Thomas v. Houston Org. of Pub. Emps.
| Decision Date | 15 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION H-14-0485 |
| Parties | BYRON THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. HOUSTON ORGANIZATION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
The following motions are pending before the court: 1) a motion to dismiss (Dkt. 6) under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), 12(b)(1), and for a more definite statement under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e) filed by defendant Houston Organization of Public Employees ("HOPE"); 2) a motion to dismiss (Dkt. 17) under TEX. R. CIV. P. 91(a) filed by HOPE; and 3) a motion to dismiss (Dkt. 9) under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) filed by the City of Houston ("City"), on behalf of defendants the City, and Civil Service Commissioners Richard Hall ("Hall") and Joseph Soliz ("Soliz") in their official and individual capacities.
After considering the complaint, the motions, the responses, the replies, and the applicable law, this court is of the opinion that HOPE's first motion to dismiss (Dkt. 6) should be GRANTED; HOPE's second motion to dismiss (Dkt. 17) should be DENIED; and the City's motion to dismiss (Dkt. 9) should be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Plaintiff Byron Thomas worked for the City in various capacities for approximately eleven years. Dkt. 1-29 at 2. Plaintiff was a member of HOPE, a labor union that represents City employees, from 2006 until his suspension. Dkts. 1-29 at 3, 6 at 1. In 2011, the Houston PoliceDepartment uncovered substantial evidence that plaintiff was selling City scrap metal for personal gain. Dkt. 1-12 at 1. During the investigation, it was discovered that plaintiff failed to fully disclose his criminal record on his City employment application. Id. On April 6, 2011, a HOPE representative represented plaintiff at a hearing before the deputy director of the City Public Works and Engineering Department where plaintiff was given an opportunity to provide an explanation as to the alleged misconduct. Dkts. 1-20 at 3; 1-12 at 2. Plaintiff refers to this as a Loudermill hearing. Dkt. 1-29 at 3. After this hearing, plaintiff was suspended from employment. Dkt. 1-12 at 2. Plaintiff appealed the decision to the Civil Service Commission ("CSC"). On May 26, 2011, a CSC hearing was held, at which plaintiff was indefinitely suspended. Dkts. 1-29 at 3-4, 1-22, 9 at 2. HOPE did not attend the CSC hearing. Dkt. 1-29 at 3.
The court reviews the procedural history of this case and earlier actions brought by the plaintiff against the defendants to inform the res judicata claims made in all pending motions.
Plaintiff initially appealed his indefinite suspension after his CSC hearing by filing suit in state court in Harris County, Texas on September 5, 2011. Thomas v. City of Houston, et al., 4:11-CV-03564, Dkt. 1-4 (S.D. Tex. 2011) [hereinafter "City I"]. Plaintiff amended his state court complaint to allege that his due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") were violated, that the City defamed him, and that the defendants conspired under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 to violate his due process rights. City I, Dkts. 17, 65 at 7. Plaintiff also amended his complaint to add additional defendants, including the CSC for Municipal Employees of the City of Houston, and Commission members Hall and Soliz. Id. The City subsequently removed the case to federal court and filed a motion for summary judgment. City I, Dkts. 41, 49. On September 17, 2012, this court granted theCity's motion to dismiss plaintiff's defamation claim because the plaintiff did not show that the government waived its immunity to the claim. City I, Dkt. 58 at 4. The court also declined to grant a default judgment against Commissioners Hall and Soliz in their individual capacities because the court lacked personal jurisdiction. Dkt. 46 at 15-16, 58 at 5, 65 at 9. On December 5, 2012, this court granted the City's motion for summary judgment as to the remaining claims, including the Section 1983 claim brought against several defendants, including the City and Hall and Soliz in their official capacities, because plaintiff did not produce evidence of a municipal policy behind the constitutional violations. City I, Dkts. 65 at 14, 70. Plaintiff then appealed the district court's final judgment to the Fifth Circuit. City I, Dkt. 72. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling and subsequently denied plaintiff's motion for rehearing. Thomas v. City of Houston, 537 F. App'x. 593 (5th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff appealed to the United States Supreme Court and his petition for writ of certiorari was denied on March 3, 2014. Thomas v. City of Houston, et al., 134 S. Ct. 1496 (2014).
On May 24, 2013, while City I was pending, plaintiff separately filed suit against HOPE in federal court. Thomas v. Hous. Org. of Pub. Emp'rs., No. 4:13-CV-01602, Dkt. 1 (S.D. Tex. 2013) [hereinafter "HOPE I"]. Plaintiff alleged that the City had wrongfully terminated his employment, and that HOPE had provided inadequate representation by failing to show up at the CSC hearing, by deceiving him, and by instructing him "to plead the fifth" at his Loudermill hearing. HOPE I, Dkt. 1. Plaintiff later amended his complaint to allege that HOPE had breached its duty to fairly represent him under the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"). HOPE I, Dkt. 21-2. HOPE filed a renewed motion to dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and a motion for a more definite statement under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e). HOPE I, Dkt. 25. The district court granted HOPE's motionto dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that plaintiff's claim under the LMRA was time barred. HOPE I, Dkt. 33.
On January 21, 2014, plaintiff filed suit in state court against HOPE, the City, and Commissioners Hall and Soliz in their official and individual capacities. Dkt. 1-29. For the purpose of considering the pending motions, the court broadly construes plaintiff's complaint to assert: 1) a defamation claim against the City; 2) a LMRA claim against HOPE; 3) a Section 1983 claim against the City and Commissioners Hall and Soliz, in their official and individual capacities; and 4) a civil conspiracy claim against all defendants. Id. at 1-2.
Hall removed this case to federal court on February 27, 2014. Dkt. 1. Subsequent to removal, HOPE filed its motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, for lack of jurisdiction and for a more definite statement, and the City filed its motion do dismiss for failure to state a claim. Dkts. 6, 9. HOPE also filed a motion to dismiss under TEX. R. CIV. P. 91(a) on April 14, 2014. Dkt. 17. All motions have been responded to and are ripe for review.
A court may dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Gines v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 699 F.3d 812, 816 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). "Factual allegations must be enoughto raise a right to relief above the speculative level, . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Moreover, the court may also take notice of matters of public record when considering a 12(b)(6) motion. Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 n.6 (5th Cir. 1994). As part of the Twombly-Iqbal analysis, the court proceeds in two steps. First the court separates legal conclusions from well-pled facts. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Second, the cour reviews the well-pled factual allegations, assumes they are true, and then determines whether they "plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief." Id. at 679.
Res judicata bars the litigation of claims that either have been litigated or could have been raised in a prior action. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411 (1980); Test Masters Educ. Servs. Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 571 (5th Cir. 2005). The doctrine has many benefits, including protecting parties from vexatious litigation and conserving judicial resources. McCurry, 449 U.S. at 94. In practice, the doctrine requires a plaintiff who has a choice of more than one remedy for a given wrong to assert each action at once, rather than serially in successive actions. Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, Miss., 701 F.2d 556, 560 (5th Cir. 1983).
Although courts generally do not entertain Rule 12(b)(6) challenges to pleadings based on principles of res judicata, dismissal is proper when the plaintiff's pleading conclusively establishes the affirmative defense. See Larter & Sons v. Dinkler Hotels Co., 199 F.2d 854, 855 (5th Cir. 1952); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Harris Cnty., Tex., 790 F. Supp. 2d 568, 581 (S.D. Tex. 2011). Additionally, "[f]ederal law determines the res judicata effect of a prior federal court judgment." Robinson v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119, 1124 (5th Cir. 1987).
For res judicata to apply, four elements must be established: (1) the parties are identical or are in privity; (2) the judgment in the prior action was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction;(3) the prior action was concluded by a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the same claim or cause of action was involved in both actions. Test Masters, 428 F.3d at 571. The fourth element is determined by the transactional test which focuses on whether the two cases are based on "the same nucleus of operative facts . . ....
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