 660, 666 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973)). “The plaintiff then bears the burden of establishing that this proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination.” See id.

The ADA defines “disability” as either (1) “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual;” (2) “a record of such an impairment;” or (3) “being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). “[M]ajor life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). “The determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity must be made ‘on a case-by-case basis.'” Matthews v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 613 Fed.Appx. 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Albertson's Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566 (1999)).

Claims of discrimination under the ADA are analyzed under the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. See Cassidy v. Halyard Health, Inc., 319 F.Supp.3d 474, 480 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). Under this framework, a plaintiff

must first establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination by showing that “(1) [s]he is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) [s]he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodations by the employer; and (3) [s]he has suffered an otherwise adverse employment decision as a result of discrimination.”

See id. (quoting Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1999)).

Once a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, “the burden shifts to [d]efendant to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for the action, and if it does so, the burden shifts back to [p]laintiff to show that the reason was a pretext for discrimination.” See id.

C. Retaliation under the ADA - Review of Applicable Law

“To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, [a plaintiff] must demonstrate that: (1) she engaged...