Thomas v. McGinnis

• Citation: 609 N.W.2d 222,239 Mich. App. 636
• Decision Date: 19 April 2000
• Docket Number: Docket No. 201840.
• Parties: Willie THOMAS, Jr., Larry Reid, Edward A. Grant, and Emma Perrymon, Personal Representative of the Estate of Phillip Miller, deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Kenneth L. McGINNIS, Defendant-Appellee, and Marjorie Van Ochten, and Richard McKeon, Defendants.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan (US)

609 N.W.2d 222

239 Mich. App. 636

Willie THOMAS, Jr., Larry Reid, Edward A. Grant, and Emma Perrymon, Personal Representative of the Estate of Phillip Miller, deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Kenneth L. McGINNIS, Defendant-Appellee, and Marjorie Van Ochten, and Richard McKeon, Defendants.

Docket No. 201840.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted January 5, 1999, at Detroit.

Decided February 8, 2000, at 9:05 a.m.

Released for Publication April 19, 2000.

Amos E. Williams, P.C. (by Amos E. Williams and Thomas E. Kuhn), Detroit, for the plaintiffs.

Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Chester S. Sugierski, Jr., Lansing, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Before: MARKMAN, P.J., and JANSEN and J.B. SULLIVAN¹, JJ.

JANSEN, J.

Plaintiffs² appeal as of right from the trial court's orders granting defendant Kenneth L. McGinnis' motion for a directed verdict and denying plaintiffs' motions to depose defense counsel and an associate and to call them as witnesses at trial. We affirm.

This case arises out of the Department of Corrections' (DOC) interpretation of M.C.L. § 800.33; MSA 28.1403, which governs prisoners' entitlement to sentence credits, as it relates to Proposal B offenders, M.C.L. § 791.233b; MSA 28.2303(3).³ Plaintiffs, who had been convicted of Proposal B offenses before December 30, 1982, were prisoners under the jurisdiction of the DOC. Defendant McGinnis was the director of the DOC, defendant Richard McKeon was McGinnis' administrative assistant, and defendant Marjorie Van Ochten was the administrator of the DOC's office of policy and hearing.

On November 15, 1993, this Court ruled in Lowe v. Dep't of Corrections (After Remand), an opinion of the Court of Appeals originally designated "for publication" but later withdrawn from publication, issued November 15, 1993 (Docket No. 138095) (Lowe I),⁴ that the DOC's interpretation was incorrect and that

Proposal B offenders incarcerated for crimes committed prior to January 1, 1983, are eligible for traditional good time and special good time credits on their maximum sentence for the period up to December 30, 1982; and, they are eligible for regular and special disciplinary credits on their maximum and minimum terms beginning January 1, 1983. Proposal B offenders are not eligible for any regular or special good time credits on their minimum sentences; nor are they eligible for any regular or special good time credits on their maximum terms after December 30, 1982.

The Attorney General, acting on behalf of the DOC, subsequently moved for rehearing of this Court's decision in Lowe I, arguing that this Court's interpretation of M.C.L. § 800.33(5); MSA 28.1403(5) violated the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. Because of the pending motion for rehearing and the DOC's inability to determine whether the motion stayed the effect of Lowe I, the DOC continued to calculate sentence credits as it had done in the past. Under that interpretation, fourteen prisoners (including the four plaintiffs) had earned sufficient credits to be released, whereas under this Court's interpretation in Lowe I, those prisoners did not have sufficient credits to be released. As a result, the DOC released the fourteen prisoners. Plaintiffs were released between November 1993 and January 1994.

In late January 1994, McGinnis determined that he was obligated to enforce Lowe I, despite the pending motion for rehearing, and, therefore, the released prisoners should be taken back into custody. He so advised the Attorney General's office, which filed ex parte motions in each of the sentencing courts to rescind the discharges and for arrest warrants so that the prisoners could be brought before the court to show cause why they should not be returned to prison to serve the remainder of their sentences. Warrants were obtained on February 7, 1994, and plaintiffs were arrested on February 9 and 10, 1994. The sentencing court that authorized the warrants for plaintiffs Reid and Miller declined to hold a show cause hearing, but another sentencing court, which had authorized the warrant for plaintiff Grant, scheduled a hearing for February 18, 1994.

In the meantime, on February 3, 1994, this Court issued an order granting the motion for rehearing of Lowe I. The order stated that "a revised opinion will be issued in due course if the Court determines that such an opinion is appropriate," but was otherwise silent regarding the effect of the decision in Lowe I pending release of a revised opinion, if any. On February 17, 1994, however, this Court issued another order staying the effect of its decision in Lowe I. Once notified of the order staying the effect of Lowe I, the DOC released the prisoners who had been arrested. Plaintiffs were all released on February 18, 1994.⁵

Plaintiffs later filed this action on May 12, 1995. Plaintiffs alleged claims of abuse of process, false arrest, false imprisonment, denial of due process under the state and federal constitutions, violation of the protection against double jeopardy under the state and federal constitutions, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional interference with economic relations, and liability for damages stemming from plaintiffs' temporary reincarcerations under 42 U.S.C. 1983.⁶ The parties later stipulated the dismissal of the claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and intentional interference with economic relations. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of defendants with regard to the claims of abuse of process, false arrest, and false imprisonment. With regard to defendants Van Ochten and McKeon, all claims against those two defendants were dismissed on the basis of governmental immunity in that plaintiffs' complaint failed to allege that their actions were grossly negligent. MCL 691.1407(2)(c); MSA 3.996(107)(2)(c). Although the trial court specifically allowed plaintiffs to amend the complaint in order to plead with specificity the actions comprising gross negligence so as to avoid governmental immunity, plaintiffs did not amend their complaint in this manner. Thus, all claims against defendants Van Ochten and McKeon were dismissed before trial and they are not parties on appeal.

Before trial, plaintiffs stipulated the dismissal of the constitutional tort claims against defendant McGinnis. The only remaining claim against McGinnis was that alleged under 42 U.S.C. 1983 in McGinnis' individual capacity.⁷ At the close of the proofs, McGinnis moved for a directed verdict on the basis of qualified immunity, and the trial court granted the motion, finding that he was entitled to qualified immunity.

The trial court's ruling with respect to a motion for a directed verdict is reviewed de novo. Meagher v. Wayne State Univ., 222 Mich.App. 700, 708, 565 N.W.2d 401 (1997). In reviewing the trial court's ruling, this Court views the evidence presented up to the time of the motion in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, grants that party every reasonable inference, and resolves any conflict in the evidence in that party's favor to decide whether a question of fact existed. Hatfield v. St. Mary's Medical Center, 211 Mich.App. 321, 325, 535 N.W.2d 272 (1995). A directed verdict is appropriate only when no factual question exists regarding which reasonable minds may differ. Meagher, supra at 708, 565 N.W.2d 401.

The issue of qualified immunity is one of law, Spruytte v. Owens, 190 Mich.App. 127, 132, 475 N.W.2d 382 (1991), and issues of law are reviewed de novo. Forge v. Smith, 458 Mich. 198, 204, 580 N.W.2d 876 (1998).

In an action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, a government official performing discretionary functions is entitled to qualified or good-faith immunity "`insofar as [the official's] conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Guider v. Smith, 431 Mich. 559, 565, 431 N.W.2d 810 (1988), quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Prison officials and officers are among the government officials who may rely on qualified immunity. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561, 98 S.Ct. 855, 55 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978). "For a constitutional right to be clearly established, `the law must be clear in regard to the official's particular actions in the particular situation.'" Walton v. Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331, 1335 (C.A.6, 1993), quoting Long v. Norris, 929 F.2d 1111, 1114 (C.A.6, 1991).

Thus the particular conduct of the official must fall clearly within the area protected by the constitutional right, such that a reasonable official would have known that his or her conduct violated the constitutional right.... This "objective reasonableness" standard focuses on whether defendants reasonably could have thought that their actions were consistent with the rights that plaintiff claims have been violated. [Walton, supra at 1336.]

"[T]o be clearly established, a question must be decided either by the highest state court in the state where the case arose, by a United States Court of Appeals, or by the Supreme Court." Robinson v. Bibb, 840 F.2d 349, 351 (C.A.6, 1988). "In an extraordinary case, it may be possible for the decisions of other courts to clearly establish a principle of law," but such decisions "must both point unmistakably to the unconstitutionality of the conduct complained of and be so clearly foreshadowed by applicable direct authority as to leave no doubt in the mind of a reasonable officer that his conduct, if challenged on constitutional grounds, would be found wanting." Ohio Civil Service Employees Ass'n v. Seiter, 858 F.2d 1171, 1177 (C.A.6, 1988). Immunity is not available if the official knew or should have known that the actions would violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights or if the official acted with the malicious intention to deprive the plaintiff of his...