Thomas v. Evans

• Decision Date: 07 April 1997
• Docket Number: No. 21192,21192
• Parties: Justin A. THOMAS, Administrator of the Estate of Judith Ann Dewald, a/k/a Judy Ann Dewald, deceased, Justin A. Thomas, Timothy Kingery, and Wesley Kingery, individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. William J. EVANS and Carolyn Evans, Personal Representatives (Administrators with will annexed) of the Estate of Ronald P. Dewald, deceased, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 872

941 S.W.2d 872 Justin A. THOMAS, Administrator of the Estate of Judith Ann
Dewald, a/k/a Judy Ann Dewald, deceased, Justin A.
Thomas, Timothy Kingery, and Wesley
Kingery, individually,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
William J. EVANS and Carolyn Evans, Personal Representatives
(Administrators with will annexed) of the Estate
of Ronald P. Dewald, deceased,
Defendants-Respondents. No. 21192. Missouri Court of Appeals,
Southern District,
Division Two. April 7, 1997.

Page 873

Ralph W. Gilchrist, Bolivar, for appellants.

Robert M. Sweere, Springfield, for respondents.

MONTGOMERY, Chief Judge.

Ronald Dewald and Judith Dewald, formerly Johnson, were married little more than a month before Ronald killed Judith and then committed suicide. ¹ Justin A. Thomas, personal representative of Judith's estate, and Justin A. Thomas, Timothy Kingery, and Wesley Kingery, individually, Judith's heirs, filed a Petition in Equity for Declaratory Judgment against William J. Evans and Carolyn Evans, personal representatives of the Estate of Ronald P. Dewald. ² Maintaining that equity requires the court to treat the murdered Judith as the survivor of Ronald so that she could take under his will, Appellants requested the court to declare Respondents "constructive trustees for the benefit of the estate of Judith Ann Dewald ... deceased, and [the individual Appellants], as heirs of Judith Ann Dewald ... deceased, as to all such property she would have inherited from the estate of Ronald P. Dewald ... the same as if she had survived him...."

Respondents subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment. At a hearing on the matter, the trial court concluded that Respondents' motion was actually a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and dismissed the petition. Appellants appeal from that ruling.

A petition is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim if it invokes principles of substantive law which entitle the plaintiff to relief. Empiregas, Inc. of Rolla v. Whitson, 902 S.W.2d 347, 348 (Mo.App.1995). In assessing the sufficiency of a petition, we accept all properly pleaded facts as true, give them a liberal construction, and draw all reasonable inferences which are fairly deducible from the pleaded facts. Murphy v. A.A. Mathews, 841 S.W.2d 671, 672 (Mo. banc 1992). Thus, proper analysis of the claim requires the following summary of the pleaded facts.

On August 6, 1993, Ronald and Judith were married. On September 9, 1993, Ronald murdered Judith and then killed himself. The petition states that Ronald "may have survived [Judith] in fact, but not in contemplation of law." At the times of their deaths, Ronald and Judith were 53 and 52 years old, respectively. Prior to his death Ronald executed his Last Will and Testament. This document was admitted to probate on September 22, 1993. According to the terms of Ronald's will, if Judith survived him by thirty days, she would receive all of his personal property, as well as one-half of the proceeds from the sale of his real estate if both she and his mother, Mabel A. Robbins, survived him. In the event Ronald's mother predeceased him, Judith would receive all of the proceeds from the sale of his real estate.

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On September 22, 1993, Respondents were granted letters testamentary and appointed personal representatives of Ronald's estate. Respondents subsequently took charge of all of Ronald's personal property and real estate.

The petition alleges that if Ronald had not murdered Judith, her life expectancy would have been greater than his. The petition states that "by reason of such murder [Ronald] enriched himself and came into possession and control of his entire estate, which except for his wilful and wanton killing of Judith Ann Dewald prior to him killing himself would have passed to Judith...." Continuing, the petition alleges:

That in equity, good conscience, and in contemplation of law, the said Ronald P. Dewald, and those under him, should not be permitted to enrich himself and themselves by reason of the murder of[ ] Judith.... Further, the said Ronald P. Dewald and those claiming under him should not be permitted and allowed to profit by his wrongdoing, nor succeed to the property of his estate.

... [E]quity should declare [Judith] to be [Ronald's] survivor and entitled to receive the property given, devised and bequeathed to her under the terms and provisions of [Ronald's will] as if she survived him.... ³

In conclusion, the petition alleges that "legal title to the property of the estate of Ronald P. Dewald has been obtained by and through the unlawful act of Ronald ... making it unconscionable for the holder of the legal title to retain and enjoy the beneficial interest through ... Ronald ... and the heirs and Estate of Judith ... should have impressed a constructive trust upon the property of the estate of Ronald ... thus acquired, in favor of the ones who are truly entitled to it, although ... Judith ... never had the legal estate."

Appellants' lone point relied on asserts their petition did state a cause of action based on the substantive principle of law that when one spouse murders the other spouse and then commits suicide, the murderer is not a survivor in contemplation of law and the trial court can equitably grant the heirs of the murdered spouse their proportionate share of the murderer's estate, the same as if the murdered spouse had survived the murderer or the same as if they had died simultaneously.

Appellants' claim is based on the common law maxim that no one shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime. Estate of Lynn, 890 S.W.2d 694, 695 (Mo.App.1995). Said another way, "one who intentionally and feloniously causes the death of another cannot acquire property by reason of that death." Baker v. Martin, 709 S.W.2d 533, 534 (Mo.App.1986).

Application of this principle is found in the following Missouri cases.

[A husband] who murders [his wife] cannot take by intestate distribution. Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S.W. 641 (1908). A surviving spouse guilty of voluntary manslaughter of her husband is barred from receiving a year's support and exempt personal property from his estate. In Re Estate of Laspy, 409 S.W.2d 725 (Mo.App.1966). A surviving spouse guilty of a successful conspiracy to murder a husband may not elect to take against his...