Thomas v. FCA US LLC, CIVIL NO. 4:15–cv–00424–SBJ

• Decision Date: 10 March 2017
• Docket Number: CIVIL NO. 4:15–cv–00424–SBJ
• Citation: 242 F.Supp.3d 819
• Parties: Linda K. THOMAS and Garold D. Thomas, Plaintiffs, v. FCA US LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

242 F.Supp.3d 819

Linda K. THOMAS and Garold D. Thomas, Plaintiffs,

v.FCA US LLC, Defendant.

CIVIL NO. 4:15–cv–00424–SBJ

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, Central Division.

Signed March 10, 2017

Jason S. Rieper, Rieper Law Office, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiffs.

Richard A. Stefani, Gray Stefani & Mitvalsky, PLC, Cedar Rapids, IA, Susan Kathleen Allen, Terrence C. Thom, Stafford Rosenbaum LLP, Milwaukee, WI, for Defendant.

ORDER DENYING FCA US LLC'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY

STEPHEN B. JACKSON, JR., UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Linda K. Thomas and Garold D. Thomas initiated this action against defendant FCA US LLC ("FCA") after Linda was injured in a motor vehicle accident while driving a 2007 Chrysler Town & Country minivan. (Dkt. 1–3). According to Plaintiffs, the knee/leg airbag in Linda's minivan deployed upon impact with another vehicle and caused severe injuries to her legs. They contend FCA is liable for those injuries because the airbag assembly had a design defect and was not reasonably safe for its intended use, FCA failed to provide adequate warnings of the dangers of the airbag assembly, and FCA breached the implied warranty that the vehicle was fit for its intended use. In support of their claims, Plaintiffs designated two individuals as expert witnesses: James Weaver and Dr. Jerry Hall. (Dkt. 18).

Presently pending before the Court is a Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert Testimony of James Weaver and Dr. Jerry Hall (Dkt. 36) filed by FCA on November 21, 2016. FCA contends the proffered opinions of Mr. Weaver and Dr. Hall fail to meet the reliability and relevance standards for the admission of expert testimony and, as a result, they should be excluded as expert witnesses in this case. (Id. ¶ 11). In support of the motion, FCA filed a Memorandum of Authorities (Dkt. 36–1) and also relies upon a Statement of Undisputed Facts (Dkt. 36–2) and an Appendix (Dkt. 36–3) of materials submitted in support of FCA's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 37) filed on the same date.

Plaintiffs filed a Resistance to Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert Testimony (Dkt. 43) on January 2, 2017. They contend Mr. Weaver's and Dr. Hall's work in this matter satisfies the requisite standards for expert witnesses and, therefore, their proffered testimony should be allowed. Plaintiffs filed a combined Brief in Support of Resistance to Motion in Limine and Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 43–1) and also rely upon their Response to Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Facts (Dkt. 43–2), their own Statement of Additional Material Facts (Dkt. 43–3), and an Appendix (Dkt. 45) of documents.

FCA filed a Reply Memorandum of Authorities in Further Support of Motion in Limine (Dkt. 49) on January 20, 2017. FCA also submitted a Response to Plaintiffs' Statement of Additional Material Facts (Dkt. 49–1) and a Supplemental Appendix (Dkt. 49–2) of materials.

Oral arguments were presented by counsel on both the Motion in Limine and the Motion for Summary Judgment on January 24, 2017. The summary judgment motion will be addressed by the Court in a separate order. For the reasons herein, the Motion in Limine will be denied.

II. STANDARDS FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a), preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness and the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court. " ‘The touchstone for the admissibility of expert testimony is whether it will assist or be helpful to the trier of fact.’ " Lee v. Andersen , 616 F.3d 803, 808 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting McKnight ex rel. Ludwig v. Johnson Controls, Inc. , 36 F.3d 1396, 1408 (8th Cir. 1994) ). Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony and provides as follows:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:

(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702. The rule reflects the principles of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. , 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), wherein the United States Supreme Court set forth standards for the admissibility of scientific expert testimony. The Daubert Court held that Rule 702 imposes a special gatekeeping obligation upon a trial judge to "ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable." Id. at 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786.

The Supreme Court later extended the application of these standards to testimony of engineers and other experts who are not scientists in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael , 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). The Kumho Tire court explained that the standards are designed to "make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field." Id. at 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167. " ‘Rule 702 does not rank academic training over demonstrated practical experience.’ " David E. Watson, P.C. v. United States , 668 F.3d 1008, 1014 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoted citation omitted).

Accordingly, when considering expert testimony, the court must determine whether the testimony is both reliable and relevant. See Barrett v. Rhodia, Inc. , 606 F.3d 975, 980 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Marmo v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. , 457 F.3d 748, 757 (8th Cir. 2006) ); Smith v. Bubak , 643 F.3d 1137, 1140 (8th Cir. 2011) (same); Polski v. Quigley Corp. , 538 F.3d 836, 839 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Lauzon v. Senco Products, Inc. , 270 F.3d 681, 686 (8th Cir. 2001) ); J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. v. General Motors Corp. , 243 F.3d 441, 444 (8th Cir. 2001) ; Weisgram v. Marley Co. , 169 F.3d 514, 517 (8th Cir. 1999).

To satisfy the reliability requirement, the party offering the expert testimony "must show by a preponderance of the evidence both that the expert is qualified to render the opinion and that the methodology underlying his conclusions is scientifically valid." To satisfy the relevance requirement, the proponent must show that the expert's reasoning or methodology was applied properly to the facts at issue.

Khoury v. Philips Med. Sys. , 614 F.3d 888, 892 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Barrett , 606 F.3d at 980 ) (internal citations omitted).

Rule 702 has been characterized as " ‘one of admissibility rather than exclusion.’ " Shuck v. CNH America, LLC , 498 F.3d 868, 874 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoted citation omitted). " ‘[D]oubts regarding whether an expert's testimony will be useful should generally be resolved in favor of admissibility.’ " United States v. Finch , 630 F.3d 1057, 1062 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoted citations omitted); see also Marmo , 457 F.3d at 758. " ‘[R]ejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule.’ " Robinson v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. , 447 F.3d 1096, 1100 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee's note).

The primary concern of Rule 702 is the underlying principles and methodology utilized by the expert, rather than the expert's conclusions. See Kuhn v. Wyeth, Inc. , 686 F.3d 618, 625 (8th Cir. 2012) ; Bonner v. ISP Techs., Inc. , 259 F.3d 924, 929 (8th Cir. 2001). Factors bearing on the admissibility of expert evidence include

(1) whether the theory or technique applied can be tested, (2) whether the theory or technique has been subject to peer review and publication, (3) the known or potential rate of error, and (4) whether it is accepted in the relevant discipline.

Kuhn , 686 F.3d at 625 (citing Daubert , 509 U.S. at 593–94, 113 S.Ct. 2786 ); see also Ahlberg v. Chrysler Corp. , 481 F.3d 630, 635 (8th Cir. 2007) (listing same factors; citing Daubert , 509 U.S. at 593–94, 113 S.Ct. 2786 ); Pro Serv. Auto., L.L.C. v. Lenan Corp. , 469 F.3d 1210, 1216 (8th Cir. 2006) (listing same factors; quoting Smith v. Cangieter , 462 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Daubert , 509 U.S. at 592–94, 113 S.Ct. 2786 )).

These factors are not exclusive, however, and they need not be considered in every case because, "[o]f course, the Daubert reliability factors should only be relied upon to the extent that they are relevant and the district court must customize its inquiry to fit the facts of each particular case."

Shuck , 498 F.3d at 874 (quoting Jaurequi v. Carter Mfg. Co. , 173 F.3d 1076, 1083 (8th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted)). For example, in some situations, "observations coupled with expertise generally may form the basis of an admissible expert opinion." Id. (finding no abuse of discretion in district court's admission of challenged testimony where experts did not test components at issue).

Other factors the court may consider include " ‘whether the expertise was developed for litigation or naturally flowed from the expert's research; whether the proposed expert ruled out other alternative explanations; and whether the proposed expert sufficiently connected the proposed testimony with the facts of the case.’ " Presley v. Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Co. , 553 F.3d 638, 643 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sappington v. Skyjack, Inc. , 512 F.3d 440, 449 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Lauzon , 270 F.3d at 686–87 )). "While weighing these factors, the district court must continue to function as a gatekeeper who ‘separates expert opinion evidence based on "good grounds" from subjective speculation that masquerades as scientific knowledge.’ " Id. (quoting Glastetter v. Novartis Pharm. Corp. , 252 F.3d 986, 989 (8th Cir. 2001) ).

"Generally, ‘the factual basis of an expert opinion goes to credibility of the...