Thomas v. Fulwood

• Decision Date: 14 September 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 14–1342 (CKK)
• Citation: 128 F.Supp.3d 341
• Parties: Raymond Thomas, Plaintiff, v. Isaac Fulwood, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

128 F.Supp.3d 341

Raymond Thomas, Plaintiff,

v.Isaac Fulwood, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 14–1342 (CKK)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed September 14, 2015

Raymond Thomas, Edgefield, SC, pro se.

Kenneth A. Adebonojo, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COLLEEN KOLLAR–KOTELLY, United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Discovery [ECF No. 12] and Plaintiff['s] Motion for Summary Judgment in Opposition to Defendant's Motion [ECF No. 16].¹ For the reasons discussed below, this case will be dismissed.

I. BACKGROUND

In the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, plaintiff "was convicted of Bank Robbery in May 1983 and sentenced to two (2) terms of seventeen (17) years imprisonment." Compl. at 1; see Plaintiff['s] Motion for Summary Judgment in Opposition to Defendant's Motion ("Pl.'s First Opp'n"), Ex. 3 (Judgment and Probation/Commitment Order). "Subsequently, the [c]ourt modified the two terms to two terms of fifteen (15) years imprisonment amounting to a total of thirty (30) years imprisonment[.]" Compl. at 1. Plaintiff was released on parole on December 9, 1999, id., and he was to remain under parole supervision until December 9, 2012, Mem. of P. & A. in Support of Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss and Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. for Prelim. Discovery ("Defs.' Mem."), Ex. 2 (Certificate of Parole [Amended] ) at 1.

On October 2, 2003, plaintiff was arrested in Florida. Compl. at 2. The United States Parole Commission ("Commission") issued a violation warrant on December 1, 2003, and had it lodged as a detainer.² See Def.'s Mem., Exs. 3–4 (Warrant and Memorandum to U.S. Marshal, Northern District of Georgia, from Sandra G. Hylton, Hearing Examiner, U.S. Parole Commission, dated December 1, 2003). Plaintiff "was convicted by the State of Florida for [robbery with a firearm, aggravated battery and resisting arrest]," and sentenced to a 10–year term of imprisonment. Id., Ex. 5 (Supplement to Warrant Application).

Plaintiff was released from Florida's custody on September 29, 2013, "at which time ... United States Marshals took custody of [him] as a result of the detainer[.]" Compl. at 2. He was taken to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma where, on April 8, 2014, his parole revocation hearing took place, id. ; see Defs.' Mem., Ex. 7 (Revocation Hearing Summary) at 1. The hearing examiner recommended revocation of plaintiff's parole and reparole effective August 1, 2014, primarily to allow additional time for release planning. Id., Ex. 7 at 2–3. An executive reviewer, however, recommended not only that plaintiff's parole be revoked, but also that he remain in custody until the expiration of his sentence. Id., Ex. 7 at 3. Ultimately, the Commission agreed with the executive reviewer's recommendation. See id., Ex. 8 (Notice of Action dated May 7, 2014) at 1. Plaintiff's statutory release date is June 20, 2022. See id., Ex. 1 (Sentencing Monitoring Computation Data as of 10–08–2014) at 2.

Plaintiff brings this civil rights action against the Commission and Isaac Fulwood, Jr., its former Chair, in both his official and individual capacities. Compl. at 2. First, plaintiff contends that defendants failed to conduct a preliminary interview and to hold his parole revocation hearing timely, noting the length of time between issuance of the warrant in December 2003, its execution in 2013, and the revocation hearing itself in 2014. See id. at 3–4; see also Mem. of P. & A. in Support of Pl.'s Compl. for the Court Not To Dismiss This Suit Against Parole Comm'n ("Pl.'s Supp. Opp'n") at 4; Reply to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss and Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 2. Second, plaintiff alleges that defendants caused him to remain incarcerated beyond December 9, 2012, the purported expiration date of his 30–year federal sentences. See Compl. at 5–8. Third, plaintiff claims that Fulwood conspired with unknown agents of the Commission on May 7, 2014, the date on which the Notice of Action was issued, to imprison him falsely. See id. at 6–7. For these alleged wrongs, plaintiff demands damages of $25 million from each defendant. Id. at 7–8.

II. DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. They argue that plaintiff's habeas claims are not properly before the Court, that sovereign immunity bars plaintiff's claims for damages against the Commission and Fulwood in his official capacity, and that absolute and/or qualified immunity bars plaintiff's claims for damages against Fulwood in his individual capacity.³

A. Plaintiff's Habeas Claims

According to defendants, "[p]laintiff's complaint sounds in habeas." Defs.' Mem. at 8. He claims to be illegally imprisoned, and thus "raises questions about the fact or duration of his incarceration." Id. Defendants argue that he must proceed by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which allows a prisoner who "is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States [,]" 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c), to seek relief in the appropriate federal district. See generally Defs.' Mem. at 8–12.

Insofar as plaintiff demands immediate relief from custody, or seeks to advance his release date, or challenges the detainer, the claims sound in habeas. SeeDavis v. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, 716 F.3d 660, 666 (D.C.Cir.2013)(holding "that a federal prisoner need bring his claim in habeas only if success on the merits will "necessarily imply the invalidity of confinement or shorten its duration." (citation omitted)); Chatman–Bey v. Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 809–10 (D.C.Cir.1988)("Congress has therefore designated habeas as the appropriate vehicle for individuals who ... challenge the lawfulness of their custody."); Boyer v. U.S. District Court, No. 89–3401, 1990 WL 91533, at *1 (D.D.C. June 19, 1990)(construing challenge to a detainer as request for "relief from confinement that is or will be imposed sometime in the future," such that "plaintiff's claims ... sounds in habeas corpus"); see alsoNelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004)("[Section 1983] must yield to the more specific federal habeas statute, with its attendant procedural and exhaustion requirements, where an inmate seeks injunctive relief challenging the fact of his conviction or the duration of his sentence." (citation omitted)).

A habeas action is subject to jurisdictional and statutory limitations. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 35 L.Ed.2d 443 (1973). The proper respondent in a habeas corpus action is the prisoner's custodian, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434–35, 124 S.Ct. 2711, 159 L.Ed.2d 513 (2004); Blair–Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1039 (D.C.Cir.1998)(citing Chatman–Bey v. Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 810 (D.C.Cir.1988)), who in this case is the Warden of the Federal Correctional Institution in Edgefield, South Carolina. Because this "district court may not entertain a habeas petition involving present physical custody unless the respondent custodian is within its territorial jurisdiction," Stokes v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 374 F.3d 1235, 1239 (D.C.Cir.2004), this district is not the proper forum for plaintiff's habeas claims. Defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's habeas claims will be granted.

B. Plaintiff's Claims Against the Commission

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff's claims against Fulwood in his official capacity and against the Commission itself on the ground that sovereign immunity bars these claims. See generally Defs.' Mem. at 12–14.

"It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction." United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983). Such consent may not be implied, but must be "unequivocally expressed," United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33–34, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992), and is "strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign," Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996)(citations omitted). "[T]he terms of [the United States'] consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit." United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586, 61 S.Ct. 767, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941)(citation omitted). For example, although the Federal Tort Claims Act waives sovereign immunity of the United States for certain torts committed by federal employees, seeRichards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6, 82 S.Ct. 585, 7 L.Ed.2d 492 (1962), it does not waive sovereign immunity for constitutional tort claims, seeFDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477–78, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994).

The Commission is a federal entity which "retains the immunity it is due as an arm of the federal sovereign." Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 429 F.3d 1098, 1106 (D.C.Cir.2005). Sovereign immunity therefore bars plaintiff's claims against the Commission itself. See, e.g,Carter–El v. District of Columbia Dep't of Corr., No. 12–5357, 2013 WL 3367416, at *1 (D.C.Cir. July 5, 2013)(per curiam) (affirming dismissal of constitutional claims against the Commission on sovereign immunity grounds); Epps v. Howes, 573 F.Supp.2d 180, 186 (D.D.C.2008)(denying relief from judgment that sovereign immunity barred claims against United States, Department of Justice, and the Commission). Because the Commission's immunity extends to its Commissioners in their official capacities, see, e.g.,Jones v. Fulwood, 860 F.Supp.2d 16, 21 (D.D.C.2012), sovereign immunity bars his claims against Fulwood in his official capacity also, see, e.g.,id. at 22; Ali v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, No. 06–0235, 2007 WL 902312, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 2007)(concluding that sovereign immunity barred § 1983 claims for monetary damages against Commissioner and hearing examiner).

C. Plaintiff's Claims Against Fulwood

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