Thomas v. Chadwick

• Decision Date: 16 October 1990
• Docket Number: No. D010223,D010223
• Citation: 274 Cal.Rptr. 128,224 Cal.App.3d 813
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Linda THOMAS et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. David L. CHADWICK et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Page 128

274 Cal.Rptr. 128

224 Cal.App.3d 813

Linda THOMAS et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. David L. CHADWICK et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. D010223.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Oct. 16, 1990.

As Modified Nov. 14, 1990.

Thompson & Lee, David R. Thompson and Deborah Peterson-Lee, Carlsbad, for plaintiffs and appellants.

McInnis, Fitzgerald, Rees, Sharkey & McIntyre, Cary W. Miller, San Diego, Horvitz & Levy, Barry R. Levy and Douglas G. Benedon, Encino, for defendants and respondents.

FROEHLICH, Associate Justice.

Appellants Linda Thomas and Harvey Thomas, individually and as guardian ad litem for Latoya Thomas, appeal from the judgment entered in favor of respondents David L. Chadwick and Children's Hospital and Health Center following an order granting respondents' motion for judgment on the pleadings. Appellants' complaint sought damages from respondents under 42 United States Code section 1983, claiming acts of respondents ultimately led to appellants being deprived of their civil and constitutional rights.

1. Factual Background

The facts presented ¹ are undeniably tragic. On January 17, 1986, appellants' two-month old child, Harvey, was transferred from a hospital in Brawley, California to Children's Hospital and Health Center in San Diego, California. The infant was examined by Dr. Chadwick, a physician employed by Children's Hospital, who failed to recognize the infant was suffering symptoms attributable to a congenital defect (i.e., a subdural hematoma caused by an arteriovenous malformation of the brain). Instead, Dr. Chadwick diagnosed the child was suffering from injuries of a nonaccidental nature which could only have resulted from a violent shaking or a fall. Because of the suspicion of child abuse, respondents filed a report pursuant to the state Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act. (PEN.CODE, § 11164² et seq.) Appellants alleged this report (the initial report) was filed without knowledge or reasonable suspicion abuse had occurred, and further alleged respondents had recklessly misdiagnosed the infant's true condition. ³

The infant died from his condition four days later, and his remains were transferred to the San Diego County Coroner for an autopsy. The autopsy originally described the cause of death as hypoxic encephalopathy due to a subdural hematoma caused by a blunt injury to the side of the head. Appellants claim the autopsy was negligently performed and was subsequently relied upon to support criminal and judicial proceedings against appellants.

On February 18, 1986, respondents sent a letter (the subsequent report) to the Imperial County District Attorney's Office, informing the district attorney of the child's death, restating Chadwick's erroneous diagnosis, and urging the district attorney to take action to remove appellants' other child, Latoya, from her parents' home. Respondents allegedly sent this letter with full knowledge of the consequences it would cause.

As a result of the initial report, the subsequent report and the autopsy, the district attorney recommended to the probation department that dependency proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 et seq. be commenced with respect to Latoya. Based on the district attorney's recommendation, the Brawley police department removed Latoya from her parents' custody on February 21, 1986, and dependency proceedings were commenced. The hearing on the Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (a) petition was timely held.

Appellants contested the legal proceedings, ⁴ obtained an attorney and also hired their own medical expert to review the autopsy and the infant's remains to determine the true cause of death. Appellants' expert apparently convinced the county coroner the true cause of death was a congenital defect, causing the coroner to amend his autopsy report to state the true cause of death. As the result of the amended autopsy report, appellants were cleared of all charges.

2. Procedural History

Appellants, after being relieved of the claims-filing requirement under Government Code section 910, sued respondents on a host of theories. In appellants' first amended complaint, they alleged causes of action against respondents for medical negligence, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil rights violations under 42 United States Code sections 1983, 1985 and 1986. Respondents' demurrer was sustained with leave to amend based on respondents' contention the immunity provisions of section 11172(a) barred any claims against respondents for damages.

Appellants' second amended complaint was limited to damages for alleged civil rights violations under 42 United States Code section 1983. Appellants claimed respondents acted negligently and recklessly in making the initial report and the subsequent report of suspected child abuse. They further claimed such reports "caused" ⁵ the Imperial County District Attorney to initiate dependency proceedings, depriving appellants of their constitutional right to family unity undisturbed by unwarranted government interference.

Respondents subsequently moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing (among other things) there was no "state action" or "acts under color of state law" by respondents, or alternatively, that respondents' acts were protected by absolute immunity under state and federal law. The trial court granted respondents' motion. ⁶

3. Contentions on Appeal

Appellants' appeal raises several contentions. First, appellants urge the immunity provisions of section 11172(a) only apply to reports based on a "reasonable suspicion" of child abuse, and do not protect reports made negligently or recklessly. Second, they argue the immunity protects only the initial report, not extending to the subsequent report made by respondents to the Imperial County District Attorney. Finally, they argue that even if the state law immunities bar their state law claims, they have adequately stated a claim for damages for civil rights violations which may not be barred by state law immunities. We address their claims seriatim.

4. The Immunities Provided by Section 11172(a) to Mandated Reporters Protects Negligent, Reckless or Even Intentionally False Reports

Appellants first argue section 11172(a) ⁷ only extends immunity to reporters when the suspicion of abuse is "reasonable," because said section only immunizes reports "required or authorized" by section 11166, and section 11166 only requires reports when there is a "reasonable suspicion" of abuse. When the suspicion is not reasonable, appellants argue, reports are not shielded by the privilege.

The precise contention advanced by appellants has already been evaluated and soundly rejected in two recent well-reasoned cases. In Storch v. Silverman (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 671, 231 Cal.Rptr. 27, the court analyzed the statutory scheme of the Child Abuse Reporting Law (§ 11164 et seq., the "state act") in order to evaluate plaintiff's claim that the immunity provisions did not immunize reports based on negligent or reckless misdiagnosis. The court, per Justice Arabian, reviewed the language and purposes of the state act, along with the legislative history and genesis of the reporting laws, and reached the conclusion that the immunity provided to mandated reporters ⁸ was absolute. (Storch v. Silverman, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d [224 Cal.App.3d 820] at pp. 676-681, 231 Cal.Rptr. 27.) In Krikorian v. Barry (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1211, 242 Cal.Rptr. 312, the court was asked to repudiate Storch 's holding that the state act conferred absolute immunity to mandated reporters for false reports made with malice. After extensive review of the statutory scheme and legislative history (focusing particularly on the genesis of the statutory grant of immunity to reporters), the Krikorian court concluded the immunity for mandated reporters was intended to be absolute, even for false or reckless reports. (Id. at pp. 1215-1222, 242 Cal.Rptr. 312.)

We subscribe to the reasoning of Storch and Krikorian. The plain language of the statute grants absolute immunity to mandated reporters. While the Legislature placed some limits on the immunity enjoyed by voluntary reporters (i.e., forfeiture of immunity for knowingly false reports or reports made with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the report), it omitted placing any similar limitations on the immunity enjoyed by mandated reporters. Such omission indicates the Legislature intended that even intentionally false reports by a mandated reporter are immunized. (See Balboa Ins. Co. v. Aguirre (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1008 197 Cal.Rptr. 250 ["As a general rule of statutory construction '[w]here a statute on a particular subject omits a particular provision, the inclusion of such a provision in another statute concerning a related matter indicates an intent that the provision is not applicable to the statute from which it was omitted.' [Citations]"].)

"Had the Legislature intended to [limit] immunity for false and reckless reports in the case of mandatory reporters, it would have done so expressly, as it did in the case of voluntary reporters. [Citation.]" (Krikorian v. Barry, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 1218, 242 Cal.Rptr. 312.) In light of the statutory language, the legislative purposes and the historical genesis of the statutory immunities, we agree that the Legislature intended to grant absolute immunity to mandated reporters for all required or authorized reports, even though based on a negligent, reckless or false diagnosis.

5. The Absolute Immunity Extends to Both the Initial and Subsequent Reports by Respondents

Appellants next argue the Legislature only intended the absolute immunity to protect the initial report, ⁹ and did not intend to protect any reports beyond the required initial report. Thus, appellants argue respondents' subsequent report to the Imperial County District Attorney is...