Thomas v. Buckner
| Decision Date | 13 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 2:11-CV-245-WKW [WO] |
| Parties | KAYLA THOMAS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. NANCY BUCKNER, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
This case is brought by several individuals whose names were allegedly placed on a quasi-public state registry of persons "indicated" as child abusers. Their chief grievance is that they were not given a hearing prior to being listed and have not had an opportunity to exonerate themselves. Their claims implicate, among other legal concepts, whether state regulations or statutes allegedly requiring a hearing trigger due process procedural protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. Plaintiffs claim damages and prospective relief through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and have sued state entities, state agency directors in their official capacities, and state case workers in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiffs must successfully navigate several doctrines, which include standing (both constitutional and prudential), sovereign and qualified immunity, and the rigors of a procedural due process claim. The case is pending on a motion to dismiss filed by all Defendants(Doc. # 21), which is opposed (Doc. # 32). Plaintiffs also move to amend the Complaint. (Doc. # 32.)
Plaintiffs' Complaint lacks important factual matter and legal authority. Defendants' seventy-three page motion to dismiss brief is replete with boilerplate language and references to persons or issues not involved in the action, and is somewhat non-responsive to whatever merit there may be to Plaintiffs' cause(s) of action. The court concludes that Plaintiffs lack standing to seek some of the requested relief; that some Defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity; and that the remaining individual defendants sued for damages in their personal capacities are, at this point, entitled to qualified immunity. As to the remaining official capacity defendants who are sued for prospective relief, the court is unable to decipher the viability of the procedural due process cause of action on the current pleadings. Plaintiffs' Complaint is due to be dismissed with leave to re-file in accordance with this opinion.
Subject matter jurisdiction is exercised pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 2201-02. Personal jurisdiction and venue are not contested, and there are adequate allegations in support of both.
Defendants generally invoke Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) as the basis for this motion to dismiss. However, two of Defendants' grounds for dismissal are sovereign immunity and standing, both of which are challenges to subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). See Thomas v. U.S. Postal Serv., 364 F. App'x 600, 601 n.3 (11th Cir. 2010) (); see also Fla. Ass'n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. State of Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1227 n.14 (11th Cir. 2000) ( that standing "raises an even more basic question of jurisdiction that cannot be waived and goes to the very heart of the requirement of Article III").
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction asserts either a facial or factual challenge to the complaint. McElmurray v. Consol. Gov't of Augusta-Richmond Cnty., 501 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. May 20, 1981)1 ); accord Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 1990). A factual attack challenges "the existenceof subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits, are considered." Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A facial attack, on the other hand, challenges the complaint on its face and "require[s] the court merely to look and see if [the] plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction." McElmurray, 501 F.3d at 1251 (quoting Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529). In considering a facial attack, as with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must take as true the allegations in the complaint. See Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009). Defendants have made a facial attack on the Complaint, asserting that Plaintiffs have not alleged an adequate basis for subject matter jurisdiction.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint; thus, in assessing the merits of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must assume that all the factual allegations set forth in the complaint are true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) . To state a claim that survives a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, a complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations," but must include enough facts "to raise a right to reliefabove the speculative level on the assumption that all allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545.
All five Plaintiffs allege that they are individuals who have been subjects of investigations of child abuse or neglect by the Alabama Department of Human Resources ("Alabama DHR") and the Shelby County Department of Human Resources ("Shelby County DHR"). (Compl. 10-13.) Four of the five Plaintiffs (all except Ms. Raney) allege that they were informed by letter from either Alabama DHR or Shelby County DHR that they had been investigated upon a report of child abuse or neglect and that the DHR's investigation gave the DHR reasonable cause to believe that "the report is indicated (true) . . . [and that] [t]his case will be disposed as indicated." (Compl. 10-13.) Allegedly, only Plaintiff Thomas was informed that she "ha[d] the right to an administrative record review." (Compl. 10-13.) None of the letters indicated a right to a hearing. At least three of the four Plaintiffs who received letters requested hearings, and those requests were denied. As a result of theinvestigations and the dispositions, Plaintiffs were listed on Alabama DHR's Central Registry.2 ,3
Ms. Raney allegedly never received such a letter. Rather, Ms. Raney's church - for a purpose presently unknown to the court4 - requested information regarding Ms. Raney from the Central Registry, and "the request revealed that [Ms. Raney's] name and information were included on the Central Registry." (Compl. 13.) Upon learning of this, see supra note 2, Ms. Raney alleges that she contacted Alabama DHR and Shelby County DHR and "complained that her name and information should not be included on the Central Registry." (Compl. 13.) She alleges that both Alabama DHR and Shelby County DHR "failed and refused to take any action to address [her] complaint." (Compl. 13.)
Plaintiffs allege that they have a "liberty interest in not being designated . . . as having perpetrated [ ] acts of child abuse [or] neglect" and that they have suffered a "stigma and injury to reputation" on account of being listed on Alabama DHR's Central Registry. (Compl. 15.) Plaintiffs do not allege that the designations were factually incorrect or that they lacked sufficient evidence. Plaintiffs also argue that "the denial of [a] [hearing] is a deprivation of [constitutional] rights provided by . . . the law of the State of Alabama." (Compl. 15.)
Count I of the Complaint alleges violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants for violating Plaintiffs' rights to substantive due process5 and to pre-deprivation hearings, and infringing upon Plaintiffs' fundamental liberty interests. (Compl. ¶¶ 1-4.)
Count II of the Complaint - titled "Federal Statutory Claim" - alleges that "DHR [(and Defendants Buckner and Mashego)] [are] obliged, pursuant to . . . Federal statutes and regulations referenced herein, to have policies, procedures and systems in place to assure that [P]laintiff[s] . . . [a]re afforded due process of law, including a pre-deprivation hearing . . . [and that] [i]nvestigations of child abuse/neglect reports are investigated by persons who have been properly trained forthat purpose." (Compl. ¶¶ 5-8.) No specific federal statutes are cited in the cause of action nor does there appear anywhere else in the Complaint factual allegations that (either Alabama or Shelby County, or both) DHR has or have failed to adequately train its employees.
Count III of the Complaint - titled "Injunctive Relief" - alleges that Plaintiffs are "now suffering immediate and irreparable harm and will suffer the same in the future as a result of the wrongful acts of the [D]efendants which have resulted in the [P]laintiffs' names and information being placed on the Central Registry." (Compl. ¶ 10.) Plaintiffs seek an order restraining Defendants from maintaining Plaintiffs' names on the Central Registry without providing Plaintiffs a hearing to dispute the dispositions of the investigations. Plaintiffs also seek an order restraining Defendants from "denying to [P]laintiffs and similarly situated persons a hearing" and from "continuing the custom, policy o[r] practice of failing to fully inform [a] person subject [to] an indicated disposition of their rights . . . ." (Compl. ¶ 12.) Count III is construed as relating back to Count I.
Count IV of the Complaint - titled "Declaratory Relief" - seeks an order declaring Plaintiffs' and other "similarly situated persons'" constitutional rights to a hearing to challenge DHR's investigation's disposition. (Compl. ¶¶ 13-14.) Count IV is construed as...
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