Thomas v. LTV Corp., 93-9112

Citation39 F.3d 611
Decision Date13 December 1994
Docket NumberNo. 93-9112,93-9112
Parties148 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2027, 63 USLW 2395, 129 Lab.Cas. P 11,245 Michael Lee THOMAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LTV CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

Joseph M. House, Dallas, TX, for appellant.

William G. Fowler, Robert E. Sheeder, Brian West Easley, Jenkens & Gilchrist, Denver, TX, for appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, DeMOSS and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges:

BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:

Michael Lee Thomas ("Thomas") appeals the district court's summary judgment in favor of LTV Corporation. The district court concluded that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 141-87, preempted Thomas' various state law claims.

This case primarily involves two issues: (1) whether Thomas' individual attendance probation agreement is treated in the same manner as a collective-bargaining agreement, for purposes of preemption under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 141-87 ("LMRA"); and (2) whether Thomas' claim for wrongful discharge under Tex. Labor Code Sec. 451.001 (formerly Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 8307c) is preempted under the LMRA. Given the facts of this particular case, we answer both questions affirmatively, and we affirm the district court's judgment.

I. Facts

From 1984 to 1991, Thomas was employed by LTV in Dallas, Texas. For most of that time, Thomas was a member of the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local Union 848 ("UAW" or "Union"), which maintained a collective-bargaining agreement ("CBA") with LTV. The CBA contained the terms and conditions of employment for Thomas and other employees similarly situated, and it also contained grievance and arbitration procedures relating to disciplinary actions taken against UAW members and the interpretation and application of the agreement. For the UAW, its members, and LTV, these provisions were binding.

Thomas had a history of absenteeism for which he received written warnings in 1989 and 1990. At a subsequent meeting attended by his union steward, an LTV supervisor, and the LTV labor-relations representative, Thomas was presented with an attendance probation agreement ("APA"). His continued employment was conditioned upon acceptance of the APA, setting forth minimum attendance requirements for one year. Under the APA, Thomas agreed that any unexcused absences would result in his immediate discharge and that his total number of absences could not exceed four percent of his scheduled work days within any three-month period. The APA also provided that if Thomas failed to meet these requirements, he would be discharged without benefit of any grievance or arbitration procedures set forth in the CBA. Thomas, the union steward, and both LTV representatives signed the APA in their respective capacities.

On January 4, 1991, Thomas suffered an on-the-job injury requiring medical treatment. Thomas was unable to work until his physician released him in April 1991. During this time, Thomas applied for and received workers' compensation benefits under LTV's compensation policy. After determining that Thomas' absences during this period exceeded the minimum attendance requirements under the APA, LTV fired Thomas on March 7, 1991.

Thomas filed a grievance through the UAW, contending that his discharge was improper because the absences caused by his work-related injuries should not have been included in calculating whether the four-percent maximum was exceeded. Under the CBA's grievance procedures, applicable when the grievance involves the termination of a union member, other officers of the local and international union participated.

On September 17, 1991, LTV and UAW officials presented Thomas with a second attendance probation agreement which he refused to sign because it waived any right he might have to sue LTV based on the original APA. Thomas made no further efforts to pursue his claim under the terms of the CBA.

II. Procedural History

In December 1992, Thomas sued LTV in Texas state court, alleging: (1) breach of contract; (2) estoppel; (3) intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (4) wrongful discharge under Texas Labor Code Sec. 451.001. Each claim arose from LTV's conduct as it related to the events surrounding Thomas' dismissal in March 1991. LTV removed the case to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, claiming that Thomas' state law claims were preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185.

In July 1993, LTV filed a motion for summary judgment on all of Thomas' claims, arguing that they were preempted by section 301 of the LMRA, that they were barred by a six-month statute of limitations, and that Thomas failed to exhaust the grievance procedures provided for under the CBA. Thomas' response included a motion to remand the claims to state court. He asserted that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and denied that section 301 preempted his claims.

With the exception of Thomas' wrongful discharge claim, the district court dismissed all of Thomas' state tort and contract claims, finding them preempted by section 301 and barred by the LMRA's six-month statute of limitations. The district court initially concluded, however, that Thomas' wrongful discharge claim under Texas Labor Code Sec. 451.001 neither required a construction of the CBA nor implicated rights created by the CBA; therefore, this claim was remanded to state court.

On October 22, 1993, LTV filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment requesting that the district court reconsider its determination that the wrongful discharge claim was not preempted by section 301. LTV argued that section 301 preempted the wrongful discharge claim based on Thomas' deposition testimony that the basis for his wrongful discharge claim was the interpretation and application of the attendance probation agreement. On October 27, 1993, the district court granted LTV's motion and dismissed Thomas' wrongful discharge claim, concluding that this claim was based upon the APA and, therefore, preempted by section 301.

III. Jurisdiction

Thomas asserts that the district court lost jurisdiction to reconsider its order remanding Thomas' wrongful discharge claim to state court. This claim was initially remanded as a matter of discretion under the authority of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367(c), which states in relevant part:

The district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if--

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law;

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction;

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction....

Discretionary remand orders under this provision are neither based upon a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction nor a defect in the removal procedure under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1447(c). More importantly, discretionary remand orders are not subject to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1447(d), which provides An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a case pursuant to section 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.

As opposed to section 1447(d) remand orders, discretionary remand orders are reviewable either by the district court or on appeal. See In re Digicon Marine, Inc., 966 F.2d 158, 160 (5th Cir.1992).

With regard to the district court's ability to reconsider its earlier remand order, the remand order is treated like any other final judgment. Generally, a district court retains jurisdiction until the time for filing an appeal has expired or until a valid notice of appeal is filed. When a timely Rule 59(e) motion has been filed, the district court retains jurisdiction for thirty days after ruling on the motion. Here, LTV's Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider or amend was filed four days after the remand order. The district court granted the motion five days later, clearly within its jurisdiction. See id. at 160-61. The district court retained jurisdiction to vacate its remand order; likewise, this Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal. See In re Shell Oil Co., 932 F.2d 1523, 1528 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 940 F.2d 1532 (5th Cir.1991).

IV. Standard of Review

A district court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Laguarta, 939 F.2d 1231, 1236 (5th Cir.1991); see also Baker v. Farmers Elec. Coop., Inc., 34 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir.1994) (preemption questions are reviewed de novo ). A motion for summary judgment is properly granted when competent evidence establishes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A defendant moving for summary judgment must affirmatively demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning each element of the plaintiff's claims for relief. Id. An issue is "material" if it involves a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). This Court is required to resolve all doubts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant and determine whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Wells v. General Motors Corp., 881 F.2d 166, 169 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 923, 110 S.Ct. 1959, 109 L.Ed.2d 321 (1990).

V. Section 301 Preemption

Thomas contends that the district court erred in concluding that his state law claims were preempted by section 301....

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