Thomas v. Chicago & L.E. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 27 November 1894
• Citation: 39 N.E. 44,139 Ind. 462
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court
• Parties: THOMAS v. CHICAGO & L. E. RY. CO.

139 Ind. 462

39 N.E. 44

THOMAS

v.CHICAGO & L. E. RY. CO.¹

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Nov. 27, 1894.

Appeal from circuit court, Huntington county; O. W. Whitelock, Judge.

Action by Sampson M. Thomas, administrator of James L. Platt, against the Chicago & Lake Erie Railway Company for injuries causing death. From an order sustaining a demurrer to plaintiff's evidence, he appeals. Dismissed.

Mock & Simmons and Watkins & Dungan, for appellant. Otto Gresham, for appellee.

McCABE, J.

The appellant, as administrator of the estate of James L. Platt, deceased, sued he appellee in the Wells circuit court to recover $10,000 damages to the widow and child of said decedent caused by the alleged negligence of the appellee in causing the death of said decedent. The venue of the cause was changed to the Huntington circuit court, where, upon the issues formed upon the complaint, there was a jury trial. At the close of the appellant's evidence, the appellee demurred to the evidence. The evidence is all properly set out in the demurrer. The circuit court sustained the demurrer to the evidence, and the appellant duly excepted, and prayed an appeal to the supreme court, which was granted. There was no judgment of any kind rendered by the circuit court, though the appellant's learned counsel in their brief say that the appellee filed its demurrer to the evidence, which the court sustained, withdrew the cause from the jury, and rendered judgment for the defendant, appellee, from which judgment counsel say the plaintiff, appellant, appeals to this court. No such judgment is found in the record. The ruling sustaining the demurrer to the evidence is assigned as the only error.

Appeals are only authorized by statute from final judgments. 1 Burns' Rev. St. 1894, § 644 (Rev. St. 1881, § 632). There are some exceptions to the general rule provided by the statute where appeals are authorized from certain interlocutory orders, but the case before us does not fall within any of those exceptions. 1 Burns' Rev. St. 1894, § 658 (Rev. St. 1881, § 646). To constitute a final judgment within the meaning of the statute so as to authorize an appeal, the order appealed from must make a final disposition of the cause. Northcutt v. Buckles, 60 Ind. 577; Thiebaud v. Dufour, 57 Ind. 589; Taylor v. Board, 120 Ind. 121, 22 N. E. 108;State v. Spencer, 92 Ind. 115;State v. Evansville & T. H. R. Co., 107 Ind. 581, 8 N. E. 619;McGuire v. State, 119 Ind. 499, 21 N. E. 1100;Champ v. Kendrick, 130 Ind. 545, 30 N. E. 635. An appeal cannot be taken by persons when no judgment is rendered for or against such persons. Jager v. Doherty, 61 Ind. 528; Elliott, App. Proc., §§ 80-83. “Here there was no judgment rendered for or against anybody, nor did the order sustaining the demurrer to the evidence make a final disposition of the cause. It was a mere interlocutory order, liable to be changed before the final disposition of the cause. The general rule,” says Judge Elliott, “that appeals lie only from final judgments, is so essential to the orderly administration of justice, and has so much to commend it, that it is with reason that statutory provisions creating exceptions are construed with some strictness. The doctrine is that where a general rule exists, and a party asserts that his case forms an exception to the rule, he must show substantial grounds for his claim, or the case will be brought under the rule. This doctrine is applied with liberality to prevent appeals from intermediate rulings or interlocutory orders, for, in almost every form in which the question has been presented, the courts have exhibited their reluctance to multiply or recognize exceptions to...