Thomas v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co.

Decision Date20 November 2015
Docket NumberCivil Action No.: 3:15-cv-01604-RBH
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
PartiesBruce B. Thomas, Plaintiff, v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Co., Defendant.
ORDER

This diversity action concerns a dispute over whether Defendant Hartford Casualty Insurance Co.1 owes Plaintiff Bruce B. Thomas the proceeds from insurance policies purchased from Defendant by Regina Holloman—who Plaintiff murdered. Plaintiff has filed a motion to remand, and Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss. See ECF Nos. 11 & 14. The case is before the Court for review of the Report and Recommendation (R & R) of United States Magistrate Judge Bristow Marchant.2 See R & R, ECF No. 25. The Magistrate Judge recommends the Court (1) deny Plaintiff's motion to remand and (2) grant Defendant's motion to dismiss. R & R at 4-5. For the reasons stated below, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge and adopts the R & R.

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff, a citizen of South Carolina, initiated this action by filing a pro se complaint in theCourt of Common Pleas for Richland County, South Carolina, against Defendant, a citizen of Connecticut.3 See ECF Nos. 1 & 1-1. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of murder and assault and battery with intent to kill and that he is now serving an aggregate sentence of life imprisonment for his convictions.4 ECF No. 1-1 at ¶ 3. Plaintiff further claims that he is the named primary beneficiary of a life insurance policy that Regina A. Holloman purchased from Defendant, and that Defendant has refused to pay Plaintiff the proceeds of the policy. Id. at ¶¶ 17-21. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that he is entitled to collect the insurance proceeds. Id. at ¶ 22.

On April 13, 2015, Defendant removed the action on the basis of diversity citizenship by filing a notice of removal in this Court. See ECF No. 1. The next day, Defendant filed an answer to Plaintiff's complaint, asserting Plaintiff's factual allegations related to his plea and conviction for the murder of Holloman. ECF No. 4 at ¶ 5. Defendant admitted that Holloman "purchased Life and Accidental Death and Dismemberment policies through the South Carolina Budget Control Board,"5 and that Plaintiff was named as one of several beneficiaries at the time of Holloman's death. Id. at ¶¶ 7-8.

On May 11, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand on the ground that Defendant's notice of removal was untimely. See ECF No. 11. Defendant filed a timely response in opposition. See ECF No.16. In a subsequent filing, Plaintiff asserted another ground for remand, arguing the amount in controversy did not exceed $75,000.6 ECF No. 23 at 4.

On May 20, 2015, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss asserting dismissal was warranted, among other reasons, because Plaintiff pled guilty to murdering Holloman and thus was barred from collecting any insurance proceeds on her behalf pursuant to section 62-2-803 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2014) (prohibiting a named beneficiary who has feloniously and intentionally killed the insured from collecting insurance proceeds). See ECF No. 14. Defendant attached several documents to its motion to dismiss, including (1) a prior R & R issued by the Magistrate Judge addressing Plaintiff's petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and summarizing the facts relating to Plaintiff's convictions; and (2) this Court's order adopting the R & R, granting summary judgment for the respondent, and dismissing Plaintiff's § 2254 habeas petition. See ECF Nos. 14-4 & 14-5; see also Thomas v. Stevenson, No. CIV.A. 9:12-01113, 2013 WL 809253, at *6 (D.S.C. Jan. 4, 2013) ("The record reflects that Petitioner's convictions arose out of an incident where he shot and killed his girlfriend and shot and seriously injured the girlfriend's mother."), report and recommendation adopted, No. 9:12-CV-01113-RBH, 2013 WL 808844 (D.S.C. Mar. 5, 2013), appeal dismissed, 539 F. App'x 275 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1558 (2014). Plaintiff filed a timely response and supplemental response opposing Defendant's motion to dismiss. See ECF Nos. 18 & 23.

The Magistrate Judge issued an R & R recommending that the Court (1) deny Plaintiff's motionto remand and (2) grant Defendant's motion to dismiss. R & R at 4-5. Plaintiff filed timely objections; Defendant filed an affidavit that the Magistrate Judge had instructed it to submit in the R & R; and Plaintiff filed a motion to strike the affidavit, to which Defendant filed a response in opposition. See ECF Nos. 28, 30, & 31. The motion to dismiss, motion to remand, and motion to strike are now before the Court.

Standard of Review

The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to the Court. The Magistrate Judge's recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The Court must conduct a de novo review of those portions of the R & R to which specific objections are made, and it may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The Court must engage in a de novo review of every portion of the Magistrate Judge's report to which objections have been filed. Id. However, the Court need not conduct a de novo review when a party makes only "general and conclusory objections that do not direct the [C]ourt to a specific error In the [M]agistrate [Judge]'s proposed findings and recommendations." Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). In the absence of specific objections to the R & R, the Court reviews only for clear error, Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005), and the Court need not give any explanation for adopting the Magistrate Judge's recommendation. Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199-200 (4th Cir. 1983).

Discussion
I. Plaintiff's Motion to Remand
A. Applicable Law

The party seeking to remove a case to federal court has the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994). Thus, Defendant bears the burden to establish federal jurisdiction is proper in this case. "Because removal jurisdiction raises significant federalism concerns," the Court "must strictly construe removal jurisdiction. If federal jurisdiction is doubtful, a remand is necessary." Id. (internal citation omitted).

State court defendants may remove a civil action to federal district court if the district court has original subject matter jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). A civil defendant must file a notice of removal either (a) within thirty days after receiving a copy of the initial pleading (i.e., the plaintiff's complaint) or (b) within thirty days after receiving service of summons if the initial pleading has been filed in court and need not be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). A plaintiff whose action a defendant has removed to federal court may file a motion to remand—within thirty days after the filing of the notice of removal—on the basis that removal was improper. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Moreover, if the district court determines at any time before entering final judgment that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a removed action, it must remand the action to state court. Id.

Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over actions between citizens of different states in which the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). "When a plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, the amount in controversy for purposes of section 1332 is the 'value of the object of the litigation.'" Toler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 25 F. App'x 141, 143 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977)). "In determining whether the 'value of the object of the litigation' is sufficient tosatisfy the amount in controversy requirement, the Court should grant a dismissal only where it appears to a legal certainty that the controversy involves less than $75,000." Tolbert v. Cook, No. CA 8:13-03312-GRA, 2014 WL 1652434, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 23, 2014). "In this circuit, it is settled that the test for determining the amount in controversy in a diversity proceeding is 'the pecuniary result to either party which [a] judgment would produce.'" Dixon v. Edwards, 290 F.3d 699, 710 (4th Cir. 2002) (alteration in original) (quoting Gov't Emp. Ins. Co. v. Lally, 327 F.2d 568, 569 (4th Cir. 1964)). In other words, the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied if either the gain to the plaintiff or the cost to the defendant exceeds $75,000. Tolbert, 2014 WL 1652434, at *2.

"The proper time for testing the sufficiency of the jurisdictional amount is when the case is removed." Woodward v. Newcourt Commercial Fin. Corp., 60 F. Supp. 2d 530, 531 (D.S.C. 1999). Ordinarily, the amount claimed by the plaintiff in his complaint "will determine whether the jurisdictional amount is satisfied for purposes of removal," Bartnikowski v. NVR, Inc., 307 F. App'x 730, 734 (4th Cir. 2009), "and a plaintiff may plead less than the jurisdictional amount to avoid federal jurisdiction." Phillips v. Whirlpool Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d 458, 461 (D.S.C. 2005). However, when the complaint does not allege a specific amount, the federal district court to which the case has been removed must identify the amount in controversy by considering the claim(s) in the plaintiff's complaint, the notice of removal, and other pertinent materials in the record. Crosby v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 665, 667 (D.S.C. 2005).

B. Plaintiff's Arguments

Plaintiff moves to remand on two grounds, arguing (1) Defendant's notice of removal was untimely and (2) the amount of the insurance...

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