Thomas v. Merritt

CourtAlabama Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtSHAW, Justice.
CitationThomas v. Merritt, 167 So. 3d 283 (Ala. 2013)
Decision Date06 December 2013
Docket Number1111588,1120264.
PartiesKim THOMAS, Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections, et al. v. Jerry Mack MERRITT and Thomas Layton, Jr. Jerry Mack Merritt v. Kim Thomas, Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections, et al.

Luther Strange, atty. gen., and James W. Davis, asst. atty. gen.; and Albert S. Butler, asst. gen. counsel, Alabama Department of Corrections, for appellants/cross-appellees Kim Thomas, Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections, et al.

Henry L. Penick of H.L. Penick & Associates, P.C., Birmingham, for appellees Jerry Mack Merritt and Thomas Layton, Jr., and cross-appellant Jerry Mack Merritt.

Opinion

SHAW, Justice.

In these consolidated appeals, the Alabama Department of Corrections (“the department”), various officials of the department, and Governor Robert Bentley,1 the defendants below (hereinafter collectively referred to as “DOC”), appeal, in case no. 1111588, from the trial court's determination limiting certain deductions from work-release earnings for inmates. In case no. 1120264, Jerry Mack Merritt, as sole representative of the plaintiff class, cross-appeals, raising numerous challenges to the trial court's final judgment. We dismiss the appeal in case no. 1120264 as untimely filed; in case no. 1111588, we reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

As previously established by this Court in Ex parte Alabama Department of Corrections, 74 So.3d 25 (Ala.2011) (“Ex parte DOC ”), the pertinent factual and procedural history of this matter is as follows:

[The department] appeal[ed] from the trial court's judgment determining that the [department] violated [its] regulations by overcharging work-release inmates for transportation costs and by misinterpreting State law by withholding more money from the gross pay of inmates' work-release earnings than it was authorized to do under State law. Jerry Mack Merritt, Thomas Layton, Johnny Walker, Warren R. Robinson, and Darrell Williams (hereinafter referred to collectively as “the plaintiffs), inmates or former inmates in the custody of the department who participated in a work-release program, cross-appeal from the trial court's judgment determining that [the department] was authorized to charge work-release inmates for certain goods or services and to charge all inmates a fee for self-initiated medical care and a fee for drug testing conducted by entities other than the department.
“ ‘... The department is authorized to operate a work-release program for inmates. Pursuant to that program, inmates are permitted “to leave the confines [of their places of incarceration] unaccompanied by a custodial agent for a prescribed period of time to work at paid employment.” § 14–8–2(a), Ala.Code 1975. Work-release inmates are confined in their respective prisons during the hours they are not at work. § 14–8–2(a). Inmates who are qualified to take part in the program have the option of whether to participate.
“ ‘Since 1992, § 14–8–6, Ala.Code 1975, has authorized the department to withhold up to 40% of an inmate's work-release earnings for costs “incident to the inmate's confinement.” Before 1992, § 14–8–6 provided that the maximum amount of earnings the department was allowed to withhold from an inmate's work-release earnings was 32.5% of those earnings. The record includes a copy of Admin. Reg. No. 410, promulgated by the department, which, in § VII.B., provides that, [a]s authorized by statute, thirty-two and one-half percent (32 ½%) of work releasees' gross earnings will be deducted by the Department of Corrections to assist in defraying the cost of his/her incarceration.” (Emphasis in original.) Richard Allen, the [then] commissioner of the department, testified by deposition that, after § 14–8–6 was amended to allow the department to withhold up to 40% of an inmate's work-release earnings, the department's policy was to withhold up to 40%, rather than up to 32.5%, of an inmate's work-release earnings even though Admin. Reg. No. 410, § VII.B., had not been formally amended. However, that unwritten policy has been ratified by the commissioner. The copy of Admin. Reg. No. 410 submitted into evidence is dated 1997, and it includes a handwritten notation at § VII.B. stating: “Changed to 40%, see 14–8–6.” The balance of a work-release inmate's earnings is deposited into his prison account.
“ ‘Administrative Regulation No. 410 also authorizes the department to charge inmates participating in the work-release program for the cost of transportation to and from their places of employment. Pursuant to Admin. Reg. No. 410, § VII.B., inmates using transportation provided by the department to and from their work-release jobs may be assessed $2 for a one-way trip and $4 for a round trip. At the time of trial, however, inmates were being charged transportation costs of $2.50 for a one-way trip and $5 for a round trip.
“ ‘The department also charges work-release inmates a laundry fee for cleaning the “free-world” clothes they wear to their work-release jobs. There is no charge for laundry services for prison-issued clothing....
“ ‘....
“ ‘The department has promulgated a number of other regulations authorizing certain charges at issue in this case. Pursuant to Admin. Reg. No. 601, the department is authorized to charge an inmate a $3 co-pay for “self-initiated” medical visits. If the visit is initiated by medical staff, a physician referral, the warden, or another prison official, the inmate is not charged the co-pay. The regulation also specifies that under no circumstances would an inmate be denied access to health care because of an inability to pay the co-pay. Allen said that the purpose of the co-pay is to discourage malingering among inmates.
“ ‘Pursuant to Admin. Reg. No. 440, § V.F.3., the department is authorized to charge an inmate the cost of a urine drug test performed by an independent laboratory to confirm a positive test for illegal drugs. At the time of trial, that cost was $31.50. If the results of the independent test were negative for illegal substances, the inmate was not charged the fee. Admin. Reg. No. 440, § V.E.5.
“ ‘After a hearing, the trial court entered a judgment [on July 15, 2009,] approving the practice of charging work-release inmates the co-pay for “self-initiated” medical care, approving the drug-testing fee charged to inmates when a drug test is administered to confirm the results of a previous drug test indicating that the inmate has tested positive for use of an illegal substance, and approving the laundry fee.
“ ‘On the other hand, the trial court found that the department had failed to amend its regulations, as required by the regulations themselves, and that the department's “informal” amendment of the regulations was invalid. Therefore, the trial court held, the department did not have the authority to withhold more than 32.5% of a work-release inmate's earnings to defray the costs of incarceration or to increase the charges an inmate pays for transportation costs from $2 to $2.50 for one-way trips and from $4 to $5 for round trips to the inmate's place of employment. The trial court enjoined the department from withholding 40% of an inmate's work-releaseearnings or from charging inmates more for transportation than the amount stipulated in Admin. Reg. No. 410, § VII.B. However, the trial court stayed its injunction for 180 days to allow the department to formally amend[ ] its regulations to bring them in line with current practices.
“ ‘Because the trial court found that, under the terms of the department's current regulations, the department was allowed to withhold only 32.5% of an inmate's work-release earnings, the issue whether [the department], by charging fees for certain goods and services in addition to withholding funds from an inmate's work-release earnings, was exceeding the 40% cap under § 14–8–6 was moot. However, the court went on to “hold” that, in amending § 14–8–6, the Legislature intended “to place an absolute cap on the monies [the department] could take from inmates: In no event shall the withheld earnings exceed 40% of the earnings of the inmates.’ (emphasis added).” The trial court stated: “Once the 40 percent threshold is reached, [the department] is prohibited by statute from taking any more money, whether it is for costs of confinement, costs of work release, or any other fee or expense.”
“ ‘The trial court further held that § 14–8–6 authorized the department to withhold a percentage of a work-release inmate's earnings “actually deposited in the institution by the employer” and not a percentage of an inmate's gross income. Therefore, the trial court held, the department had misinterpreted the statute when it promulgated Admin. Reg. No. 410, § VII.B., which allows the department to withhold 32.5% of a work-release inmate's gross earnings.
‘The trial court noted that the parties had agreed to resolve liability issues before presenting evidence on damages or class certification. Because the amount of damages relating to the issues of transportation costs and income withholding had yet to be determined, the trial court certified its judgment on the issue of liability as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. DOC appeal[ed]; the plaintiffs cross-appeal[ed].’
[Alabama Dep't of Corr. v. Merritt, ] 74 So.3d [1] at 6–8 [ (Ala.Civ.App.2010) (footnotes omitted) ].
“The Court of Civil Appeals issued an opinion on June 18, 2010; it subsequently withdrew that opinion and issued another opinion on rehearing. The Court of Civil Appeals first addressed the propriety of the Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., certification in light of the fact that the issue of damages had not yet been adjudicated. The Court of Civil Appeals held that the plaintiffs, inmates and former inmates in the custody of the department who participated in a work-release program, cannot recover money damages because the department is
...

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    • May 13, 2016
    ...Therefore, we have no jurisdiction to entertain EB Investments' appeal of the preliminary injunction. See Thomas v. Merritt, 167 So.3d 283, 289–90 (Ala.2013). Therefore, insofar as EB Investments purports to appeal from the preliminary injunction, the appeal is dismissed.C. Pavilion's Appea......
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    ...Ins. Co., 169 So.3d at 1073 (using definitions found in Merriam–Webster's Collegiate Dictionary to interpret statutes); Thomas v. Merritt, 167 So.3d 283, 294 (Ala.2013) (same); Board of Zoning Adjustment of Trussville v. Tacala, Inc., 142 So.3d 624, 632 (Ala.Civ.App.2013) (using definitions......
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    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • January 22, 2016
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