Thomas v. Bronco Oilfield Servs., 2:16-cv-01557

• Court: United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. Western District of Pennsylvania
• Writing for the Court: Mark R. Hornak, Chief United States District Judge
• Citation: 503 F.Supp.3d 276
• Parties: Carlo L. THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. BRONCO OILFIELD SERVICES, Defendant.
• Decision Date: 30 November 2020
• Docket Number: 2:16-cv-01557

503 F.Supp.3d 276

Carlo L. THOMAS, Plaintiff,
v.
BRONCO OILFIELD SERVICES, Defendant.

2:16-cv-01557

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed November 30, 2020

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Irene D. Thomas, Thomas & Associates, Pittsburgh, PA, for Plaintiff.

Theodore A. Schroeder, Emilie R. Hammerstein, Littler Mendelson, Pittsburgh, PA, J. Todd Woolery, Pro Hac Vice, McAfee & Taft, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendant.

OPINION

Mark R. Hornak, Chief United States District Judge

This case presents an intricate combination of record facts as considered in the context of the legal principles applicable to cases arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, along with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the allocation of decisional responsibility between the Court and a jury. While many of the events central to the disposition of these matters are straightforward, not much else about this case is. The Defendant has moved for summary judgment on all claims, a motion the Plaintiff opposes. The question before the Court is whether these matters may be properly resolved without a trial as the Defendant contends. Because the Court

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concludes that they cannot, the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied, and the case set for trial.

The Plaintiff, Carlo Thomas, is African-American. He worked for Defendant Bronco Oilfield Services as a Flowback Hand. Over the course of ten (10) months, four (4) different non-African-American coworkers on four (4) different occasions called Plaintiff the n-word or a variation of the n-word while he was at work. The record reflects that the coworker involved in the first incident was issued an oral warning by the involved frontline supervisor, and that once the Defendant's more senior officials eventually learned about that and the other subsequent incidents, it fired the offending employees who then still worked for the company. Plaintiff himself was later terminated from employment for attendance violations. Plaintiff now brings hostile work environment discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII and the parallel provisions of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. Because a reasonable jury could conclude that the circumstances present in this case constituted a hostile work environment for which Defendant was vicariously liable, and because a reasonable jury could conclude that either or both of Plaintiff's protected activities of filing EEOC Charges and complaining of racial harassment were a "but for" cause of his termination, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

The resolution of the Defendant's Motion and the consideration of the arguments of the parties requires an extensive review of the record. The following material facts are undisputed¹ unless otherwise noted. Defendant Bronco Oilfield Services ("Bronco") provides drilling, workover, and production completion services in the oil and gas industry. (Defendant's Concise Statement of Material Facts ("Def.’s CSMF"), ECF No. 113, ¶ 1.)² Plaintiff worked in Defendant's Washington, Pennsylvania, shop, as a Flowback Hand beginning on April 15, 2014. (Id. ¶¶ 16–17).

Defendant maintains a policy ("Harassment Policy") prohibiting discrimination

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and harassment based on an employee's protected status, including an employee's race. (Def.’s CSMF ¶ 5.) The Harassment Policy includes a non-exhaustive list of examples of prohibited conduct, including the use of racial slurs. (Def.’s CSMF ¶ 6; Pl.’s Ex. 18, ECF No. 117–20, at 9.)³ Defendant also maintains an Equal Employment Opportunity Policy that prohibits discrimination based on "race, color, natural origin, sex, age (40 and over), disability or any other protected status where otherwise qualified." (Def.’s CSMF ¶ 4; Pl.’s Ex. 18, ECF No. 117–20, at 9.)⁴ The Harassment Policy contains a reporting procedure for employees who believe they have been subjected to discrimination or harassment. (Def.’s CSMF ¶ 7.) The Policy also prohibits retaliation against employees who raise complaints under it. (Id. ¶ 8.) The Policy instructs all supervisors and managers to "take appropriate action to prevent incidents" of harassment from occurring. (Pl.’s Ex. 18, ECF No. 117–20, at 7.) Should a supervisor or manager receive a complaint or report of harassment, the Policy requires them to contact Human Resources "to institute prompt investigatory measures and appropriate remedial action." (Id. )

Upon hire, employees receive a copy of the Harassment Policy during their orientation, and Bronco disseminates the Policy through its intranet. (Def's CSMF ¶ 9.) Employees receive training on the Policy, either in person or through a learning management system. (Id. ¶ 10.)

Defendant also has an attendance policy, which requires employees to notify their supervisor or department manager as soon as an employee knows that she will need to be absent or late. (Id. ¶ 12.) The attendance policy also provides that the District or Location Manager has the sole discretion on how to treat an employee's failure to call in to provide notice of lateness or absence. (Id. ¶ 13.) The attendance policy further specifies that being absent or late without proper notice will subject an employee to discipline, including dismissal. (Id. ¶ 14.) District managers have discretion in disciplining employees and enforcing the policy. (Id. ¶ 15.)

Plaintiff received, read, and acknowledged Defendant's Harassment Policy and Code of Business Conduct when he was hired. (Id. ¶¶ 18–19.) Plaintiff also understood Defendant's attendance policy, including the requirement of giving notice if he would be late or absent. (Id. ¶ 23.) As a Flowback Hand, he worked on remote job sites as well as at the Defendant's Washington, PA, shop. (Id. ¶ 20.) When he was hired, his supervisor was Justin Welty, who was later succeeded by Marty McNulty. (Id. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff also reported to the Washington location's District Manager, Michael Segers. (Id. ¶ 22.)

In or around July of 2014, Seth Krenzelak, a non-supervisory employee of Defendant,

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said to Plaintiff, "Hey my [n-word],"⁵ in the shop during work hours. (Def.’s CSMF ¶ 24.) Another employee who witnessed this exchange reported the incident to McNulty,⁶ who met with Plaintiff and asked Plaintiff what he wanted McNulty to do. (Def.’s CSMF ¶ 25.) Plaintiff told McNulty that he was upset, humiliated, angry, and disgusted, and replied "[you're] the supervisor, [you] should do what [you're] supposed to do. Do what's right." (Dep. of Carlo L. Thomas ("Thomas Dep."), ECF No. 114–3, at 48:12–18.) McNulty instructed Krenzelak to apologize and allowed Plaintiff to leave for the day after McNulty asked Plaintiff if he wanted to return to work and Plaintiff said he did not because he was "too upset." (Def.’s CSMF ¶ 26; Thomas Dep. 48:10–24.) Krenzelak told McNulty that he made a mistake and was "just trying to be friendly." (Def.’s CSMF ¶ 27; Dep. of Marty McNulty ("McNulty Dep."), ECF No. 114–4, at 49:16–17.)

Beyond leaving early that day, Plaintiff did not miss any work as a result of Krenzelak's use of the racial slur. (Def.’s CSMF ¶ 28.) Plaintiff and Krenzelak continued to work on the same job site. (Id. ¶ 29.) Although Plaintiff told McNulty that he did not want to be in Krenzelak's presence again, McNulty scheduled them to work the same shifts, but in different trucks. (Thomas Dep. 51:2–14.) Plaintiff did not have to interact with Krenzelak. (Def.’s CSMF ¶ 29; Thomas Dep. 52:15–17.) At the time of the incident, Plaintiff did not report Krenzelak's use of a racial slur to Segers. (Def.’s CSMF ¶ 30.) At some point after the incident, but not around the same time period as the incident, McNulty reported the incident to Segers. (Pl.’s CSMF ¶¶ 30, 37.) Neither McNulty nor Segers reported this incident to Defendant's Human Resources ("HR") department, (Pl.’s CSMF ¶¶ 37, 39; Def.’s CSMF ¶ 50; McNulty Dep. 44:17–45:2), and Plaintiff did not report Krenzelak's use of a racial slur to HR until February 4, 2015. (Pl.’s CSMF ¶ 31.)

In October of 2014, Flowback Operator David Emrock, another non-supervisory employee, directed the n-word toward Plaintiff while they were alone together in a company truck. (Def.’s CSMF ¶ 32.) Plaintiff did not report the Emrock incident to any supervisors or HR at that time. (Id. ¶ 33.) However, Plaintiff did not work with Emrock after that day. (Id. ¶ 34.) Defendant terminated Emrock's employment on January 20, 2015, for unsatisfactory performance. (Id. ¶ 35.) Between the incidents with Krenzelak and Emrock, from July 2014 through October 2014, Plaintiff did not feel that his work environment impeded his ability to do his job. (Id. ¶ 36.)⁷

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In December 2014, Plaintiff was written

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up for a no-call, no-show. (Id. ¶ 37.) At that time, he informed Segers for the first time of the Krenzelak and Emrock incidents, without revealing...