Thomas v. Buckner

• Decision Date: 29 January 2016
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 2:11-CV-245-WKW (WO)
• Parties: KAYLA THOMAS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. NANCY BUCKNER, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

KAYLA THOMAS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. NANCY BUCKNER, et al., Defendants.

CASE NO. 2:11-CV-245-WKW (WO)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHERN DIVISION

January 29, 2016

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

This case concerns Plaintiffs' allegations that Alabama Department of Human Resources ("DHR") officials deprived them of procedural due process in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983 and committed several state law torts when DHR placed them on a registry of "indicated" child abusers without affording them a due process hearing, and then disclosed their status as registered "indicated" child abusers to others.

In November 2013, Defendants filed a motion to stay this action to allow them to provide Plaintiffs due process hearings. (Doc. # 73.) The court granted the motion and stayed the case. (Doc. # 76.) After the parties reported that the administrative hearings had been concluded in Plaintiffs' favor and that the "indicated" statuses had been changed to "not indicated," the court entered an order directing Plaintiffs to show cause "why their official-capacity claims against Defendants, alleging violations of their procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, should not be dismissed, and why supplemental jurisdiction should not be declined over Plaintiffs' state-law claims pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)." (Doc. # 87.) Plaintiffs responded to the order to show cause. (Doc. # 88.) Defendants filed a reply to Plaintiffs' response to the order. (Doc. # 91.) However, neither side adequately addressed the issues presented in the show cause order. The parties' briefs indicate that they are confused about - and do not agree on - which claims remain pending in this case. Further, the parties spent the majority of their briefs addressing the merits of a motion for attorney's fees which has yet to be filed.

After reviewing the case file in detail and considering the parties' arguments and the governing law, the court concludes that Plaintiffs' remaining § 1983 claims are due to be dismissed as moot. Pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' remaining state-law claims. Accordingly, this case is due to be dismissed.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Plaintiffs' Remaining Claims

On April 4, 2011, Plaintiffs Kayla Thomas, Haley Ponder, LaShannon Trammel, Lawrence Trammel, and Joan Raney filed a complaint against NancyBuckner, in her official capacity as the Commissioner of DHR; Kim Mashego, in her official capacity as the Director of the Shelby County Department of Human Resources ("Shelby County DHR"); and several other Defendants. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants had investigated reports of child abuse and neglect, concluded that the reports were substantiated, and placed Plaintiffs on a DHR registry of "indicated" perpetrators of child abuse. Plaintiffs averred that their constitutional and federal statutory due process rights had been violated because they were not afforded a hearing prior to being placed on the registry and because the persons investigating the child abuse allegations were not properly trained. Plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief. (Doc. # 1-2 at 18-22.)

On September 13, 2011, the court entered a memorandum opinion and order (Doc. # 41) on Defendants' motion to dismiss. (Doc. # 21.) The court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims, but allowed Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend the complaint. The court stated: "Plaintiffs may seek prospective relief against the official capacity defendants to the extent that Plaintiffs can allege a sufficient constitutional injury. Second, Plaintiffs (in particular, Ms. Raney) may allege claims against defendants in their personal capacities if there is a sufficient basis in fact and law to do so." (Doc. # 41 at 41.)

On September 29, 2011, three of the original plaintiffs (Kayla Thomas,Haley Ponder,¹ and Joan Raney) filed an amended complaint against Nancy Buckner, in her personal capacity and in her official capacity as Commissioner of DHR, and against Kim Mashego, in her personal capacity and in her official capacity as Director of Shelby County DHR. (Doc. # 42.) Plaintiffs asserted the following claims:

• Count 1: a § 1983 claim for deprivation of procedural due process (Doc. # 42 at 31-32);

• Count 2: a § 1983 claim for deprivation of a "right previously recognized under state law" (Doc. # 42 at 32-33);

• Count 3: a "claim for injunctive relief pursuant to" § 1983 (Doc. # 42 at 33);

• Count 4: a "claim for declaratory relief pursuant to" § 1983 (Doc. # 42 at 34);

• Count 5: a state-law claim for negligence and wantonness (Doc. # 42 at 34);

• Count 6: a state-law claim for conversion (Doc. # 42 at 35);

• Count 7: a state-law claim for "suppression of material fact" (Doc. # 42 at 35-36); and

• Count 8: a state-law claim for injunctive relief (Doc. # 42 at 36).

Plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and an award of attorney's fees and costs. (Doc. # 42 at 37-38.)

On October 7, 2011, the Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint (Doc. # 43). On September 11, 2012, the court entered a memorandum opinion and order (Doc. # 47) granting in part and denying in part Defendants' motion to dismiss. The court ruled as follows on Plaintiffs' claims:

• Count 1: dismissed in part with respect to all claims for monetary relief² against Defendants in their individual capacities on grounds of qualified immunity (Doc. # 47 at 21-24);

• Count 2: dismissed entirely for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (Doc. # 47 at 20-21, 24);

• Count 3: dismissed entirely as redundant and not a cause of action (Doc. # 47 at 24);

• Count 4: the court did not address Count 4 (Doc. # 47);

• Counts 5, 6, and 7 (the state-law claims): dismissed in part on grounds of sovereign immunity with respect to all money damages claims against Defendants in their official capacities (Doc. # 47 at 23-24); and

• Count 8: dismissed entirely as redundant and not a cause of action (Doc. # 47 at 24.)

The court concluded: "In sum, Count 1 remains against Defendants in their official capacities for prospective relief and Counts 4, 5, and 6 remain againstDefendants in their official capacities for prospective relief and in their individual capacities." (Doc. # 47 at 25.) This summary statement was not consistent with the court's findings within the memorandum opinion and order. On September 12, 2013, Defendants moved for clarification of the court's September 11, 2012 Order, or alternatively, to dismiss certain claims in the complaint. (Doc. # 69.)

On October 15, 2013, the court entered an order (Doc. # 72) granting the motion for clarification (Doc. # 69) as follows: (1) dismissing Count 4 of the amended complaint; (2) dismissing the state-law claims (Counts 5, 6, and 7) against Defendants in their official capacities on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity; and (3) dismissing the state-law claims (Counts 5, 6, and 7) for injunctive relief against Defendants in their individual capacities as "meaningless." (Doc. # 72.)

The court concluded its October 15, 2013 order with the following statement: "Accordingly, Count 1 remains against Defendants in their official capacities for prospective relief."³ (Doc. # 72 at 2.) Based on this statement,Defendants take the position that there are no state-law claims remaining in the case. Defendants are incorrect. The court has not dismissed the state-law claims for money damages claims against Defendants in their individual capacities.

The following claims of Plaintiffs Kayla Thomas and Joan Raney are the only claims in the amended complaint that have not been dismissed:

• Count 1: a § 1983 procedural due process claim for injunctive and declaratory relief against Nancy Buckner and Kim Mashego in their official capacities, and

• Counts 5, 6, and 7 (state-law claims for negligence and wantonness, conversion, and "suppression of material fact") for monetary relief against Nancy Buckner and Kim Mashego in their individual capacities.

B. Other Relevant Procedural History

On October 10, 2012, the court entered a scheduling order. (Doc. # 53.) Twice, on the parties' joint motions, the deadlines in the scheduling order were extended. Ultimately, the discovery deadline was set for November 27, 2013; the dispositive motion deadline was set for January 10, 2014; the pretrial conference was set for April 10, 2014; and trial was set for the term beginning May 5, 2014. (Doc. # 64.)

On November 19, 2013, Defendants moved for a stay of the remaining deadlines in the scheduling order and for a stay of Nancy Buckner's deposition pending the resolution of the administrative hearings that DHR had voluntarily agreed to provide Plaintiffs. (Doc. # 73.) In their motion to continue, Defendants specifically disclaimed any liability on Plaintiffs' claims. (Doc. # 73 at ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs opposed the motion, objecting both to a stay of the deposition and to a stay of the case. (Doc. # 74.)

On November 21, 2013, the Magistrate Judge granted the motion to stay the deposition of Nancy Buckner. (Doc. # 75.) On November 22, 2013, the court granted the motion to stay the case pending resolution of the administrative hearing. (Doc. # 76.)

On August 26, 2014, the parties filed a joint status report informing the court that an administrative law judge ("ALJ") had entered final decisions in Plaintiffs' favor and that DHR had changed the "indicated" dispositions to "not indicated." (Doc. # 86.)

On September 2, 2014, the court ordered Plaintiffs to "show cause . . . why their official-capacity claims against Defendants, alleging violations of their procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, should not be dismissed, and why supplemental jurisdiction should not be declined over Plaintiffs' state-law claims pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)." (Doc. # 87.) Bothparties have filed briefs with...