Thomas v. Devries, Civ. A. No. 91-435-4-MAC (DF).

• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia
• Writing for the Court: FITZPATRICK
• Citation: Thomas v. Devries, 834 F.Supp. 398 (M.D. Ga. 1993)
• Decision Date: 19 October 1993
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 91-435-4-MAC (DF).
• Parties: James D. THOMAS, Ph.D., Plaintiff, v. David J. DEVRIES, Ph.D., et al., Defendants.

834 F. Supp. 398

James D. THOMAS, Ph.D., Plaintiff, v. David J. DEVRIES, Ph.D., et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 91-435-4-MAC (DF).

United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Macon Division.

October 19, 1993.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

H. Christopher Coates, Milledgeville, GA, for plaintiff.

William W. Calhoun, Atlanta, GA, for defendants David J. Devries, Ph.D., Individually and in His Official Capacity as Chairman of Dept. of Mathematics and Computer Science of Georgia College, Thomas F. Armstrong, Ph.D., Individually and in His Official Capacity as Dean of School of Arts and Sciences of Georgia College, Georgia College of University System of Georgia, Bd. of Regents of University System of Georgia.

ORDER

FITZPATRICK, District Judge.

Before the court is a motion for summary judgment filed on behalf of all defendants in this case. For purposes of this motion all reasonable doubts about the facts are resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Warrior Tombigbee Transport Co., Inc. v. M/V Nan Fung, 695 F.2d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir.1983).

James D. Thomas was an associate professor of math and statistics at Georgia College. Georgia College is a unit of the University System of Georgia operated by the Board of Regents as an agency of the State of Georgia. (Defendant's Statement of Material Facts at 1). Mr. Thomas was given a one-year teaching contract for the 1987-88 academic year, and this one-year contract was repeatedly renewed until March 1990, when he was informed that his employment would terminate after the 1990-91 school year ended. (Plaintiff's Brief in Response at 2-3).

The decision to release Mr. Thomas was made after he approached Dean Thomas Armstrong with allegations that David Devries, Chairman of the Department of Math and Computer Sciences, eavesdropped upon Mr. Thomas' telephone conversations. Id. at 4-5. Before the eavesdropping allegation David Devries was pleased with Mr. Thomas' performance and intended to renew his teaching contract. Id. at 5-9. After the eavesdropping accusation David Devries gave Mr. Thomas a poor performance evaluation allegedly as a pretext for a retaliatory dismissal. Id. at 9-17.

By approaching Mr. Armstrong about the eavesdropping Mr. Thomas initiated a grievance in accordance with the Georgia College Faculty Handbook. Id. at 5. Mr. Devries' vindictive action violated a non-retaliatory clause located within the College's grievance procedure, Id. at 3, so after learning that his contract was not renewed Mr. Thomas filed another grievance that was later dismissed on the advice of counsel. Id. at 26. Instead of relying upon the college's grievance procedure Mr. Thomas filed this complaint.

Mr. Thomas originally alleged violations of First Amendment rights and substantive and procedural due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. After the defendants' motion for summary judgment was filed Mr. Thomas voluntarily dismissed his First Amendment claim, but he continues to pray for equitable relief and damages in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of liberty and property interests. It is an analysis of the validity of these due process claims that now demands the court's attention.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Summary judgment is proper "if ... there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party may provide affirmative evidence of the non-moving party's inability to prove its case at trial, and summary judgment is mandated if a party cannot establish the existence of essential elements that they carry the burden of proving at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

In the present case Eleventh Amendment immunities prevent plaintiff from reaching these essential elements. Georgia College and the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia are named as defendants, but "The Eleventh Amendment insulates a state from suit brought by individuals in federal court unless the state either consents to suit or waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity." Stevens v. Gay, 864 F.2d 113, 114 (11th Cir.1989) (citing Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 906-08, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). Since the state has not consented or waived immunity, and since Georgia College and the Regents of the University System are state entities to which Stevens applies, a § 1983 action against these defendants may not be entertained in federal court.

Besides the state agencies named in the complaint, plaintiff also identifies David Devries and Thomas Armstrong as defendants to this suit in their official capacities. While the Eleventh Amendment does not insulate state employees acting in their official capacities from prospective injunctive relief, 864 F.2d at 114 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-71, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1356-60, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974)), nor does it preclude liability for ancillary costs associated with that relief, 864 F.2d at 114 (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 n. 18, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3107 n. 18, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) (citing Edelman, 415 U.S. at 667-68, 94 S.Ct. at 1357-58)), any injunctive remedy imposed upon defendants operating in their official capacity must be "designed to end a continuing violation of federal law...." Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 2940, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986). In the present case there is no continuing violation that needs be addressed. The violation, if any, occurred at the time that the defendants committed the retaliatory act that initiated this action, and once plaintiff's contract was terminated the violation was complete. Plaintiff argues that there is an ongoing constitutional violation because his "termination of employment at Georgia College continues to the present and will continue in the future unless reinstatement relief is granted." (Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief at 9). To paraphrase plaintiff: the end of his employment is continuing, or the cessation of his job constantly renews itself. These statements are not convincing, and the confusion probably derives from plaintiff's erroneous association of the constitutional violation with its tangential harm. The constitutional violation ended when plaintiff's employment was terminated, but the harm caused by the constitutional violation persists. Unfortunately the court is without jurisdiction to provide injunctive relief from harms associated with past constitutional violations, see, e.g., Coney v. Department of Human Resources, 787 F.Supp. 1434, 1440-41 (M.D.Ga.1992), so these defendants are immune from liability in their official capacities.

The court takes its position on this particular issue with reluctance and only after the most careful consideration. Plaintiff's case proves that the line between suits permitted by Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), and those prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment will often be indistinct. See also 478 U.S. at 278, 106 S.Ct. at 2940.

Other courts confronting this issue have reached different conclusions, but these cases are distinguishable. Elliott v. Hinds, 786 F.2d 298 (7th Cir.1986), is a pre-Papasan decision which held that wrongful discharge of a tenured employee is an ongoing violation. Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1990), is a post-Papasan decision that does not reference or in any way distinguish the Papasan holding. Dube v. State University of New York, 900 F.2d 587 (2d Cir.1990), cites Papasan, but only for a proposition unrelated to the issue of whether a wrongful discharge is an ongoing constitutional violation. Coakley v. Welch, 877 F.2d 304 (4th Cir.1989), and Ezzell v. Board of Regents of The University System of Georgia, 838 F.2d 1569 (11th Cir.1988), found ongoing violations after wrongful discharges, but the ongoing violations depended upon the continued existence of state regulations which essentially authorized the wrongful discharges. In short, the court finds no case which helps to remove plaintiff's case from the limitations imposed by Papasan.

Neither does the Fourteenth Amendment supersede the Eleventh Amendment in actions alleging § 1983. Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to override Eleventh Amendment immunity to the extent necessary to enforce legislation designed to implement the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, but "it is well settled that § 1983 does not constitute an exercise of that authority." 900 F.2d at 594 (citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340-42, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1144-45, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979).

Even if the constitutional violation were ongoing and injunctive relief otherwise available, plaintiff's prayer includes monetary damages that do not fit the description of ancillary costs associated with injunctive relief. Ancillary costs cannot be "in practical effect indistinguishable ... from an award of damages against the state." 415 U.S. at 668, 94 S.Ct. at 1358. To maintain a distinction between injunctive relief and damages, plaintiff's prayer for relief should not be measurable "in terms of a monetary loss resulting from a past breach of a legal duty on the part of the defendant state officials." Id. The complaint in the instant action prays for back pay and benefits as a form of equitable relief, but Edelman categorizes this equitable request as a disguised claim for damages that are never recoverable against state employees functioning in their official capacities.

Official capacities aside, David Devries and Thomas Armstrong are further named as defendants in their individual capacities. Again the Eleventh Amendment cloaks them in immunity. Suits against state employees in their individual capacities may be subject to qualified or good faith immunity, and such defendants are shielded from liability insofar as their conduct does not violate "`clearly established statutory or...